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Abstract:Minimizing the costs that others impose upon oneself and upon those in whom one has a ﬁtness stake, such as kin and allies, is a
key adaptive problem for many organisms. Our ancestors regularly faced such adaptive problems (including homicide, bodily harm, theft,
mate poaching, cuckoldry, reputational damage, sexual aggression, and the inﬂiction of these costs on one’s offspring, mates, coalition
partners, or friends). One solution to this problem is to impose retaliatory costs on an aggressor so that the aggressor and other
observers will lower their estimates of the net beneﬁts to be gained from exploiting the retaliator in the future. We posit that humans
have an evolved cognitive system that implements this strategy – deterrence –which we conceptualize as a revenge system. The revenge
system produces a second adaptive problem: losing downstream gains from the individual on whom retaliatory costs have been imposed.
We posit, consequently, a subsidiary computational system designed to restore particular relationships after cost-imposing interactions by
inhibiting revenge and motivating behaviors that signal benevolence for the harmdoer. The operation of these systems depends on
estimating the risk of future exploitation by the harmdoer and the expected future value of the relationship with the harmdoer. We
review empirical evidence regarding the operation of these systems, discuss the causes of cultural and individual differences in their
outputs, and sketch their computational architecture.
Keywords: adaptationism; aggression; computation; conﬂict; cost/beneﬁt analysis; evolution; evolutionary psychology; forgiveness;
function; punishment; reconciliation; social relationships; revenge; violence; social psychology
1. Introduction
1.1. Is revenge a “Disease”? Is forgiveness a “Cure”?
The desire for revenge is a cause of many forms of aggres-
sion (Carlson & Miller 1988; Richard et al. 2003). It is a
causal factor in 10% to 20% of homicides worldwide
(Carcach 1997; Daly & Wilson 1988; Dooley 2001;
Gaylord & Galligher 1994; Kubrin & Weitzer 2003), 61%
of school shootings (Vossekuil et al. 2002), and 27% of
bombings (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
1999). Moreover, the desire for revenge apparently
makes people ripe for recruitment into terrorist organiz-
ations (Speckhard & Ahkmedova 2006).
Perhaps because the desire for revenge is so closely
linked to violence, it has been fashionable in Western
thought since the Stoic (and, later, Christian) philosophers
to view revenge as immoral, irrational, or both (Jacoby
1983; Murphy 2003; Summerﬁeld 2002). Social scientists
in the past century also promulgated the idea that the
desire for revenge is indicative of psychological dysfunction
(Horney 1948; Murphy 2003; Summerﬁeld 2002). Linking
revenge to mental disorder seems reasonable at ﬁrst glance
because the desire for revenge is a common response to
extreme violence and trauma, and because it is also associ-
ated with post-traumatic stress symptoms (Bayer et al.
2007; Orth et al. 2006; Parkes 1993).
Two decades ago, clinical psychologists and therapists
endorsed (at least tacitly) the “revenge as disease” conceit
as they initiated the psychological study of revenge’s concep-
tual foil – forgiveness. The earliest published professional
articles on forgiveness were descriptions of forgiveness-
based therapeutic techniques for helping people recover
from the effects of traumatic experiences and vengeful feel-
ings on their psychological and relational functioning (e.g.,
Hope 1987; Human Development Study Group 1991;
Marks 1988; Moss 1986; Phillips & Osborne 1989; Pingleton
1989; Ritzman 1987; Worthington & DiBlasio 1990). Liken-
ing revenge to a disease has had a predictable effect on how
forgiveness has come tacitly to be understood: If the desire
for revenge is a disease, then perhaps forgiveness is the cure.
For instance, many of the earliest empirical studies on
forgiveness were related to the use of interventions for
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promoting forgiveness in therapeutic settings (DiBlasio &
Benda 1991; Freedman & Enright 1996; Hebl & Enright
1993; McCullough & Worthington 1995), and much of
the scientiﬁc literature on forgiveness implies that forgive-
ness, as an alternative to revenge, has positive conse-
quences for human health and well-being (Worthington
et al. 2007). The clinical interventions that have emerged
from scholarly interest in the links of forgiveness to
health and well-being are generally effective at promoting
forgiveness – as well as at reducing psychological symptoms
of anxiety and depression and boosting self-esteem (Baskin
& Enright 2004; Lundahl et al. 2008); and revenge is often
linked negatively (and forgiveness positively) to indicators
of physical and mental health (Worthington et al. 2007).
Relatedly, some researchers characterize forgiveness as a
salutary alternative, but one that is also difﬁcult to enact
and easily disrupted by constraints such as poor executive
function (Pronk et al. 2010), temporary depletions of
psychological resources that are necessary for self-control
(Dewall et al. 2007), or symptoms of mental disorder
(Orth et al. 2008).
Such claims do not in themselves, however, license the
view that revenge is best likened to a disease and forgive-
ness to a difﬁcult-to-implement cure. Suppressing cough-
ing, sneezing, and other symptoms might make patients
feel better; however, these might be best thought of as
normal and functional aspects of the body’s defenses
(Nesse & Williams 1994).
1.2. An alternative model: Evolved mechanisms for
revenge and forgiveness
However, other theoretical approaches to understanding
revenge and forgiveness are possible – and, indeed, are
commonly used in the biological sciences. In this article,
we propose that revenge and forgiveness result from
psychological adaptations that became species-typical
because of their ancestral efﬁcacy in solving recurrent
social problems that humans encountered during evolution
(Williams 1966). Revenge and forgiveness, we argue, have
complementary biological functions: We posit that mech-
anisms for revenge are designed to deter harms, and that
forgiveness mechanisms are designed to solve problems
related to the preservation of valuable relationships
despite the prior impositions of harm.
Our goals here are to (a) deﬁne revenge and forgiveness
in functional terms that will make them more amenable to
an adaptationist analysis (Williams 1966); (b) describe the
selection pressures that give rise to systems for revenge
and forgiveness; (c) explain cultural and individual differ-
ences; and (d) outline the proximate causes and the compu-
tations involved when these systems are performing their
evolved functions.
2. Deﬁning revenge
2.1. Non-functional approaches to deﬁning revenge
To appreciate the beneﬁts that might come from concep-
tualizing revenge and forgiveness in functional terms, it is
useful to start by considering some of the deﬁnitions that
have guided previous scholarship on revenge. Govier
(2002), for example, wrote, “When we seek revenge, we
seek satisfaction by attempting to harm the other (or associ-
ated persons) as a retaliatory measure” (p. 2, emphasis in
the original). Elster (1990) likewise deﬁned revenge as
“the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suf-
fering upon those who have made one suffer, because they
have made one suffer” (p. 862). Uniacke (2000) also claims
that “revenge is personal and non-instrumental: with
revenge we seek to make people suffer because they have
made us suffer, not because their actions or values
require us to bring them down” (p. 62). Social psycholo-
gists, too, often use “the intention to see the transgressor
suffer” (Schumann & Ross 2010, p. 1193) as a key deﬁni-
tional element of revenge.
These and other deﬁnitions (e.g., Carlsmith et al. 2008;
Frijda 1994; McCullough et al. 2001; Mocan 2008) all
capture the notion that revenge is harm imposed in response
to some triggering violation or inﬂiction of harm, but these
proximate explanations leave a promissory note for an ulti-
mate explanation that must be paid (Tinbergen 1963).
Why should revenge produce pleasure? “Enjoyment” is
not a complete explanation for behavior, but is rather an
important part of the phenomenon to be explained (West
et al. 2011). Is revenge an adaptation and, if so, what
ﬁtness beneﬁts explain its existence (Andrews et al. 2002;
Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Williams 1966)?
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2.2. Deﬁning revenge functionally
A functional deﬁnition of revenge addresses these issues.
Biologists sometimes deﬁne behavior functionally. For
example, Maynard Smith and Harper (2003) deﬁned a
signal as “any act or structure which alters the behaviour
of other organisms, which evolved because of that effect,
and which is effective because the receiver’s response has
also evolved” (p. 3). Likewise, West et al. (2007) deﬁned
cooperation as “a behaviour which provides a beneﬁt to
another individual (recipient), and which is selected for
because of its beneﬁcial effect on the recipient” (p. 416).
To an evolutionary biologist or evolutionary psychologist,
the function of a behavioral mechanism is the effect that
causes the mechanism that produces that behavior to
evolve (Andrews et al. 2002). By hypothesizing a function,
it becomes possible to search for the behavioral or physio-
logical features that contribute to accomplishing the puta-
tive function (Williams 1966). If the psychological
systems that produce revenge (or any other behavior) do
not show features supporting a hypothesized function, the
hypothesis that a given system serves the hypothesized
function is undermined.
2.2.1. A function for revenge: Changing other individuals’
incentives toward the self. We think revenge solves an
adaptive problem that is faced by many species: how to
change other organisms’ incentives to emit beneﬁts and
to avoid imposing costs upon oneself (Clutton-Brock &
Parker 1995; Daly & Wilson 1988; Tooby & Cosmides
1996). Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that cognitive mechan-
isms for revenge evolved because their behavioral outputs
(i.e., retaliatory impositions of costs or withholdings of
beneﬁts) caused individuals to revise downward the net
returns they expect to receive by engaging in exploitive
behaviors against the vengeful individual in the future,
which in turn (a) deters them from efforts to exploit the
retaliator (Bshary & Grutter 2005) or (b) induces them to
emit beneﬁts for the sake of the retaliator. Cognitive
systems that motivate organisms to provide these sorts of
contingent punishments and rewards (Seymour et al.
2007) may boost their bearers’ lifetime reproductive
ﬁtness (Chagnon 1988; but cf. Beckerman et al. 2009)
and thereby evolve for their ability to change other organ-
isms’ incentives toward the self (Tooby & Cosmides 1996).
Our approach to revenge has an afﬁnity with Sell et al.’s
(2009) recalibrational theory of anger, which claims that
anger is an evolved motivational program designed to
motivate behavior in the angry individual that will cause
the individual at whom the anger is directed to revise
upward the value he or she places on the angry individual’s
welfare.
2.2.2. Welfare tradeoff ratios. To further develop our pro-
posal that revenge is designed to raise individuals’ incen-
tives toward the self, we use Tooby et al.’s (2008)
Welfare Tradeoff Ratio (WTR) concept. Tooby et al.
(2008) conceptualize WTRs as internal regulatory variables,
stored in memory and continually updated, that humans
use to guide social decision making according to appropri-
ate criteria. An individual’s WTR for a target individual
reﬂects how much the bearer values the target’s welfare –
operationally, how large a beneﬁt to the self the bearer
would be willing to take if doing so required imposing a
given cost of upon the target. WTR values of 1:1 indicate
that the actor values the welfare of the target individual
equally to his or her own: The actor would impose a 1-
unit cost upon the target individual if and only if it, in
turn, led to at least a 1-unit beneﬁt for the self. WTRs
less than 1 – say, 1:2 – indicate that the actor values the
target individual’s welfare one-half as much as one’s own,
and therefore, that the actor would willingly impose a
cost of up to 2 units upon the target to obtain one unit of
beneﬁt or more for himself or herself (Petersen et al.
2010; Sell et al. 2009; Tooby et al. 2008). A WTR of 0 indi-
cates that an actor would willingly impose a cost of any size
upon the target to obtain even an inﬁnitesimally small
beneﬁt: such a target’s welfare is completely ignored.
Moreover, individuals will impose costs on enemies even
if doing so is a cost, rather than a beneﬁt, to themselves:
Reﬂecting this reality of social behavior, WTRs can be
negative (Petersen et al. 2010).
WTRs, according to Petersen et al. (2010) and Tooby
et al. (2008), exist in two natural kinds: monitored and
intrinsic. An actor’s monitored WTR for a target individual
expresses the regard an actor should have for the target’s
welfare in light of the social consequences that the actor’s
behavior might trigger if the target (or that individual’s
kin, friends, or allies) were to discover the actor’s behavior
and then attempt to harm or help the actor on the basis of
that information. Monitored WTRs are responsive to
factors that modify a target’s ability to respond retributively
(i.e., with rewarding or punishing), such as physical
strength, coalition size, and access to resources (Petersen
et al. 2010). Monitored WTRs regulate actors’ behaviors
by way of systems that estimate the probability of contin-
gent reprisals and systems that estimate the probability of
contingent rewards from the targets of those behaviors.
In contrast to monitored WTRs, intrinsic WTRs express
the regard that an actor possesses for a target individual’s
welfare solely due to the indirect effects of the actor’s be-
havior toward the target on the actor’s own welfare
(rather than because of the target’s ability to monitor and
impose rewards or sanctions). Intrinsic WTRs are cognitive
representations of the interdependence of the welfare of an
actor and a target irrespective of any retributive responses
that the actor’s behavior might elicit from the target of that
behavior. The claim that people can have different moni-
tored and intrinsic WTRs for the same target individual
explains how it is possible for humans to treat a feared co-
worker with kid gloves in the workplace, but then derogate
the coworker in private. To know whether individual A’s
behavior toward individual B is being guided by A’s moni-
tored WTR toward individual B, one must observe how A’s
regard for B (as revealed through behaviors that inﬂuence
B’s welfare) changes as a function of whether B is able to
learn of A’s welfare-relevant action. This claim can also
explain why humans behave with regard for their chil-
dren’s, mates’, and friends’ welfare even in situations in
which the target individual could not possibly observe the
actor’s behavior.
Surrounding oneself with individuals who have high
monitored WTRs toward the self (if monitoring is feasible)
and high intrinsic WTRs toward the self (under all circum-
stances) is beneﬁcial, as is distancing oneself from individ-
uals who do not. In modern environments, however, many
individuals in relatively close proximity consistently fail to
provide beneﬁts that they plausibly could provide. For
McCullough et al.: Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
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example, people could spontaneously offer strangers the
contents of their wallets, but typically they do not. Gener-
ally, however, such non-deliveries of beneﬁts neither
cause humans to feel entitled to better treatment, nor to
attack those that do not provide such beneﬁts. Instead,
humans form expectations for how other individuals
should treat them based on relationship categories such
as friend, father, mother, ally, stranger, enemy, dominant,
and subordinate. Expectations also take into account
other actors’ behavioral histories, including direct experi-
ence and reputational information, as well as their per-
ceived ability to harm and help (Petersen et al. 2010).
Assuming, then, that humans have computational pro-
cesses for generating baseline WTRs (of both the moni-
tored and intrinsic varieties) for other individuals – and
estimates of those other individuals’ baseline WTRs
toward them –we also posit the existence of cognitive rou-
tines for registering that an actor has treated the self with
less regard (i.e., that an actor has committed an action
that connotes a lower WTR toward the self) than one
would have expected based on one’s previous estimate of
the actor’s WTR toward the self. At issue here is not
simply whether an individual imposed a cost upon
oneself, but whether that cost imposition was permissible
given the victim’s understanding of the harmdoer’s WTR
for the self. Parents, for example, readily abide their chil-
dren’s imposing many costs upon them over the life
course, and few of those costs are met with revenge
because those costs are perceived as permissible given
not only the parents’ high WTRs for their children, but
also the parents’ acceptance of their children’s relatively
low WTRs toward their parents. (Children’s behavior, we
would argue, is adaptively organized by cognitive mechan-
isms that motivate children regularly, and largely with
impunity, to impose all sorts of costs – both large and
small – on their parents. Breastfeeding, begging for food
or attention, and tantrums are examples. Parents tacitly
accept such costs even if they are inconvenient and annoy-
ing.) Understanding a harmdoer’s intentions is important
because accidental harm does not provide information
about the actor’s WTR. Intentional harm, however,
implies that the harm was caused by the harmdoer’s low
WTR for the victim (Petersen et al. 2010; Sell 2011).
2.2.3. Revenge and WTRs. The introduction of the WTR
concept here enables us to put our proposal concisely:
The revenge system, by motivating retaliatory harm, was
selected because it caused other individuals to raise their
WTRs for avengers (see also Petersen et al. 2010; Sell
et al. 2009) so that those individuals would refrain from
imposing costs upon the avengers in the future. Imposing
a large harm on a victim to obtain a small beneﬁt for the
self indicates that the aggressor does not highly regard
the victim’s welfare relative to the aggressor’s own
welfare. Revenge is an effort to compel an aggressor to
increase his or her regard for the victim’s welfare – essen-
tially, to teach the aggressor that imposing costs of the
same size upon the victim in the future (should they be
detected) will be met with retaliatory costs. Again, the
central logic is the logic of deterrence: If an aggressor
learns that the victim will impose large retaliatory costs,
then the aggressor can be made less likely to perform
such acts in the future.
By “regard for the victim’s welfare,” we do not mean that
revenge causes increased feelings of care or concern.
Instead, we are arguing that revenge produces vigilance
about imposing future costs upon the avenger. Thus, we
deﬁne revenge as a targeted imposition of costs or with-
holding of beneﬁts, in response to a cost-inﬂicting (or
beneﬁt withholding) event, that results from a cognitive
system designed (i.e., selected) for deterring other organ-
isms from imposing costs (or inducing other organisms to
confer beneﬁts) upon oneself or other individuals in
whom one has ﬁtness interests.
2.2.4. Other deﬁnitional considerations. Our deﬁnition of
revenge is similar to many evolutionary biologists’ deﬁ-
nition of punishment. Many biologists have been heavily
inﬂuenced by Clutton-Brock and Parker (1995), who
deﬁned punishment as a costly (in the currency of ﬁtness)
imposition of costs (in the currency of ﬁtness) on another
individual that results in delayed beneﬁts (in the currency
of ﬁtness) for the punisher (see also Jensen 2010). Although
our deﬁnition of revenge broadly matches Clutton-Brock
and Parker’s deﬁnition of punishment, we depart slightly
from their approach: Our claim is that the imposition of
costs at a cost is only revenge when it is a response to a
harm-imposition or a beneﬁt-withholding that was caused
by a mechanism designed to deter cost-impositions or
beneﬁt-withholdings in the future. Revenge, by our deﬁ-
nition, therefore differs from other forms of punishment
such as those administered by individuals acting as repre-
sentatives of social institutions (e.g., judges, school princi-
pals), and in the context of precautions or shaping (e.g.,
the adult who scolds a child for swearing, or the behaviorist
who wants her laboratory rats to learn to avoid the ﬁrst left
turn in a maze).
Our attempt here is to model interactions among individ-
uals rather than among groups of individuals. We take no
position on whether the psychology that governs the oper-
ation of revenge systems (and the reconciliation systems we
will discuss later) also evolved to regulate behavior in inter-
group contexts. The computations required to make adap-
tive decisions about revenge (and forgiveness) in the
context of intergroup conﬂict (e.g., see Lickel et al. 2006)
might be different enough from those required to make
adaptive decisions in the context of conﬂicts between indi-
viduals within a single living group as to require a distinct
cognitive architecture (Petersen et al. 2010).
Before continuing, we clarify four points. First, when
one’s kin, friends, allies, mates, or offspring are harmed,
one suffers indirect harm (in the currency of ﬁtness), and
the revenge system should reﬂect this fact (Lieberman &
Linke 2007). Similarly, one can impose retaliatory harm
by imposing costs on a provoker’s kin, friends, allies,
mates, and offspring (Aureli et al. 1992; Engh et al. 2005;
Gould 2000). Our analysis of revenge applies to direct
impositions of cost, as well as indirect costs that accrue
via their effects on one’s kin, mates, and afﬁliates (Aureli
et al. 1992; Bernhard et al. 2006; Hamilton 1964; Shinada
et al. 2004). In the remainder of this article, we do not
always speciﬁcally add these indirect considerations in the
interest of brevity. Second, and related, we intend for
costs to be in the currency of ﬁtness, even though the rel-
evant psychology is not tracking ﬁtness costs per se, but
rather, appropriate proxies (e.g., somatic damage, damage
to one’s property, reputation, social relationships, etc.).
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Third, we include as revenge many behaviors that do not,
as a matter of fact, manage to deter anyone (as when people
behave aggressively toward a driver whom they perceive to
have mistreated them on the road, and with whom they will
never interact again). Because the modern world consists of
many one-shot interactions, in (possible) contrast to ances-
tral human environments (Hagen & Hammerstein 2006),
systems designed to deter do not always implement their
proper functions (Sperber 1994) – that is, the effects for
which they were selected. Evolved mechanisms are not
expected to perform the jobs for which they were naturally
selected with perfect ﬁtness-optimizing performance in
every possible environment (West et al. 2011).
Fourth, harming a provoker is only revenge, we propose,
when the system that motivated the harmful behavior was
designed by selection pressures for deterrence. So, for
instance, avoiding a provoker to avert a second harm is
not revenge (instead, the harm imposed by avoidance, if
any, might be a by-product of a mechanism designed to
reduce the probability of future harm to the self), but
avoiding a provoker for the purpose of limiting his or her
access to a valued resource (i.e., to withhold beneﬁts)
might constitute revenge (Barnes et al. 2009). In sub-
sequent sections, we situate avoidance as a strategy per se
among a larger suite of strategies that includes avenging
the harm, forgiving it, and ignoring it (and perhaps others).
3. A functional model of revenge
3.1. Selection pressures for a revenge system
Clutton-Brock and Parker (1995) noted that retaliation
(which they called “punishment”) is prevalent among non-
human animals (for some examples, see Aureli et al. 1992;
Hoover & Robinson 2007; Jensen et al. 2007; Silk 1992),
and they hypothesized that retaliation produces ﬁtness
gains for a punisher by reducing the probability that the
recipients of punishment will repeat their injurious
actions against the punisher in the future. Likewise, we
hypothesize, following Daly and Wilson (1988), that
humans similarly have mechanisms designed to produce
revenge that evolved because of their effectiveness in
addressing this adaptive problem (see also Fitness & Peter-
son 2008; Petersen et al. 2010; Tooby & Cosmides 2008).
We envision four types of deterrence: (1) direct deter-
rence of cost impositions (i.e., harming the provoker
directly); (2) indirect deterrence of cost impositions (i.e.,
harming someone whose ﬁtness affects the provoker’s
own ﬁtness); (3) direct deterrence of the withholding of
beneﬁts; and (4) indirect deterrence of the withholding of
beneﬁts. Here we describe the ﬁrst three of these, omitting
a discussion of the fourth because of the thinness of the
empirical literature.
3.1.1. Direct deterrence of cost impositions. By direct
deterrence, we mean that revenge discourages an aggressor
(who imposed a cost upon an avenger) from imposing other
costs upon the avenger in the future. The logic here, iden-
tical to the logic underlying deterrence theories of punish-
ment (Bentham 1962), is that if a potential aggressor can
choose whether to take an action that imposes costs on a
potential victim to acquire some beneﬁt, then the potential
victim is better off if he or she changes the potential
aggressor’s incentives so that the expected value of the
cost-imposing action for the potential aggressor is lowered.
Revenge transforms expected value in this fashion by
causing an aggressor to learn that the retaliatory inﬂiction
of ﬁtness costs in the future is likely to exceed (or, at least,
substantially reduce) the potential beneﬁts to be gained by
harming the potential victim.
To work as a deterrent, however, avengers must act in
such a way that the aggressors update their expectations
of the avenger’s future behavior (and, in so doing, revise
their monitored WTR toward the avenger, with the conse-
quence that the harmdoer becomes more vigilant in avoid-
ing imposing costs upon the avenger in the future). If an
aggressor imposes a cost of 1 on a victim to obtain a
beneﬁt of 2, and the victim proceeds to impose a retaliatory
cost greater than 2, this retaliatory response only acts as a
deterrent if the aggressors updates his or her represen-
tation of future options to reﬂect the possibility that the
victim will again impose (similarly sufﬁciently large) offset-
ting costs upon the aggressor in the future. Effective updat-
ing, of course, requires an array of computational steps:
The target of revenge must, among other things, (a) store
an internal regulatory variable (Tooby et al. 2008) that rep-
resents his or her level of regard for the avenger’s welfare
(this is Tooby et al.’s [2008] monitored welfare tradeoff
ratio), (b) represent the magnitude of the costs and
beneﬁts, (c) represent the causal relationship between the
initial aggressive act and the retaliatory act, and crucially,
(d) infer that retaliation at one time point is diagnostic of
how the avenger is likely to behave in similar future situ-
ations. As Petersen et al. (2010) point out, targets of
revenge must also be able to make generalizations about
the ranges of behaviors toward the avenger that are likely
to be met with vengeance in the future.
The logic of revenge gives rise to strategic complications.
For example, though revenge at time 1 might predict
revenge at time 2, nothing forces this to be true. An organ-
ism could be, for example, intermittently vengeful. This
leads to well-known problems associated with inducing
others to learn that one’s vengeful dispositions are stable
over time (Frank 1988; Hirshleifer 1987). This idea is of
interest in the ﬁeld of international relations because
nations must signal their willingness to take revenge, even
during the end game of an armed conﬂict, if they wish to
deter conﬂict in the ﬁrst place (Schelling 1960).
Experimental evidence in support of the proposition that
revenge is well-suited to deterring the imposition of costs
comes from studies of human behavior in economic
games such as the sequential and iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (Axelrod 1980; 1984). This literature is too
large to summarize exhaustively, but several stylized ﬁnd-
ings are worth considering. In the sequential Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game there is one round of play, but the
second mover chooses only after seeing the ﬁrst player’s
choice. In such games, the second player is much more
likely to cooperate after a cooperative move than after a
defecting move. More relevant to our present point, defec-
tion is almost always met with retaliatory defection (see
Table 6 in Clark & Sefton 2001; cf. Hayashi et al. 1999).
In the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, subjects play mul-
tiple rounds of the simultaneous move game with either
the same partner or different ones. For the present
purpose, key issues are whether people respond to defec-
tion with defection –moves plausibly interpretable as
revenge (though clearly open to other interpretations,
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such as loss prevention) – and whether such moves elicit
subsequent cooperation from one’s partner. Experiments
using large numbers of trials in Prisoner’s Dilemma
Games suggest that people do respond to defection with
defection (Bixenstine & Wilson 1963) though the details
vary across studies (Rapoport & Chammah 1965). Recipro-
cal strategies such as tit-for-tat tend to elicit cooperation
(e.g., Axelrod 1984; W. Wilson 1971), hinting at the effec-
tiveness of meeting defection with defection for eliciting
subsequent cooperation (Gardner & West 2004).
Moreover, in an analysis of data from 5 different labora-
tory studies of dyadic negotiation in which partners played
250 consecutive trials in which they could either punish,
reward, or withhold reward (and punishment) from each
other, Molm (1997, see especially pp. 126–34) found that
the frequency with which actors used retaliatory punishment
(i.e., after one’s negotiation partner had punished the actor
in a previous move) was positively associated with the fre-
quency with which they rewarded each other. Further, the
partner of each dyad who used contingent punishment
more frequently in response to his or her partner’s previous
cost imposition was the partner who received more beneﬁt
from it. In contrast, the frequency with which dyads pun-
ished non-contingently (that is, independently of whether
the punishment was a retaliatory response to punishment
or the withholding of beneﬁts) was associated with lower
rates of rewarding: It is only when punishment is contingent
on previous punishment (or the withholding of beneﬁts, as
we elaborate in section 2.2.3) that it promotes cooperation.
In some situations, one can beneﬁt from revenge’s efﬁ-
cacy as a deterrent simply by advertising one’s ability to
retaliate; it is not always necessary to do so. The difference
in how people play the Dictator Game, as opposed to the
Ultimatum Game (Güth et al. 1982), illustrates this point.
In both games, some amount of money, say $10, is to be
divided between two people. In the Dictator Game, one
person unilaterally decides how to split the money. In the
Ultimatum Game, one person – the Proposer – proposes a
split, and the other person – the Responder – can either
accept the proposal or reject it, in which case both
players receive nothing. When the Responder rejects the
Proposer’s offer, then, the Responder is penalizing the Pro-
poser by the amount that the Proposer set aside for himself
or herself, but to impose this penalty, the Responder also
pays a price: the amount that the Proposer had allocated
to the Responder.
Unsurprisingly, typical proposals in the Ultimatum
Game, in which punishment is possible, are larger
(roughly 40% of the stake; Oosterbeek et al. 2004) than
they are in the Dictator Game (roughly 28%; Engel, in
press), in which punishment is not possible. Along similar
lines, Andreoni et al. (2003) compared the results of a Dic-
tator Game to those of three other games in which the
Responders could either (a) punish, (b) reward, or (c)
both punish and reward. In the punishment condition,
the second player could pay one unit to impose a ﬁve-
unit cost upon the ﬁrst player. Under such conditions,
players specify larger transfers to the second player,
though transfers are still higher when the second player
has access to (using the authors’ metaphor) both a carrot
(i.e., increasing the ﬁrst player’s payoff) and a stick (i.e.,
the capacity to inﬂict retaliatory costs).
The Trust Game (Berg et al. 1995) shows a similar deter-
rent effect for the ability to punish. In the Trust Game,
Player 1 – also sometimes called the “investor” – starts
with an endowment of money and is given the opportunity
to transfer some of it to Player 2, also known as the
“trustee.” Transferred money is multiplied (often tripled),
and the trustee can then return some, none, or all if it
back to the investor. Money sent by the investor is com-
monly interpreted as trust, and money returned is com-
monly interpreted as trustworthy behavior on the part of
the trustee. Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009) used a game
like the trust game in which the investors had only a
binary choice – trust or not trust – and the trustees had
only 3 choices – low, medium, and high levels of trust-
worthiness. When punishment is added to this game (by
allowing investors and trustees alike to punish their part-
ners, subject to certain conditions), investors are more
likely to make the trusting choice, and trustees on
average return more money back to investors. Here, the
possibility of punishment changes behavior in the desired
way: it increases trusting and trustworthy behavior. Fehr
and List (2004) reported similar results with students and
CEOs.
At least one laboratory experiment also shows how the
risk of retaliation deters aggressors from harming the pro-
spective avenger. Diamond (1977) had undergraduate
men write an essay that a confederate proceeded to
harshly criticize. Participants came back to the laboratory
24 hours later and were given the opportunity to give ten
(bogus) shocks of varying intensities to the person who
wrote the insulting reviews. Half were led to believe that
after they administered shocks, they would then switch
roles and receive shocks themselves. People who believed
that they could harm the insulting evaluators without the
threat of retaliation gave stronger shocks to the evaluators.
Thus, the fear of retaliation deterred aggression. More gen-
erally, the possibility of retaliation has been used to explain
why defections within cooperative systems (e.g., the
relationships between cleaners and clients in cleaner-
client mutualisms), and thus, punishment as well, is rare
in many cooperative animal systems (Cant 2011).
3.1.2. Indirect deterrence of cost impositions. Psycho-
logical mechanisms for revenge might be designed to
deter would-be aggressors, including those who have not
yet exploited the avenger. The logic behind deterring
third parties is parallel to that of deterring second parties.
If a third party must decide whether to impose a cost on
an individual, the prospective victim can change the third
party’s incentives if he or she previously demonstrated
that when a previous provocateur took a similar course of
action, he or she inﬂicted costs upon that provocateur. To
the extent that the third party believes that his or her pro-
spective victim will be consistent in his/her propensity for
revenge – an important limitation – the third party will
alter his or her choices accordingly. In other words, by
knowing that an individual is prone to avenging costs that
others have imposed upon him or her, third parties will
learn to treat the avenger with greater care, and with less
willingness to extract costs from the avenger, in the
future (dos Santos et al. 2011).
The computational demands here are non-trivial. For
revenge to induce learning in third parties, third parties
must be able to categorize actions adequately to determine
whether the aggressive acts they are contemplating against
a prospective victim are sufﬁciently similar to previous
McCullough et al.: Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
6 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2012) 36:1
aggressors’ actions against the prospective victim to draw
the prospective victim’s retaliation. Third parties must
also be able to track the causal structure of their prospec-
tive victims’ vengeful acts. Finally, third parties must be
able to compute, for any range of beneﬁts to be extracted
from prospective victims, the retaliatory costs those pro-
spective victims are likely to subsequently impose.
Despite the computationally intensive nature of third-
party deterrence, it is plausible that revenge functions to
deter both potential repeat offenders and would-be ﬁrst-
time offenders in a way that parallels the legal distinction
between special deterrence (directed at recidivism of a
criminal offender, in particular) and general deterrence
(directed at other possible violators). Psychological
revenge systems can do double duty in the same way that
criminal justice systems do.
Reputation, then, might play an important role in third-
party deterrence (dos Santos et al. 2011). To the extent that
ancestral humans lived in small, close-knit groups (Boehm
2008) without police, courts, and prisons for protecting
individual rights, a readiness to retaliate might have been
an important component of people’s reputations that
would not only beneﬁt them within a single living group,
but, more importantly, as they transferred from one small
living group to another (Marlowe et al. 2011). Researchers
have documented the importance of defense of honor, and
the revenge that it stimulates, as a major cause of violence
among people from many societies, including Mediterra-
nean herding societies (Black-Michaud 1975), tribal Mon-
tenegro (Boehm 1987), urban white males in the
Southern United States (Cohen et al. 1996; Nisbett &
Cohen 1996), and disadvantaged urban African-Americans
(Anderson 1999). A longitudinal study of roughly 900 ado-
lescent boys also revealed that boys who endorsed street-
code beliefs (e.g., that violence is an appropriate response
to insults and violations of honor) went on one year later
to engage in more violence, including greater participation
in gang ﬁghts and attacks in which their goal was to
seriously injure or kill someone (Brezina et al. 2004).
Laboratory research supports the notion that the psycho-
logical mechanisms that cause revenge are sensitive to the
presence of third parties, which is consistent with the idea
that revenge is enacted partly out of reputational concerns.
Victims retaliate more when an audience has witnessed the
provocation – especially if the audience communicates to
the victim that he or she looks weak because of the harm
suffered, or if the victim knows that the audience is
aware that he or she has suffered particularly unjust treat-
ment (B. R. Brown 1968; Kim et al. 1998). Moreover, when
two men have an argument on the street, the presence of a
third person doubles the likelihood that the encounter will
escalate from a verbal altercation to one that involves vio-
lence (Felson 1982). Not all studies, however, ﬁnd that
the presence of observers increases victims’ likelihood of
punishing (e.g., Bolton & Zwick 1995).
3.1.3. Direct deterrence of the withholding of beneﬁts. The
logic of revenge applies as much to changing others’ incen-
tives to deliver beneﬁts to the self as to simply refraining
from imposing costs on the self: From the standpoint of
natural selection, there is no principled difference
between the two, even if it turns out to be the case that cog-
nitive systems that track the delivery and omissions of
desired or anticipated beneﬁts are distinct from systems
that track the imposition of costs. Obtaining beneﬁts and
avoiding costs are functionally identical (although registering
the omission of beneﬁts requires certain computations that
registering the imposition of harms might not; see sect. 5.1).
In a study described in section 3.1.1 above, Molm (1997,
pp. 126–34) found that the frequency with which actors
used punishment in response to a partner’s previous with-
holding of rewards was positively associated with the rate at
which partners rewarded each other over the series of
trials. In other words, a willingness to punish one’s inter-
action partner in response to his or her withholding of
beneﬁts increased the partner’s delivery of beneﬁts.
Public Goods Games also illustrate how revenge can
deter the withholding of beneﬁts. In these games, a few
(e.g., 4–6) participants receive initial endowments of
money that they each can divide between two pools. One
pool is private; only the subject beneﬁts from money kept
in his or her own pool. The other pool is shared; money
placed in this pool is multiplied by a number greater than
1 and the product is then divided evenly among all group
members. Money maximizers keep everything in their
private pools; aggregate group wealth is maximized when
everyone contributes their entire earnings to the public
pool. These games are social dilemmas (Kollock 1998;
Ostrom 1990) because they create a tension between indi-
vidual and group outcomes and provide an assay of
cooperation (for reviews, see Camerer 2003; Ledyard
1995). Several Public Goods Game experiments are par-
ticularly important to review here because they add an
important dose of realism: The avenger must pay a cost
for the opportunity to punish (Clutton-Brock & Parker
1995; Jensen 2010).
Yamagishi (1986) had subjects play 12 rounds of a Public
Goods Game in 4-person groups. He varied whether par-
ticipants could punish other members of the group, and
varied the cost to reduce another player’s payoff by one
unit. Players used the system for administering punishment
when the opportunity to punish was made available to
them. When it was available, players contributed greater
amounts to the public good (see also, Carpenter & Mat-
thews 2004; Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi 1988). These
results imply that punishment reduces the withholding of
beneﬁts in these games.
From this and subsequent work, we can draw some ten-
tative conclusions. Punishment seems to be particularly
effective in eliciting contributions when (a) the punishing
technology makes the cost of punishment relatively low in
comparison to the cost imposed on the individual being
punished (Egas & Riedl 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann
2008); (b) there are many repeated interactions (Egas &
Riedl 2008; Gürerk et al. 2006; Walker & Halloran 2004);
(c) people can communicate their intentions regarding
investment levels and the use of punishment (Ostrom
et al. 1992); and (d) people make choices about their pre-
ferred group partners on the basis of those prospective
group members’ contributions on previous rounds of play
(Page et al. 2005), or can migrate into or out of groups
that have the capacity to punish (Gürerk et al. 2006).
When a participant in such experiments punishes a
group member who has withheld contributions to the
public good, such punishment behavior could be caused
by revenge systems, but it could arguably result from
other systems – for example, one designed to produce
behaviors that induce the targeted individual to emit
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beneﬁts for other people in the future, or one designed for
the enforcement of social norms (Clavien & Klein 2010).
Fehr and Gächter (2002) ran an experiment in which
players changed groups after every round so that punish-
ment could not be used strategically to induce group
members who were uncooperative in round r to cooperate
with the punisher in round r + 1. Even with this methodo-
logical alteration, Fehr and Gächter (2002) obtained similar
results as in Public Goods Game experiments in which par-
ticipants played with the same partners in each game, or
with individuals with whom they might be randomly
paired in successive rounds (Fehr & Gächter 2000). Partici-
pants punished uncooperative group members, and group
members cooperated more when the option of punishing
was available to the group (see also Anderson & Putterman
2006). Fehr and Gächter (2002) interpreted these results as
evidence for altruism rather than for revenge because pun-
ishers could not use punishment to help themselves
directly: All players were regrouped after each round of
play. We would argue, however, that a revenge interpret-
ation of Fehr and Gächter’s (2002) results is plausible
(Clavien & Klein 2010; Kurzban & DeScioli, submitted).
First, Fehr and Gächter (2002) describe subsidiary results
based on participants’ self-reported responses to hypotheti-
cal scenarios (see also Fehr & Fischbacher 2004) to make a
case that third parties’ anger (and other group members’
fear of those third parties’ anger) shapes cooperation and
punishment decisions in Public Goods and Third-Party
Punishment games. However, these data are consistent
with a revenge interpretation also because anger is a
common response to personal exploitation (Fessler 2010;
Sell 2011; Sell et al. 2009; Srivastava et al. 2009). That is,
we believe that anger is the motivational system that
brings about revenge, though here it is not discharging its
proper function (Sperber 1994): Our view is that punish-
ment in the Public Goods Game is caused by a proximate
psychology designed for deterrence of personal harms in
a world in which interactions were generally repeated
with a relatively small number of interactants (e.g.,
Hagen & Hammerstein 2006).
Moreover, other research traditions have associated
empathy for victims, rather than anger toward perpetrators,
as the proximate emotional cause of action whose goal is to
deliver beneﬁts to others (Batson 2011). Indeed, some work
from this latter tradition suggests that individuals do not natu-
rally become angry upon observing the mistreatment of one
stranger by another stranger unless empathy for the victim
was experimentally manipulated beforehand (Batson et al.
2007). Further, Shinada et al. (2004) found that (a) self-
reported anger toward low contributors, and (b) judgments
of the unfairness of low contributors’ behavior are correlated
with the extent to which one punishes low contributors within
one’s own groups, but they are not correlated with the extent
to which one punishes low contributors in other people’s
groups. According to these latter experiments, anger evi-
dently makes people punish individuals who have harmed
them directly or who have disrupted cooperation in their
groups, but in some circumstances, might not naturally motiv-
ate third-party punishment in response to witnessing
someone receiving unfair treatment from a third party.
Fehr and Gächter (2002) construe their results as altru-
ism (as opposed to revenge) because of the increase in con-
tributions that punishment elicits from previously low
contributors. They articulate the sense in which they
mean that punishment is altruistic, writing that punishment
“may well beneﬁt the future group members of a punished
subject, if that subject responds to the punishment by
raising investments in the following periods. In this sense,
punishment is altruistic” (p. 137, emphasis added). So, if
punishment is being used in this sense, then punishment
ought to decline as participants approach the end of the
experiment, after which no one will engage in any more
rounds of investment, and in one-shot games. This is con-
tradicted by multiple studies (Anderson & Putterman
2006, see Footnote 8; Carpenter & Matthews 2004; Fehr
& Gächter 2002; Page et al. 2005).
Our view doesn’t commit to revenge instrumentally ben-
eﬁting the vengeful individual in all instances. We take harm
(or withholding of beneﬁts) to be the eliciting factor, anger to
be the proximate motivating system (Sell et al. 2009), and
imposition of costs to be the behavioral output. So, although
our view does commit to what will elicit revenge, the associ-
ated emotion of anger, and the behavioral output, we are not
committed to the view that revenge will be absent when
there is no chance of repeat interaction or that it will
implement its proper function (e.g., Hagen & Hammerstein
2006; West et al. 2011). This argument could, of course, be
applied equally if one were to argue that third-party punish-
ment psychology (i.e., altruistic punishment) were also
“misﬁring” because it was designed for a world of repeat
interactions (Anderson & Putterman 2006, see Footnote 8;
Carpenter & Matthews 2004; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Page
et al. 2005). Because of the way that payoffs are structured
in Public Goods Games with punishment, revenge can gen-
erate beneﬁts for others as a side effect (as in Fehr &Gächter
2002). The fact that some people beneﬁt as a side effect of
revenge should not necessarily cause one to infer that
revenge systems are designed for altruism (Burnham &
Johnson 2005; Kurzban & DeScioli, submitted; Price et al.
2002; West et al. 2011).
Some studies do show that some third parties punish
individuals who fail to provide beneﬁts to others even
when those third-party punishers themselves have not
been harmed, which suggests caution regarding a revenge
interpretation. For example, Carpenter and Matthews
(2012) ran a one-shot Public Goods Game and varied
whether participants could punish members of their own
groups (which could potentially inﬂuence the punishers’
outcomes) or members of other people’s groups (where
the punishers’ own welfare would be unaffected). In the
key treatment, the “one-way TPP” (third-party punish-
ment) condition (in which participants could punish indi-
viduals within their own groups and in other people’s
groups, but could not be punished by the individuals in
other groups), they found that 90% of subjects did not
punish outside their group (p. 12). The average amount
participants used to punish third parties was roughly ten
cents, and these same participants used approximately
seven times as much money to punish low contributors
within their own groups. Moreover, in a condition in
which participants could only punish contributors within
their own groups, the total expenditure for punishment
was ten times as high as the expenditure for third-party
punishment in the one-way TPP treatment.
Also, Carpenter and Matthews (2009) found in a
repeated game that second-party punishment and third-
party punishment did not differ greatly in magnitude.
Further, some evidence indicates that people do engage
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in third-party punishment in games other than Public
Goods Games (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004), though the
expenditures for third-party punishment are, as in Carpen-
ter and Matthews (2012), lower than for second-party pun-
ishment. Nevertheless, in such games, the amounts of
punishment that third parties mete out toward uncoopera-
tive or ungenerous individuals is not strong enough to deter
individuals from withholding beneﬁts from others, whereas
second-party punishment is (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004). In
any case, third-party punishment systems might or might
not be designed to incentivize the targets of such punish-
ment to beneﬁt others in the future (DeScioli & Kurzban
2009b); for example, advertising one’s willingness to
engage in third-party punishment appears to produce repu-
tational advantages (Barclay 2006; Nelissen 2008), which
might suggest an alternative function (Yamagishi et al. 2009).
3.2. Cross-cultural commonalities and variability in the
revenge system’s operation
3.2.1. Cross cultural universality in the operation of the
revenge system. Cross-cultural research suggests that
revenge is a universal response (Brown 1991) to the impo-
sition of costs – especially in the extreme case, the homicide
of a kinsman. Ericksen and Horton (1992) found that 90%
of the 186 societies in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample
(SCCS) showed clear evidence that blood feuds or individ-
ual self-redress were either actively used or formally out-
lawed in favor of formal adjudication procedures (the
latter implying that revenge must have historically been a
problem) “if a consanguineal kin group member is killed,
injured, or insulted by a member of another kin group”
(p. 60). For 18 of the 186 societies in the SCCS –most of
the remaining 10% – data for making such a determination
were either missing or conﬂicting. Relatedly, Daly and
Wilson (1988) concluded that 57 (95%) of the 60 societies
in the Human Relations Area Files probability sample had
“some reference to blood feud or capital punishment as an
institutionalized practice, or speciﬁc accounts of particular
cases, or at the least, the articulate expression of the desire
for blood revenge” (p. 226, italics in original).
More recently, Boehm (2008) reported results from an
ethnographic survey of data for 10 “Pleistocene-appropri-
ate” societies (i.e., economically independent pure
hunter-gatherers that do not live in permanent year-
round settlements). Boehm concluded that punishments
of various types in response to prior harms were wide-
spread, including public and private gossip about a violator
(100% each); and physical punishment (90%).
A ﬁnal line of cross-cultural evidence supporting the uni-
versality of revenge comes from Henrich et al.’s (2006)
study of the Ultimatum Game in 15 small-scale societies
(including two groups from North America, three groups
from South America, six groups from Africa, a group
from Asia, and three groups from Oceania) that differed
in language, climate, and economic base. In all 15 societies,
as proposers’ offers tilted away from a 50/50 split in the pro-
posers’ favor, the recipients in all 15 societies became more
likely to reject those offers. As Henrich et al. (2006) wrote,
“In every population, less-equal offers were punished more
frequently” (p. 1770). Taken together, the results from
Ericksen and Horton (1992), Daly and Wilson (1988),
Boehm (2008), and Henrich et al. (2006) suggest that
revenge is widespread cross-culturally, if not indeed univer-
sal (Brown 1991).
3.2.2. Cross-cultural variation in the operation of the
revenge system. Nevertheless, there is substantial cross-
cultural and temporal variation in the overall amounts
and forms of revenge. Across societies, the percentages of
homicides attributable to revenge (for instance) range
from as low as 8% to as high as 45% (e.g., Cardona et al.
2005; Daly & Wilson 1988; Gaylord & Galligher 1994;
Kubrin & Weitzer 2003). If revenge is for deterrence, it
might be more prevalent in cultural ecologies in which
there are few or no institutions (police, courts) that deter
interpersonal aggression and other forms of harm. (We
note that we take the question of why and how these insti-
tutions emerge to be a separate issue.)
Ericksen and Horton (1992) coded 186 societies in the
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample to determine which of
three approaches was favored for settling grievances
when a member of one’s own kin group is killed, injured,
or insulted by a member of another group: (a) kin group
feuding (i.e., classic blood feuding), (b) individual self-
redress (individuals avenging their grievances on their
own), and (c) formal adjudication. They found that individ-
ual revenge was the primary means of redress in traditional
foraging societies. When people organize into tribes –
especially tribal societies that emphasize manly honor
(e.g., Boehm 1987) – kin groups take up relatives’ grie-
vances. Second, kin feuding evidently gives way to formal
adjudication as external political forces implement the
rule of law. Third, revenge by individuals or extended kin
groups is replaced by formal adjudication in societies with
favorable resource bases and vertical inheritance – that is,
societies in which individuals would stand to beneﬁt from
the social stability that comes from replacing revenge
with other means of sanctioning. In brief, then, these ﬁnd-
ings suggest that when institutions arise to administer third-
party punishment, individual acts of revenge are crowded
out. (One could equally conceptualize this as institutions
raising the price of revenge, thereby reducing the
demand for it.)
Anderson (1999) has suggested that concentrated neigh-
borhood disadvantage (e.g., low socioeconomic status
[SES] and median family income) precipitates a wide-
spread lack of trust in formal legal methods for settling
differences, and instead encourages the adoption of a
“code of the street” that prescribes the use of personal
revenge, rather than appeals to law enforcement auth-
orities for settling one’s interpersonal grievances (Brezina
et al. 2004). Research on contemporary geographic distri-
butions of revenge homicides supports this view. Kubrin
and Weitzer (2003) found that concentrated neighborhood
disadvantage was an excellent predictor of retaliatory homi-
cide (i.e., homicides motivated by a desire for revenge in
response to a previous perceived slight or injury): Indeed,
the census tracts in St. Louis, MO, with high levels of
poverty, high unemployment rates, and high percentages
of children not living with both parents also had the
highest rates of retaliatory homicide. Conversely, in
census tracts with very low concentrated neighborhood dis-
advantage, retaliatory homicide was negligible. (These data
leave open the possibility that violence, generally, is more
common in such environments, as opposed to revenge, nar-
rowly, being more common.) This insight is echoed in many
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other ethnographic studies that ﬁnd that revenge is more
frequently used in societies in which social institutions for
settling grievances are generally viewed as weak, and in
which individuals are socialized to defend their honor
with retaliatory violence at even the most trivial of interper-
sonal slights (Black-Michaud 1975; Boehm 1987; Nisbett &
Cohen 1996).
3.3. Individual differences in the operation of the revenge
system
There are individual differences in (a) the stated desire for
revenge after being harmed (Singer et al. 2006); (b) the
strength of the pattern of neural activation that correlates
highly with the stated desire for revenge (Singer et al.
2006); and (c) the strength of retaliatory behavioral
responses (Eisenberger et al. 2004). For example, women
have moderately lower self-reported tendencies to seek
revenge after being harmed than do men (Miller et al.
2008), and are less aggressive in response to provocation
than are men (for an extensive review, see Bettencourt &
Miller 1996). Given the marginal effectiveness of physical
violence on the part of women compared to men, this is
not surprising (Archer 2009; Sell et al. 2009).
Research in behavior genetics suggests that roughly 30–
40% of the variance in individual differences in people’s
(self-reported) propensities to seek revenge results from
additive genetic effects (Eaves et al. 2008). Shared environ-
mental inﬂuences account for relatively little (i.e., approxi-
mately 15%) of the variance (Eaves et al. 2008). The
remaining variance (45–70%) is attributable to non-
shared environment, non-additive genetic effects, gene–
environment interactions, and measurement error. Our
claim that there is a species-typical, evolved mechanism
for revenge is not, of course, undermined by evidence of
substantial individual differences (Buss 2009; Tooby &
Cosmides 1990a). Indeed, if revenge is a system for deter-
rence, then the system should be sensitive to characteristics
of the would-be avenger that would render revenge more
or less effective as a deterrent for that individual.
Revenge (in particular, imposing physical harm on others)
does not return equal beneﬁts, or exact equal production
costs, across all individuals (Sell et al. 2009). For those indi-
viduals for whom the costs are too high and the beneﬁts too
low, alternatives to revenge should be preferred. More gen-
erally, it is likely the case that the operation of species-
typical psychological mechanisms is inﬂuenced by the
other characteristics of the individual in which those mech-
anisms reside (or, as considered in sect. 3.2.2, the environ-
ments of the individuals in which those mechanisms
reside). Applying this reasoning to what is currently
known about the correlates of individual differences and
their genetic and environmental substrates helps clarify
the literature on individual differences in revenge.
3.3.1. Genetic sources of individual differences. Efforts
to isolate genetic markers associated with individual differ-
ences in revenge have begun (McDermott et al. 2009),
although the source of variation (e.g., random, unselected
noise, frequency dependent selection for individual differ-
ences in vengefulness; environmental heterogeneity in
ﬁtness optima; see Buss 2009) remains unknown. One
possibility is that these genetic individual differences can
be thought of as contingent shifts in social strategy as a
function of other heritable phenotypic characteristics – a
phenomenon that Tooby and Cosmides (1990a) called
reactive heritability.
Suppose the costs of revenge are higher, on average, for
people with low upper body strength or body size – traits
that are highly heritable (Carmichael & McGue 1995; Sil-
ventoinen et al. 2008) – because the vengeful efforts of
weak individuals are more likely to be answered with
counter-revenge (Sell et al. 2009). The same logic explains
why men with greater body weight and height (both of
which are indicative of physical formidability) are more
likely to be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder
(Ishikawa et al. 2001), why large football players are per-
ceived as more aggressive, less friendly, and less coopera-
tive than are smaller players (Koenig & Ketelaar 2006),
and why men’s physical strength is positively associated
with their aggressiveness, anger-proneness, their histories
of ﬁghting and success in conﬂict, and their beliefs about
the utility of personal aggression (Gallup et al. 2007; Sell
et al. 2009). If this supposition is correct, then statistically
equating men on physical strength should substantially
reduce the contribution of additive genetic factors to indi-
vidual differences in the propensity for revenge.
The same logic builds a causal bridge between the fact
that 99.9% of women have less upper body strength than
does the average man (Lassek & Gaulin 2009) and the
facts that (a) women are nearly a standard deviation less
vengeful than men are (Archer 2009; Miller et al. 2008);
(b) women are half a standard deviation less physically
aggressive than men are, despite being no less anger-
prone than men are (Archer 2004); and (c) sex differences
in provoked aggression are strongest in experimental situ-
ations in which females are at greater risk than males of
becoming the targets of counter-aggression (Bettencourt
& Miller 1996). For women, the costs of revenge may
best be lowered not through taking revenge via their own
physical strength, but through either (a) indirect aggression
such as reputational damage (Hess & Hagen 2006), or, as
Sell et al. (2009) suggest, (b) recruiting coalitional
support from others who can effect revenge on their
behalf and (with their physical strength) deter counter-
retaliation.
Phenotypic factors associated with women’s success in
recruiting male coalitional support might include factors
such as physical attractiveness or waist-hip ratio that
relate to mate value – some of which are highly heritable
in women (Olson et al. 2001; Zillikens et al. 2008).
Indeed, Sell et al.’s (2009) ﬁndings that women’s physical
attractiveness, but not physical strength, predicts their
anger-proneness, beliefs about the utility of personal
aggression, sense of entitlement, and self-reported history
of success in resolving interpersonal conﬂicts in their own
favor suggests that women’s ability to leverage male coali-
tional support lowers the costs of revenge for women.
If this explanation is correct, then heritable individual
differences in women’s vengefulness should shrink after
statistically controlling for measures of mate value.
3.3.2. Environmental sources of individual differences. As
with other social strategies, the propensity for revenge
might vary across individuals because of the costs and
beneﬁts of using the strategy (Buss 2009). Cultural inﬂu-
ences such as concentrated neighborhood disadvantage
(see section 3.2.2 above), civic trust, policing efﬁciency,
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and even parental support for retaliation as a way of hand-
ling grievances (Black-Michaud 1975; Brezina et al. 2004;
Copeland-Linder et al. 2007; Ericksen & Horton 1992;
Herrmann et al. 2008; Kubrin & Weitzer 2003; Nisbett &
Cohen 1996; Solomon et al. 2008) are good candidates
for explaining variance in revenge. Variables such as endor-
sement of a street code of conduct (Brezina et al. 2004;
Stewart et al. 2006), and (mis)trust in the police (Kääriäinen
2007) may also be useful for capturing important aspects of
the proximate psychology through which such environ-
mental effects inﬂuence the propensity for revenge.
Finally, there is substantial individual variance in revenge
that is attributable to non-shared environmental factors –
that is, factors that monozygotic twins do not share in
common. To the extent that revenge produces deterrence
or other beneﬁcial effects such as an improved reputation,
increased social status, or increased attractiveness to pro-
spective mates (Anderson 1999; Boehm 1987), it necess-
arily produces these effects with respect to speciﬁc
bullies, despots, friends, peers, and potential mates, and
these unique effects will calibrate individuals’ propensities
to engage in revenge in unique ways. Non-shared environ-
mental effects have been notoriously difﬁcult to identify in
behavioral-genetic research (Turkheimer & Waldron 2000)
because they are virtually inﬁnite in number and generally
small in magnitude. Nevertheless, as these unique social
experiences accumulate over the life course, they will
make even identical twins increasingly different from
each other (Harris 2006). The cumulative effect of these
unique social experiences will be to alter people’s compu-
tations of revenge’s costs and beneﬁts, thereby yielding
different propensities for revenge over the life course.
4. The evolution of forgiveness
4.1. Revenge-based costs and design for forgiveness
Revenge carries costs that can potentially offset its deter-
rence beneﬁts. Although the costs of the act of revenge
can sometimes be small – for example, spreading gossip
or injuring a much smaller individual – these costs can
sometimes be large – for instance, (to use a contemporary
example) suicide bombing. Even in two-person Prisoner’s
Dilemmas (Dreber et al. 2008; Rand et al. 2009; Wu
et al. 2009) and Public Goods Games (Bochet et al.
2006), the costs of punishment are often large enough to
negate any gains in payoffs that punishment produces by
increasing partners’ cooperation.
In most cases, however, a more important cost of taking
revenge lies in the fact that other people also have revenge
systems, so costs imposed on them might cause them (or
their kin, friends, or allies) to engage in counter-revenge
(Boehm 1987; Cinyabuguma et al. 2006; Denant-
Boemont et al. 2007; Dunbar et al. 1995; Gould 2000;
Herrmann et al. 2008). Research on the iterated and
sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates the general
point. A move of defect when both players are using a
“tit for tat” strategy (Rapoport & Chammah 1965) locks
players in a cycle of mutual defection known as the “echo
effect” (Axelrod 1984), which drastically reduces payoffs.
Because of this effect, “forgiving” strategies (e.g., respond-
ing to a partner’s defection on round t by cooperating on
round t+1) such as “generous tit for tat,” “contrite tit for
tat,” and “ﬁrm but fair” (Frean 1994; Hauert & Schuster
1998; Nowak & Sigmund 1993; Wu & Axelrod 1995)
reduce the chance of getting trapped in defect-defect
spirals. Indeed, when noise is present, such strategies
elicit more cooperation from human cooperators than
does tit for tat (Bendor et al. 1991; Klapwijk & Van Lange
2009; Van Lange et al. 2002). Vendettas and blood
feuding illustrate this point ethnographically (Boehm 1987).
A third cost of revenge applies when the aggressor is
someone of value to the victim, such as a friend, genetic
relative, or close ally. In such cases, taking revenge
carries the cost of damaging one’s own interests indirectly.
For this reason, we expect revenge to be less frequently
imposed upon kin, people with whom one has an ongoing
exchange relationship (Trivers 1971), friends and allies
(DeScioli & Kurzban 2009b), and long-term mates
(Clutton-Brock 1989). Related, but importantly different –
and arguably the principal cost relevant to revenge
systems – is that revenge runs the risk of turning a friend
into a foe, in which case the expected downstream value
of the relationship is sacriﬁced, or ﬂipped from positive
to negative. Although new relationships can replace old
ones, establishing new positive social relationships – includ-
ing search and the accumulation of trust – represents a cost
(Hruschka & Henrich 2006).
4.2. Reducing the costs of revenge
The costs of revenge, then, depend on the nature of
relationship between the aggressor and the victim. To
explore this important point, we again refer to the
“welfare tradeoff ratio” concept (Petersen et al. 2010; Sell
et al. 2009). Recall from section 2.2 earlier that imposing
a large harm upon a victim to obtain a small beneﬁt for
the self indicates that the aggressor does not highly
regard the victim’s welfare relative to his or her own.
Revenge, therefore, is a way for victims to attempt to
cause their aggressors to increase their regard for the
welfare of their victims.
Deciding whether to take revenge, then, should reﬂect a
computation that weighs the expected beneﬁts of revenge
(e.g., will it cause the aggressor to update, in the favorable
direction, his or her monitored WTR toward the victim?)
against its costs (e.g., will the aggressor or his or her allies
engage in counter-revenge, or update his or her monitored
WTR toward the victim in the unfavorable direction?).
The beneﬁt side of the computation might be similar for
both friends and foes: The key consideration is whether
the act of revenge will deter future cost impositions upon
the victim. However, when the aggressor is a friend or
ally, the estimates of the costs must incorporate additional
terms. As we have argued, there are the additional indirect
costs associated with imposing harm on one’s relatives and
allies and the potential harm to existing mutually proﬁtable
relationships. We posit, therefore, the existence of mechan-
isms whose function is to inhibit revenge when the costs of
revenge outweigh its deterrent beneﬁts and to steer organ-
isms toward other approaches to up-regulating aggressors’
WTRs toward the self. These are forgiveness systems.
One factor in this computation is the aggressor’s relation-
ship to the victim. People should be less likely to take
revenge on friends and relatives because of their ﬁtness
interdependence (Dunbar et al. 1995), which is expressed
computationally as the victim’s intrinsic WTR toward the
aggressor. We are not claiming that people forgive all
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harms done to them by genetic relatives: Conﬂicts could
arise between relatives due to, for example, parent–off-
spring conﬂict (Trivers 1974). We nevertheless expect
that there are systems designed to take kinship or other
social factors that inﬂuence ﬁtness interdependence into
account in this context. Second, to the extent that
revenge will reduce or eliminate the beneﬁts to be captured
from one’s kin, friends, allies, mates, and so on, a well-
designed system should assess the value of the relationship
(see sect. 5.3 in this article, and Petersen et al. 2010), and
raise the other’s WTR toward the self without, if possible,
imposing costs. We believe that forgiveness systems have
this function: Raising an aggressor’s WTR toward the self
without using revenge (the active imposition of retaliatory
costs) to do so. After Petersen et al. (2010), we believe
that the function of forgiveness systems is to up-regulate
the aggressor’s WTR toward the victim by motivating the
victim to behave in ways that will raise the aggressor’s
intrinsic WTR (but not the monitored WTR) toward the
victim. Recall from section 2.2.2 that intrinsic WTRs
reﬂect one’s willingness to take beneﬁts for oneself at a
cost to target individuals based on all of the factors that
create ﬁtness interdependence between the actor and the
target. When an individual forgives, he or she is attempting,
therefore, to establish positive relations with a harmdoer by
ﬁrst causing that harmdoer to increase his or her intrinsic
valuation of the victim.
4.3. Forgiveness: A functional deﬁnition
When a victim simply refrains from retaliation – for
example, when a dominant individual has exploited a
much weaker subordinate – forgiveness is not implicated
in the sense in which we intend (cf. Gardner & West
2004). When revenge is not taken in such instances, it
might be because, for example, one is physically unable
to do so, or because revenge will invite even more exploita-
tion in the future.
When friends, kin, or allies (rather than strangers, rivals,
or enemies) have harmed the self, however, the relational
costs associated with revenge (as described in sect. 4.2)
also apply. In such instances, the revenge system can be
in conﬂict with the putative forgiveness system. In previous
work, the ﬁrst author’s research group has deﬁned forgive-
ness as a set of motivational changes whereby an individual
becomes (a) less motivated to retaliate against an aggressor;
(b) less motivated to maintain estrangement from an
aggressor; and (c) more motivated by good will for the
aggressor (McCullough & Root 2005; McCullough et al.
1997; 1998; 2003).
Here we suggest that forgiveness systems are designed to
guide victimized individuals toward behaviors that will
change aggressors’ intrinsic WTRs toward the self without
the use of retaliatory impositions of costs – speciﬁcally, by
inhibiting revenge and by signaling one’s view of the
harm one has incurred, as well as one’s willingness to
return to constructive relations conditional on the aggressor
refraining from similar cost impositions in the future (i.e.,
contingent on an updating of the aggressor’s WTR
toward the victim). This construal of forgiveness permits
the conceptual distinctions that other theorists (e.g.,
Enright & Coyle 1998; Worthington 2005) consider impor-
tant (e.g., that forgiveness is different from forgetting an
offense, condoning it, or attempting to minimize its
signiﬁcance).
Choosing an appropriate behavior following a harmful
act, then, requires that one consider, at a minimum, (a)
the aggressor’s WTR for the victim as implied by the
harmful act; (b) the potential downstream beneﬁts embo-
died in the relationship if it were to continue; and (c) the
potential effectiveness of several behaviors that might be
deployed to modify the aggressor’s WTR toward the self.
Different combinations of values for the variables implied
in those considerations can produce many distinct behav-
ioral options. In section 4.4, we limit ourselves to discussing
four of them. After sketching these four options, we con-
tinue by discussing reconciliation, by which we mean the
restoration of relations between aggressor and victim at
mutually acceptable WTRs between offender and victim.
Finally, we outline what we believe to be some critical com-
putational steps that a well-designed cognitive architecture
for generating adaptive behavioral responses to impositions
of interpersonal harm (viz., revenge and forgiveness) must
execute.
4.4. Forgiveness among a suite of other behavioral
options
4.4.1. Acceptance. First, after an individual has imposed a
cost upon the self, one might simply tolerate, or refrain
from responding to, the harm (Gardner & West 2004) –
essentially accepting the aggressor’s WTRs for the victim
as implied by the cost-imposing action. In such cases,
victims simply absorb the costs they have incurred at the
hands of the aggressor, avoid the costs associated with
enacting revenge, and continue interacting with the aggres-
sor without attempting to modify the aggressor’s WTR
toward the self. In such cases, social interaction between
the aggressor and the victim continues, possibly with the
victim lowering his or her estimate of the aggressor’s
WTR toward him or her. Such a course of action might
occur when the costs of the harm are lower than the
expected costs associated with attempting to up-regulate
the aggressor’s WTR toward the self. Speciﬁcally, we
predict that individuals tend to ignore harms whose costs
to the self (discounted by the beneﬁts to be obtained
from deterring future similar harms by the aggressor or
third parties who might be deterred indirectly) are lower
than the costs associated with attempting to adjust the
aggressor’s WTR toward the self. Acceptance may be sig-
naled using language or by appeasement gestures that com-
municate one’s willingness to accept certain costs imposed
by the aggressor and an absence of any residual motivation
to engage in retaliatory aggression.
4.4.2. Revenge. Second, one might take revenge – that is,
attempt to impose a cost upon the aggressor with the
goal of altering the aggressor’s monitored WTR toward
the self and to obtain the beneﬁts of deterrence more gen-
erally. As a result of revenge, social relations might end
(e.g., social relations might be completely terminated, or
revenge might incapacitate or kill the aggressor), or
counter-revenge might ensue. Alternatively, relations
between aggressor and victim might be restored under
renegotiated and mutually tolerable WTRs. We expect
revenge when the beneﬁts of deterring future harms and
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adjusting the aggressor’s WTR toward the self outweigh the
costs associated with imposing a retaliatory response.
4.4.3. Avoidance. Third, one might reduce or terminate
one’s interactions with the aggressor – that is, render it
more difﬁcult for the aggressor to impose costs upon, or
obtain beneﬁts from, the victim. Avoidance reduces the
likelihood that the aggressor will be in a position to
impose costs upon the victim again in the future. Avoidance
might be more likely to be chosen when (1) the likely effec-
tiveness of revenge is low (for any of the reasons we have
already described) and (2) the estimate of the residual
value in the relationship is low. When avoidance evolves
for its efﬁcacy in deterring harmdoers by depriving them
of beneﬁts they could have acquired through cooperative
interaction with the individual who conditionally avoids
harmdoers – rather than solely for its self-protective
effects – then avoidance is better classiﬁed as an exit-
based form of revenge (Barnes et al. 2009; Cant & John-
stone 2006).
4.4.4. Forgiveness. Fourth, the victim might forgive – that
is, attempt to raise the aggressor’s WTR (particularly the
intrinsic WTR) toward the victim without imposing costs
or withholding beneﬁts from the aggressor in a retaliatory
fashion. Putative forgiveness systems coordinate several
tasks: They inhibit (i.e., down-regulate the activity of)
systems that motivate revenge and avoidance, and they
motivate “reparative behaviors” (Petersen et al. 2010)
which signal that (a) the aggressor’s behavior damaged
the victim, and that (b) despite that harm, there is the possi-
bility of future gains from interaction if the aggressor is
willing to refrain from similar aggressive actions in the
future (i.e., increases his or her WTR toward the victim).
To cause aggressors to recalibrate their WTRs toward
their victims, forgivers might (among other things)
attempt to remind aggressors of previous beneﬁts that
they have provided to the aggressors (Petersen et al.
2010). Forgiveness should be more likely as the value of
the relationship to the transgressor goes up and as the
value of any deterrence to be obtained through acts of
revenge or avoidance goes down (e.g., when a transgressor
has indicated a disinclination to impose similar of costs on
the victim in the future; see sect. 5.3 further on).
4.5. Reconciliation as a relational outcome
Subsequent to acceptance, revenge, avoidance, or forgive-
ness, aggressors and victims might reconcile, which we take,
following Worthington (2005), to be a process by which an
aggressor and a victim communicate to one another that
they have arrived at mutually acceptable WTRs toward
each other that will govern future interactions. In some
cases, reconciliation might follow conﬁrmation that one
partner’s previous WTR for the other was too low (i.e.,
when the aggressor acknowledges that he or she inappro-
priately exploited the victim), or too high (i.e., when a
victim acknowledges that the aggressor has – and will con-
tinue to have – a lower WTR for the victim than the
victim previously believed), or just right (i.e., the victim
accepts the aggressor’s prior act was, in fact, within the
bounds of the aggressor’s WTR toward the victim: In
such an instance we might say that the victim overestimated
the implications of a cost-imposing behavior for his or her
estimate of the aggressor’s WTR toward the self). Reconci-
liation is, then, the termination of individuals’ efforts to
recalibrate one another’s WTRs and the return to social
relations at mutually endorsed WTRs (after Petersen
et al. 2010).
There is a direct analog between our conceptualization
of reconciliation and the concept to which the term recon-
ciliation refers in the animal behavior literature. Many
group-living animals (including many primates, some
canids, and at least one corvid) engage in conciliatory be-
havior – friendly post-conﬂict interactions with conspeciﬁcs
(Aureli & de Waal 2000; de Waal & van Roosmalen 1979).
Conciliatory behavior following an aggressive interaction
tends to be followed by reductions of aggression (Aureli
& Schaffner 2002; Aureli & van Schaik 1991b; Castles &
Whiten 1998b), increases in friendly contact (Koyama
2001), and reductions in post-conﬂict anxiety (Aureli
1997; Aureli & van Schaik 1991b; Castles & Whiten
1998b; Koski et al. 2007), all of which suggest that these
conciliatory behaviors – for instance, grooming (Cheney &
Seyfarth 2007) – function to reduce retaliatory aggression
and foster a return to cooperative interaction. In this
sense, these behaviors appear to facilitate reconciliation
inasmuch as nonaggressive, cooperative interaction often
follows from them.
5. Exploitation risk and relationship value: Two
computations regulating revenge and forgiveness
Calculating the costs and beneﬁts associated with the
various courses of action one might take after another indi-
vidual has imposed an unacceptable cost upon oneself
requires some intermediate computations (see also Peter-
sen et al. 2010) – namely, estimation of the risk that the
aggressor will harm the victim again in the future (which
increases the likelihood of revenge and reduces the likeli-
hood of forgiveness), and estimation of the future value
of the relationship with the aggressor (which reduces the
likelihood of revenge and increases the likelihood of for-
giveness). In this section, we elaborate on the computation
of future exploitation risk and future relationship value, and
describe some of the social factors that may be used as
information by the cognitive mechanisms that execute
these intermediate computations.
5.1. Computing risk of future exploitation
Well-designed systems for adaptive choice between revenge
and forgiveness must consider the provoker’s ability and
intention to impose costs upon the victim in the future
(see also Bentham 1962). In the limiting case, suppose
that after an offense that occurred completely privately (to
rule out the possibility third parties could learn of the
offense), a highly valuable relationship partner could persua-
sively signal that he or she would never – or could never –
again inﬂict such costs. In such a case, revenge would yield
no deterrent beneﬁt. Estimates that future similar harms
are unlikely should, to some extent, inhibit revenge.
Consistent with this hypothesis, people more readily
forgive transgressors whose behavior was unintentional,
unavoidable, or committed without awareness of its poten-
tial negative consequences (Eaton & Struthers 2006; Fehr
et al. 2010; McCullough et al. 2010), presumably because
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such information reveals that the harmdoer’s harmful be-
havior toward the victim does not reﬂect a propensity to
harm the victim again in the future (Petersen et al. 2010).
Information relevant to the transgressor’s future intent
can come from explicit acknowledgments of wrongdoing
(Eaton et al. 2006), efforts to repay or undo the costs
imposed upon the victim (Bottom et al. 2002; Zechmeister
et al. 2004), or both (Eaton & Struthers 2006). Verbal
expressions of sympathy for a victim’s suffering and explicit
declarations of one’s intention to refrain from harming the
victim in the future are inﬂuential aspects of effective
apologies (Gold & Weiner 2000; McCullough et al. 1997;
Nadler & Liviatan 2006; Zechmeister et al. 2004).
Effective apologies make transgressors seemmore remor-
seful (Risen & Gilovich 2007), less blameworthy (Zechmeis-
ter et al. 2004), and higher in personality traits such as
agreeableness, sincerity, compassion, kindness, genuineness,
and dependability (Risen & Gilovich 2007; Struthers et al.
2008; Tabak et al. 2012), all of which appear to convey a
lack of motivation to inﬂict costs upon the victim in the
future. Indeed, admissions of guilt without corresponding
efforts to compensate the victim or communicate remorse
can actually inhibit forgiveness (Allan et al. 2006; Zechmeis-
ter et al. 2004). From the viewpoint of the model we are
advancing here, such ﬁndings make sense because admit-
ting culpability should strengthen victims’ conﬁdence in
their beliefs that the harmdoer intentionally harmed the
victim and might be disposed to behave similarly in the
future, and thus, that forgiveness (i.e., the inhibition of
revenge and efforts to up-regulate an aggressor’s WTR
peacefully) would be imprudent.
Verbal apologies can be easily faked, however (Frank
1988) – hence, the “cheapness” of “cheap talk” –which
should cause one to wonder why they matter at all. We
anticipate, therefore, that systems for forgiveness will be
sensitive to cues of sincerity – that is, cues that the individ-
ual offering the apology is not being deceptive. Credibility-
enhancing displays (Henrich 2009), therefore, tend to be
associated with effective apologies. For example, concilia-
tory behaviors such as delivering large repeated beneﬁts
(which King-Casas et al. [2008] winsomely named
“coaxing”), or exposing oneself to harm by the victim
(e.g., submission gestures; see Matsumura & Hayden
2006) require stronger internal commitments to improved
relations – the putting of money where one’s mouth is
(Bottom et al. 2002), and as a result, appear to facilitate for-
giveness better than apologies without behavioral signs of
an internal commitment to improved future relations.
Likewise, facial displays such as blushing facilitate for-
giveness after some transgressions (de Jong et al. 2003).
The reliability of such displays may be on account of their
relative unfakeability (Frank 1988). Indeed, Dijk et al.
(2009) discovered that people judged those who blushed
after transgressions as more trustworthy, sympathetic,
and socially skilled than individuals who did not blush –
some of the same inferences that people make about apolo-
getic transgressors (Risen & Gilovich 2007; Struthers et al.
2008). Also, participants infer that people who blush are
ashamed or embarrassed about their transgressions
(Keltner & Buswell 1997) –which makes sense if blushes
are, in fact, signals that harmdoers are aware of the fact
that they behaved in a way that was inconsistent with
their former (or current) welfare tradeoff ratio for the
person or persons whom they harmed.
Also, revenge is unnecessary (holding aside its value as a
third-party deterrent) when additional transgressions are
impossible. When the aggressor’s future capacity for vio-
lence has been removed (which legal theorists call incapa-
citation), for instance, avenging a harm may yield little
additional deterrent value. In some ethnographic accounts,
reconciliation rituals involve the surrender of weapons
(e.g., Boehm 1987), which symbolize an unwillingness to
engage in future cost-imposing behaviors. Such rituals,
along with verbal communications, and credibility-enhan-
cing displays (Henrich 2009) can be combined to make a
highly persuasive signal of one’s unwillingness to harm
one’s victim again in the future.
5.2. Computing the expected future value of the
relationship with the transgressor
The expected future value of a relationship is computed, we
hypothesize, in much the same way that it would be in con-
texts other than the aftermath of a transgression (Tooby
et al. 2008). Because of the well-known principles of kin
selection, close relatives are likely to be a source of beneﬁts,
and thus, we expect that kinship will facilitate forgiveness
(Lieberman et al. 2007). Similarly, people with whom one
has a close history of association (Tooby & Cosmides
1992; Trivers 1971), shared interests (Tooby & Cosmides
1996), similar values (Davis et al. 2009), and many opportu-
nities for mutually beneﬁcial transactions are good candi-
dates for forgiveness because of the possibility of
continued gains from association.
Research supports this hypothesis. McCullough et al.
(2010) found that scores on a self-report measure of per-
ceived relationship value (e.g., “I thought about the
things I still like about our relationship.”) predicted the
rates at which people forgave during the 100 days after
another individual had harmed them. The association
between relationship value and forgiveness persisted even
after controlling for participants’ sex, feelings of closeness
and commitment to their offenders, their ratings of the
painfulness of the transgression, the transgressor’s respon-
sibility and intentionality in committing the transgression,
and the extent to which the transgressor apologized and
made amends. Also, priming people with the names of
other individuals with whom they are close leads to
increased self-reported inclination to forgive a variety of
hypothetical offenses, increased accessibility of the
concept of forgiveness, and reduced deliberation about
whether forgiveness is an appropriate course of action (Kar-
remans & Aarts 2007). Such ﬁndings complement those
from previous studies showing that people are more
inclined to forgive individuals to whom they feel close
and committed (Finkel et al. 2002; McCullough et al.
1998) or securely attached (Kachadourian et al. 2004).
We hypothesize that forgiveness is associated with variables
such as closeness, commitment, and attachment because
they index perceived relationship value. Note, however,
that in relationships in which the shadow of the future is
particularly long – that is, in which there are multiple
opportunities for future interaction (after controlling for
other, and perhaps better, measures of relationship
value) – the judicious use of revenge could lead to long-
term payoffs for the avenger inasmuch as those acts of
revenge might deter many future cost impositions and
might induce many future conferrals of beneﬁts.
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Here too, there is an analog in the literature on reconcilia-
tion among nonhuman animals: Conciliatory behavior is most
common in “valuable relationships” – that is, relationships
whose restoration would be expected to yield ﬁtness payoffs
to interactants (de Waal 2000; Silk 2002; van Schaik &
Aureli 2000). In nonhuman animals, “relationship value”
can come in a variety of currencies that inﬂuence reconcilia-
tion, including genetic relatedness (Call et al. 1999; Fraser &
Bugnyar 2011; Katsukake & Castles 2001), mate value (Watts
1995), coalitional support (Cordoni & Palagi 2008), and
grooming/aiding effort (Cordoni & Palagi 2008; Fraser &
Bugnyar 2011; Koski et al. 2007; Preuschoft et al. 2002;
Romero et al. 2009). The effects of particular forms of
relationship value on conciliatory behavior have also been
demonstrated recently in studies of chimpanzees (Fraser
et al. 2010; Koski et al. 2007; Watts 2006), brown capuchin
monkeys (Daniel et al. 2009), domestic dogs (Cools et al.
2008), Hamadryas baboons (Romero et al. 2009), sifakas
(Palagi et al. 2008), wolves (Cordoni & Palagi 2008), and
Assamanese macaques (Cooper et al. 2005).
6. Individual differences in forgiveness
As with revenge, there are individual differences in the
extent to which people forgive harms they have incurred
(McCullough & Hoyt 2002). Much (i.e., approximately
57%) of the variance in people’s (self-reported) propensi-
ties to forgive results from additive genetic effects. The
remaining variation is attributable to measurement error,
unique environmental effects, non-additive genetic
effects, gene–environment interactions, and other sources
of inﬂuence that cannot be partitioned into additive
genetic effects and shared environmental effects (Steger
et al. 2007).
Research links individual differences in forgiveness with
personality variables such as high agreeableness, low neur-
oticism, and religiosity (Mullet et al. 2005). As with
revenge, people may possess heritable phenotypes that
modify the costs and beneﬁts of forgiving. Sex is one such
trait, and women appear to score higher on self-reports
of general tendencies to forgive than men do (Miller
et al. 2008). Such a ﬁnding might be clariﬁed in the
future by considering particular relationship contexts in
which forgiving might have higher beneﬁts (or lower
costs) for women than for men.
Likewise, we anticipate that the marginal beneﬁts of for-
giveness will be greater for people who lack social partners
(Hruschka & Henrich 2006). People who are motivated to
maintain scarce relationships and form new ones should be
more willing – all else being equal – to forgive harms in the
service of these efforts. Conversely, we might expect for-
giveness to be less common in ecologies in which social
relationships are short-lived, though we know of no data
on this issue.
7. Summary
The desire for revenge and the ability to forgive are univer-
sal human psychological endowments (Boehm 2008;
Brown 1991; Daly & Wilson 1988; McCullough 2008). In
this article we have posited that revenge and forgiveness
result from cognitive mechanisms that were designed to
deter and to reduce the costs of deterrence while preser-
ving valuable relationships, respectively. We have sketched
the computational structure required for these putative
functions, and discussed evidence that bears on these pro-
visions as well as data surrounding relevant individual
differences.
For some crucial questions about the revenge and forgive-
ness systems we have posited here, data are scant, and we
could only speculate. To this point, the attention placed on
revenge and forgiveness in the psychological literature has
been somewhat limited and undertheorized. For instance,
although we think that revenge plays a large and important
role in human social relationships, our study of 9 recent text-
books in social psychology reveals a surprising dearth of cov-
erage: The median number of pages on which “revenge” or
“retaliation” are indexed is 0, with a mean of 0.78. Oddly –
given that it has been taken seriously within the social
sciences only recently – forgiveness has fared better in
social psychology textbooks, with a median number of
indexed pages of 1 and a mean of 1.22. Even so, researchers’
abilities to shed light on forgiveness too have been limited,
we think, by a failure to consider the functions that forgive-
ness might have evolved to serve within the human behavior-
al repertoire. We hope the adaptationist framework in which
we have tried to situate the concepts of revenge and forgive-
ness will assist other researchers in formulating new direc-
tion for research in these areas.
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Abstract: Humans have the cognitive abilities to implement the revenge
and forgiveness systems hypothesized by McCullough et al., but the
evidence suggests that simpler processes may underlie most revenge
cases in humans and other animals. The mediating role of emotions can
be at the basis of the ﬂexibility needed in the hypothesized systems and
the associated assessment of social relationships.
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In this target article McCullough et al. present a fascinating view
on revenge, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Whereas the existence
of forgiveness in nonhuman animals may be controversial (and dif-
ﬁcult to demonstrate), there is compelling evidence for revenge
and reconciliation. In addition, the key function of revenge in
imposing a retaliatory cost on aggressors has already been pro-
posed for macaques (Aureli et al. 1992; cf. Clutton-Brock &
Parker 1995). Thus, it seems that humans share both the form
and function of revenge with other animals. Why then do McCul-
lough et al. hypothesize that humans have evolved a cognitive
system that implements the deterrence strategy, which they
label a revenge system? Are McCullough et al. implying that
animals, which show similar revenge patterns to those of
humans, have the same cognitive revenge system? If so, humans
did not evolve it but have adapted it from what a common ances-
tor already had in place. However, McCullough et al. are more
likely implying that humans have evolved a unique cognitive
system for revenge that is too complex for other animal species.
The revenge system presented in the target article is indeed
complex. Whereas humans certainly have the cognitive abilities
to implement such a system, is it really necessary to explain the
majority of cases of revenge perpetrated by human beings?
Couldn’t a simpler mechanism based on emotional mediation be
at the core of the patterns of revenge that have been reported
for humans and other animals? There has been growing attention
to the mediating role of emotions in humans (Frijda 1986; Pank-
sepp 1989; Rolls 1995) and other animals (Aureli & Schaffner
2002; Aureli & Whiten 2003; Crook 1989; Lott 1991; Owren &
Rendall 1997; Pryce 1996). An important function of emotions
is motivating organisms to act (LeDoux 1996; Rolls 1990). In
this respect, emotions interface between sensory inputs and
motor outputs in a way that allows the individual to take a particu-
lar motivational stance (Aureli & Whiten 2003; cf. Tooby & Cos-
mides’ [1990b] system of coordination), which then constrains its
behavior for an appropriate amount of time (e.g., a longish period
in the case of fear caused by sighting a snake; cf. Damasio 1994;
Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1992).
The concept of relationship value is central to the forgiveness
system hypothesized in the target article and to reconciliation
between former opponents, as acknowledged by the authors.
However, the expected value of social relationships does not
need complex computation about the future. Most of our
decisions are not taken based on improbable knowledge of the
future, but are guided by probabilistic estimates based on past
experience (Tooby & Cosmides 1990b). This is especially true
for social intercourse as current behavior is affected, entirely or
in part, by the individual’s memory of past interactions (Aureli
et al., in press; Hinde 1979; Seyfarth & Cheney 2012). The assess-
ment of social relationships requires bookkeeping of the various
interactions with the partner, computation of their relative fre-
quencies, and conversion of their quality and associated infor-
mation into a common currency. Such an assessment seems to
be complex. However, emotions can play a critical role.
Emotional mediation has already been suggested to be at the
basis of the assessment of social relationships (Aureli & Schaffner
2002). The emotional experience of an individual is certainly
affected by the frequency and quality of previous interactions
with group members (see Aureli & Schino [2004] for a review).
Furthermore, emotional states may express a crucial integration
of the information contained in the various interactions between
two partners and may change over time depending on the inter-
actions exchanged. The emotional experience can then be func-
tionally equivalent to the aforementioned processes of
bookkeeping, computation, and conversion needed for relation-
ship assessment (Aureli & Schaffner 2002). The resulting emotion-
al experience is partner-dependent. Thus, emotional differences
can be at the core of the observed variation in social interactions
reﬂecting the variation in relationship quality across partners.
Biological systems do not emerge ex novo as elegant solutions,
but develop from pre-existing structures and therefore are
constrained by their evolutionary past. Humans have the abilities
for complex computations as required by the proposed revenge
and forgiveness systems, but they usually rely on evolutionarily
older systems. Quick and accurate decision-making is based on
the exploitation of how information is structured in the social
environment mediated by emotions (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
Similarly, emotions can serve as somatic markers that allow
rapidly rejecting or endorsing certain options based on the reacti-
vation of emotional states associated with previous experiences
and permitting the individual to efﬁciently make a decision
(Damasio 1994; 1996).
When revenge spreads from the two opponents to family
members, as in maﬁa vendettas, it seems more cognitively
demanding because the individuals involved need to know about
the relationships of others and the degree of similarity with
their own relationships. Such family based revenge has already
been reported in monkeys (Aureli et al. 1992; Judge 1982; Sey-
farth & Cheney, in press). This suggests that even the cognitive
processes underlying vendettas are not unique to human beings.
Personality, self-control, and welfare-tradeoff
ratios in revenge and forgiveness
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Abstract: We address how trait self-control and trait concern for others
relate to the concepts of monitored and intrinsic Welfare Tradeoff
Ratios (WTRs), respectively, and how recent work on personality,
revenge, and forgiveness are informed by the adaptationist perspective
proposed in the target article. We also discuss how the proposed
adaptationist perspective provides clues to some previously puzzling
ﬁndings on revenge.
In the target article, McCullough et al. forward a timely adapta-
tionist framework for conceptualizing revenge and forgiveness.
According to this theoretical perspective, revenge and forgiveness
are evolved psychological mechanisms that regulate the interper-
sonal behavior of a victim in response to the harm-doing of a trans-
gressor. Central to their model is the mechanism of Welfare
Tradeoff Ratios (WTRs) in conducting cost–beneﬁt analyses of
interdependent social behaviors. WTRs are psychological mech-
anisms that compute the relative welfare of a target’s welfare com-
pared to one’s own welfare. In the target article the authors make
a distinction between intrinsic and monitored WTRs. Intrinsic
WTRs involve welfare tradeoffs that consider the indirect beneﬁts
a particular relationship has for the individual’s own welfare,
whereas monitored WTRs involve computations of a welfare-tra-
deoff taking into consideration the target’s ability to monitor and
respond to one’s behavior. In light of this theoretical framework,
we review recent research relating personality with revenge and
forgiveness and suggest how this perspective may explain some
recent unexpected ﬁndings in the literature.
Research suggests that forgiveness can be challenging, and that
forgiveness is facilitated by the use of self-control – an ability to
monitor and regulate behavior to achieve long-term goals
(Balliet 2010; Pronk et al. 2010). Additionally, prior research has
found that self-control increases the ability to positively weigh
others’ outcomes (i.e., WTRs) during interdependent social inter-
actions (Balliet & Joireman 2010). Thus, self-control is not only
Commentary/McCullough et al.: Cognitive systems for revenge and forgiveness
16 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2012) 36:1
relevant for revenge/forgiveness, but may also affect the proxi-
mate mechanisms outlined in the target article, namely WTRs.
Can the relation between self-control, forgiveness, and revenge
be understood by the adaptationist model? Here we suggest
that self-control may work together with evolved psychological
mechanisms (e.g., WTRs) to affect revenge and forgiveness.
Speciﬁcally, individual differences in self-control may aid our
understanding of monitoredWTRs. People who monitor their be-
havior in relation to goals during social interactions, thereby exert-
ing self-control, may be more thoughtful about how their own and
other’s current behavior may affect future outcomes. Another
possibility is that self-control is used to compare other’s perceived
WTRs to one’s ownWTR, and this process may affect revenge and
forgiveness. Although previous research suggests that self-control
may enable people to inhibit their desire for revenge in order to
maintain valuable social relations, as we discuss below, self-
control can also enable people to become more vengeful. Other
traits may relate to individual differences in the calibration of
intrinsic WTRs (such as social value orientations; see Balliet
et al. 2009). Importantly, both features of personality that affect
monitored and intrinsic WTRs may interact to affect revenge
and forgiveness.
Recently, Balliet et al. (2011a) measured intentions of revenge
in response to a partner’s initial transgression during an iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (and maximizing difference game). They
found that trait self-control negatively related to revenge in
response to their partner’s defection, but only amongst individuals
who were less concerned for others’ outcomes, relative to their
own outcomes (i.e., low intrinsic WTRs). In this experimental
context, participants were thought to be interacting for several
trials of the dilemma. One implication of this ﬁnding is that self-
control may affect calculating concern for anonymous others,
and especially in situations when another has an ability to
respond and punish one’s behavior. Certainly, in the context of
each iterated game, mutual cooperation is in the long-term self-
interest for both parties. Thus, self-control may be a general
ability that works by adjusting (monitored) WTRs to manage
social relations and achieve long-term outcomes for the individual.
A second implication is that the effect of self-control on revenge
may depend on a person’s intrinsic WTR.
An unexpected ﬁnding in recent work is that positive intrinsic
WTRs can lead to stronger revenge motivation in response to a
perceived transgression, but only when people have the time
and exert self-control to think about the costs and beneﬁts of
revenge (Balliet et al. 2011a; Perunovic & Holmes 2008).
Perhaps high intrinsic WTRs establish expectations of social be-
havior that are easily violated, and self-control may initiate a
comparison between own and an other’s perceived WTRs
that may subsequently encourage revenge in an attempt to
get the other to recalibrate their monitored WTR to reach an
equilibrium with their own. Yet, for individuals who have a
low intrinsic WTR, the use of self-control may result in
attempts to display an increase in their own WTR toward the
other. Interestingly, in both accounts self-control may encou-
rage strategies to reach an equilibrium between one’s own
and the other’s WTR.
A second ﬁnding not easily explained by existing theories is that
punishment more effectively increases cooperation when punish-
ments are costly to deliver (Balliet et al. 2011b). Prior theorizing
suggests that reduced costs of punishment make punishment
more effective at promoting cooperation. Yet, this ﬁnding may
indicate the importance of others’ perceived WTRs for revenge
and forgiveness. Not only do people possess their own WTR,
but also cognitive mechanisms disposed toward understanding
others’ WTRs, and these hold important implications for both
own intrinsic and monitored WTRs. Perhaps costly punishments
communicate that punishment is delivered out of concern for
the relationship or group and so may be more effective by simul-
taneously increasing the transgressor’s own intrinsic WTR as well
as the monitored WTR.
As we reﬂected on the ability of an adaptationist perspective to
guide research on revenge and forgiveness, we noticed in several
instances that this perspective could be meaningfully related to
conclusions from our own research and is able provide clues to
some previously puzzling ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, trait self-control
and trait concern for others may affect forgiveness by the cali-
bration of monitored and intrinsic WTRs, respectively – a possi-
bility that deserves future research attention. Overall, we are
excited about the possibility of this model directing future
research. Managing social relations certainly provided an abun-
dance of challenges in our ancestral environment that were
directly relevant to survival and reproduction. Taking revenge to
deter harm and forgiving others to maintain vital social relations
are likely two important ingredients that have enabled humans
to successfully navigate the social environment.
Pathways to abnormal revenge and
forgiveness
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Abstract: The target article’s important point is easily misunderstood to
claim that all revenge is adaptive. Revenge and forgiveness can
overstretch (or understretch) the bounds of utility due to
misperceptions, minimization of costly errors, a breakdown within our
evolved revenge systems, or natural genetic and developmental
variation. Together, these factors can compound to produce highly
abnormal instances of revenge and forgiveness.
In the target article, McCullough et al. do an admirable job of
arguing that revenge is not a disease, and instead may be an adap-
tion to prevent exploitation. This approach is long overdue in
many social sciences, as it moves away from pejorative preconcep-
tions about behaviours we don’t like. As with any adaptive expla-
nation for behaviour, there is a high risk of the authors’ argument
being misunderstood to claim that all instances of revenge should
be adaptive. Such misunderstandings regularly occur with other
evolutionary explanations of human social behaviour. As such,
the authors’ argument requires extension to examine when
revenge and forgiveness will overstretch (or understretch) the
bounds of utility, and why.
A complete explanation of revenge and forgiveness will include
errors of absence as well as errors of excess. While there are popu-
larized cases of ridiculous revenge, we often overlook the exces-
sive “lack of revenge” or excessive forgiveness. These are the
things that ﬁll books like Chicken Soup for the Soul. They are
potentially equally maladaptive, but we don’t see them as
“errors” because we “like” this behaviour (see also Wakeﬁeld
1992). There is likely an optimal level of revenge and forgiveness
for any situation. Too little revenge is an insufﬁcient deterrent, but
too much revenge invites further retaliation (Barclay 2008). Too
little forgiveness prevents reparation of a relationship, but too
much forgiveness invites future exploitation (Axelrod 1984).
Finding the optimal level of revenge involves “brinksmanship”
(Daly & Wilson 1988), a difﬁcult game when people have imper-
fect information about the world or about others’ past and future
intentions (e.g., Todd 2001). Because of such constraints, no
evolved psychological mechanism is expected to produce
optimal results in every single instance, but is expected to be adap-
tive on average (Haselton & Buss 2000; Nesse 2005; Barclay
2011). The following are some causes of excessive or insufﬁcient
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revenge or forgiveness, and when combined in one individual,
they could result in markedly abnormal behaviour indeed.
Misperceptions of costs and beneﬁts. To produce adaptive
levels of revenge and forgiveness, our brains must use environ-
mental cues of the costs and beneﬁts. Assessing these costs and
beneﬁts is no small task, as one must assess one’s strength relative
to a transgressor (and possibly an audience), audience presence
and characteristics, one’s need, the risk, the relationship value,
and a host of other factors. Naturally, there is error associated
with assessing any of these (Barclay 2008). Sometimes these
errors will balance out, but when they don’t, they will compound
to produce more revenge or forgiveness than is optimal. Statisti-
cally speaking, these misperceptions alone will cause deviations
from optimality that are normally distributed about the
optimum, with most individuals near optimality but with some
individuals displaying excessively high or low revenge or
forgiveness.
Misperceptions of others’ actions. The optimal level of revenge
and forgiveness likely depends on others’ intentions, both in terms
of the reasons for their past actions and their intended future be-
haviour. Assessing such intentions is a mind-reading game, and is
also prone to error. “Rules of thumb” based on past experience
will only sometimes be right, and will sometimes overestimate
hostility. Based on this, we might predict that people who are
better at reading others’ intentions will produce more optimal
levels of revenge and forgiveness.
Minimizing costly errors. Different errors have different costs,
and natural selection has presumably designed our emotions so
that we avoid committing more costly or more frequent errors
(Haselton & Buss 2000; Nesse 2005). If being too vengeful is
more costly than being insufﬁciently vengeful, then our revenge
systems should be biased towards producing less revenge than is
“needed,” and vice versa. A similar argument holds for forgive-
ness. Which is more costly, excessive or insufﬁcient revenge (or
forgiveness)? This is probably an empirical question. In fact, the
answer may vary in different social environments depending on
the frequency and importance of exploitation (bias towards exces-
sive retaliation) and long-term cooperation (bias towards excessive
forgiveness). By focusing on the costs and frequencies of these
different errors, we can predict when we will observe excessive
vengeance or excessive forgiveness.
Genetic or development noise variation. The target article out-
lines a number of tasks performed by our revenge and forgiveness
systems, each of which involves many steps. As with any complex
trait, each of these sub-tasks will be affected by multiple genes and
environmental inﬂuences. Because these inﬂuences can combine
in different combinations, it will cause natural variation about an
optimum for each sub-task, resulting in some individuals in the
tail ends of excessive revenge.
Pathologies within the revenge systems. Although the target
article suggests that revenge is not a “disease,” it does leave
open the possibility of genuine diseases within our evolved
revenge systems. Some individuals might indeed have something
“broken” in the brain areas responsible for assessing costs,
beneﬁts, and intentions, or for producing an appropriate level of
revenge. For example, if a (subconscious) assessment of costs
tends to inhibit revenge, then anything that damages the brain’s
inhibitory systems will prevent this inhibition and will result in
excessive revenge. Also, if someone is insensitive to costs or pun-
ishment in general (e.g., psychopaths), then there will be nothing
to lower their vengefulness down to optimal levels. In other
words, the capacity for revenge is not pathological, nor is the
acting on that capacity, but there can be pathologies associated
with expressing that capacity. It is these pathologies that probably
produce the types of revenge and forgiveness that make newspa-
per headlines (Barclay 2008).
These are but some of the potential causes of abnormal levels of
revenge and forgiveness. Some will result in normally distributed
variation in revenge and forgiveness, whereas others will cause
systematic biases towards excess (e.g., pathologies, error
management). Altogether, they show how not every instance of
revenge will be beneﬁcial, nor will every instance of forgiveness.
Thus, we can extend the framework that McCullough et al.
provide to make predictions about “abnormal” levels of revenge
and forgiveness.
The cultural shaping of revenge
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Abstract: There are interesting parallelisms between McCullough et al.’s
article and studies of revenge presented by French legal anthropologist
Raymond Verdier, particularly as regards the discussion of the
increasing likelihood of revenge with increasing social distance.
Additionally, the observation that many peoples speak of revenge in the
language of debt and repayment, links it with exchanges of beneﬁts as
well as costs.
Substantial parts of this interesting target article by three psychol-
ogists, McCullough, Kurzban, and Tabak (McCullough et al.), are
strikingly congruent with studies of revenge conducted by anthro-
pologists over the last three decades. Among the most important
publications in this arena are the four volumes edited by French
legal anthropologist Raymond Verdier and his collaborators
(Verdier 1981a; 1986; Verdier & Poly 1984; cf. Courtois 1984).
In his introduction to that work, Verdier (1981b) points out that
in many (perhaps most) societies vengeance is spoken of in
terms of debt and repayment, the vocabulary in which people
talk about the owing and paying of goods and services – and
most importantly, the same terms in which the exchange of
women as brides is discussed. Indeed, one of the most common
means of terminating an actual or potential blood feud is for the
family or lineage of the killer to turn over one of its daughters
as a wife to the family or lineage of the homicide victim, the
woman’s life-giving capacity being taken as compensation for
the life than was taken. This perspective potentially ampliﬁes
the applicability of the Welfare Tradeoff Ratio (WTR) to
include all ﬁtness relevant exchanges, comprehending beneﬁts
as well as costs in a single calculation.
Another area of convergence arises from the authors’ remark
that “we expect revenge to be less likely in the context of kin,
people with whom one has an ongoing exchange relationship
(…), friends and allies (…), and long term mates” (target article,
sect. 4.1, para. 3). Verdier (1981b; 2008) distinguishes three
increasingly distant categories of social relations – identity, adver-
sity (by which he means that the actors on the poles of the
relationship are adversaries, but not usually permanent
enemies), and hostility – each marked by a characteristic form of
retribution. (These categories map rather well to the three
spheres of reciprocity – generalized, balanced, and negative – pro-
posed by Sahlins (1972) to classify the varieties of material
exchange.) Within identity, the ﬁrst and closest category of
social relations (e.g., the family, the clan), violent revenge is for-
bidden. To kill or injure someone in that tight circle would only
be to compound the initial injury to oneself. Retribution is charac-
teristically left to the workings of supernatural forces.
It is in the second category, adversity, (e.g., different clans
within the same tribe, neighboring tribes that intermarry) that
the cultural elaboration of revenge ﬂourishes, often with elaborate
rules stipulating what constitutes an injury calling for revenge,
who ought (or must) take revenge, who is eligible and who is ineli-
gible as a target, and where and when and how it is permissible to
take revenge, and what sort of revenge is mandated. The typical
goal in this realm of adversity is to achieve a balance of injuries,
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after which peaceful relations and their mutual beneﬁts are
resumed.
In the most distant category, that of hostility, there are no
ongoing beneﬁcial relations between the groups involved (e.g.,
strangers, invaders, etc.), no attempts at a balance of injuries,
and no ameliorating rules. The goal is to crush, if not exterminate,
the enemy who committed the initial injury.
From this viewpoint, it is perhaps inaccurate to expect that
“revenge is more frequently used in societies in which social insti-
tutions for settling grievances are generally viewed as weak”
(target article, sect. 3.2.2, para. 3). A more ethnographic approach
might assert that revenge, in the sphere of adversity, is a means of
settling grievances – and further, that revenge, in addition to its
individual purpose of raising one’s WTR with respect to a previous
adversary, has the social purpose of restoring peaceful relations
between adversaries. Perhaps the best example of this function
of revenge is found in Exodus 21:23. “A life for a life, an eye for
an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” The explicit point of this passage is
that once the proportional act of revenge has taken place, the
exchange is to be considered closed and no further hostilities
are permitted.
On the evolutionary origins of revenge and
forgiveness: A converging systems
hypothesis
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Abstract: McCullough et al. argue that humans possess evolved
computational systems for implementing retaliatory behavior that both
deters aggression and promotes subsequent reconciliation. However,
they do not apply this analysis to the sphere of intergroup relations. We
believe their model can be usefully extended to this domain and discuss
why this would be possible, pertinent, and productive.
In their target article, McCullough et al. propose that cognitive
systems for revenge and forgiveness result from psychological
adaptations that helped solve certain social problems encountered
through the course of human evolution. While the authors
develop an important new perspective on the evolutionary
origins of such behaviors, they make several assumptions that,
we believe, limit the scope and applicability of their own thesis.
Most notably, they “take no position on whether the psychology
that governs the operation of revenge systems (…) also evolve
to regulate behavior in intergroup contexts” (sect. 2.2.4, para. 2).
In what follows we argue that the authors’ model should be
extended to include intergroup contexts, and that it correspond-
ingly has potentially important implications for understanding
the nature of conﬂict and cooperation between groups.
Research into the origins of group behavior has established the
key role that intergroup relations have played in the evolution of
social cognition. This work suggests that “the group” constitutes
the “mind’s natural environment,” acting as the interface
between an individual and their physical environment (Caporael
1997). As such ﬁtness should be correlated with the development
of functionalized cognitive mechanisms supporting the develop-
ment of relationships that necessarily include intergroup compari-
sons (Caporael & Baron 1997). Being able to effectively make
such comparisons is critical, because in ancestral environments
clear cognitive representations of ingroup (us) versus outgroup
(them) boundaries affords signiﬁcant functional beneﬁts such as
maximizing security and limiting the potential for disease
transmission.
If we accept that intergroup cognition has an evolutionary
origin, could the same basic system be used in intragroup con-
texts (and vice versa)? McCullough et al. suggest not, and that
a different cognitive architecture may have evolved to govern
intergroup conﬂict compared to intragroup conﬂict (sect. 2.2.4,
para. 2). Our contention is that, in evolutionary terms, systems
for regulating intra- and intergroup behavior should be inti-
mately linked because they involve precisely the same compu-
tational requirements. In other words, determining whether to
retaliate to a member of one’s coalition, and subsequent recon-
ciliatory behavior, can apply just as much (and perhaps more
crucially) when negotiating competitive and cooperative inter-
group relations.
Evidence for this “converging systems hypothesis” can be found
in research on intergroup relations that has demonstrated the
operation of precisely the same mechanisms as revealed in
studies of intragroup public goods dilemmas (including some of
the same studies cited by the authors; e.g., Fehr & Gächter
2002; Kollock 1998; Ostrom 1990; Yamagishi 1986). Speciﬁcally,
converging systems are evident when it comes to general incen-
tives for cooperation and non-cooperation that apply to larger
social contexts in which groups compete for resources (i.e., inter-
group contexts). Take Sherif’s (1966) classic realistic group con-
ﬂict theory. This intergroup theory is based on the assumption,
shared by much work on intragroup public dilemmas, that con-
ﬂicts are “rational” in the sense that opposing groups have incom-
patible goals and compete for scarce resources (Taylor &
Moghaddam 1987). Bornstein (2003) similarly argues that
intragroup dilemmas are embedded within, and indeed character-
ize, intergroup conﬂict and cooperation. He notes that before it is
rational for groups to compete, it must be rational for the individ-
ual group members to do so. In other words, the beneﬁts associ-
ated with the outcome of intergroup conﬂict (e.g., security,
territory, political power, status, pride) are public goods which
extend to all group members regardless of their individual contri-
bution. As Dawes (1980) states, “Soldiers who ﬁght in a large
battle can reasonably conclude that no matter what their com-
rades do they personally are better off taking no chances; yet if
no one takes chances, the result will be a rout and slaughter
worse for all the soldiers” (p. 170). In sum, the types of social
dilemmas cited by the authors are inherently embedded within,
and indeed characterize, situations of intergroup conﬂict and
cooperation. This suggests that common processes can determine
both intra- and intergroup outcomes, and provides a basis for pre-
dicting a similar level of convergence when it comes to the com-
putational systems involved.
The potential relevance of this convergence becomes apparent
when considering the central role revenge and forgiveness have
played in contemporary theories of intergroup conﬂict and its
reduction. In fact, when McCullough et al. conclude that “the
attention placed on revenge and forgiveness in the psychological
literature has been somewhat limited and undertheorized” (sect.
7, para. 2), we would point out that revenge and forgiveness
have been key concepts in over 60 years of research on the poten-
tial for intergroup contact to reduce conﬂict (Allport 1954; Brown
& Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Mechanisms under-
lying processes of forgiveness and reconciliation are particularly
central to this work, and relevant cognitions and emotions such
as perspective-taking and empathy are well-speciﬁed (Hewstone
et al. 2006; Paolini et al. 2004; Turner et al. 2008). Furthermore,
anthropological and sociological studies have shown that contact
outcomes, such as the formation of relationships that cut across
tribal boundaries, promote forgiveness and reconciliation (Coser
1956; Deutsch 1973; Evans-Pritchard 1940; LeVine & Campbell
1972). This work suggests that groups have an evolved propensity
to engage in intergroup contact precisely because it can give rise
to cross-cutting afﬁliations that ensure stability and security (i.e., it
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is more difﬁcult to have conﬂictual relations with a group based on
territory that is simultaneously an ally according to common ances-
try; Crisp & Hewstone 2007). Notably, recent work has begun to
specify the computational mechanisms through which these posi-
tive intergroup relations can be established (Crisp & Turner
2009; 2011). Considering how these contributory cognitive
systems evolved will help us develop a clearer understanding of
how and when contact can be successful in tackling contemporary
intergroup conﬂicts. It may also help us move closer to understand-
ing how these computational systems enabled ancestral coalition
building, and through this, the construction of complex societies.
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Abstract: General systems for reciprocity explain the same phenomena as
the target article’s proposed revenge system, and can explain other
cooperative phenomena. We need more reason to hypothesise a speciﬁc
revenge system. In addition, the proposed calculus of revenge is less
sensitive to absolute magnitudes of revenge than it should be.
We have two related critical points concerning the target article.
The ﬁrst is that the evidence surveyed is consistent with a
simpler and more general hypothesis. This is clearer in the case
of revenge, where the relevant hypothesis is that there is adap-
tation for reciprocity, which applies to both welfare increasing
and welfare reducing actions by others. The second is that the
welfare trade-off ratio (WTR) hypothesised to determine accepta-
ble harm/beneﬁt ratios between individuals fails to account for the
importance of absolute magnitude of revenge.
The literature in behavioural ecology pays signiﬁcant attention
to reciprocity of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours,
including reciprocation of cheating and aggression with withhold-
ing of cooperation (Trivers 1971). Conversely, it pays little or no
attention to revenge as a separate topic. Welfare increasing
actions, such as grooming, infant access, and resource sharing,
are no less suitable candidates for reciprocation than welfare
decreasing ones, such as aggressive assault and preventing
resource access. So, for example, we see dynamic and context sen-
sitive interactions between rates of welfare-decreasing and
-increasing behaviours among female baboons, including aggres-
sion against low-ranking ones, and grooming of high-ranking by
low-ranking ones (Barrett et al. 2002). A relatively uniﬁed
system is needed for trading off expected costs and beneﬁts of
available actions (including actions classiﬁable as altruistic, antag-
onistic, reconciliatory, or punitive). This is so even if its implemen-
tation is distributed and if some sub-functions – such as cheat
detection – are specialised. Hypothesising a single general reci-
procity system (or reciprocity sensitivity) instead of a speciﬁc
revenge system means not having to hypothesise a separate
system for cooperation and altruism. In addition, hypothesising
a single system is consistent with a large body of established
work on the uniﬁed neural representation of rewarding and aver-
sive outcomes (Montague & Berns 2002).
The best way to make a case against a general reciprocity
system and in favour of a speciﬁc revenge adaptation would be
to provide evidence of dissociation. For example, if in some
cases of local brain damage, genetic intervention, and so on,
there were individuals who could reciprocate altruism but not
exploitation or attack, or vice versa, the hypothesis of speciﬁc
revenge adaptations would be on stronger ground. There could
be other considerations favouring a speciﬁc revenge adaptation
that has features not predicted by a general reciprocity disposi-
tion, but the target article does not specify them or give evidence
that they are satisﬁed.
It may seem as though a general reciprocity system would
struggle to account for forgiveness. But the evidence regarding
forgiveness is equivocal. Among nonhuman primates reconcilia-
tion behaviours following conﬂict have been documented in
many species, and are sometimes taken to serve the function
of repairing valuable relationships. These behaviours are not uni-
versal (see, e.g., Kappeler [1993] on the absence thereof among
ring-tailed lemurs). Among the species in which they are
observed, they exhibit properties that are partly at odds with
the hypothesised forgiveness among humans. In particular,
unlike forgiveness, which is a victim-initiated process, reconcilia-
tions are typically initiated by former aggressors (e.g., post-con-
ﬂict grunting by former aggressor baboons – see Castles &
Whiten 1998a). In addition the same outcomes, in respect of
reduced stress by the victim of aggression, and reduced rates
of subsequent attack from the previous aggressor, are observed
in cases where instead of reconciliation there is redirected
aggression by the former victim to an individual lower in the
hierarchy (Aureli & van Schaik 1991a). The target article is
silent on why redirected aggression might be a substitute for
reconciliation.
Our second concern is that the schematic quantitative proposal
regarding revenge is, in at least one important respect, incom-
plete. The basic proposal in the target article is that agents main-
tain and update welfare tradeoff ratios (WTRs) for other agents,
which determine acceptable harm/beneﬁt outcomes. The
problem with simple ratios is that they are unable to account for
a key feature of revenge or punishment, at least when described
by many recorded cultures, which is that it is often quantiﬁed in
absolute terms. Ratios on the other hand merely ﬁx a range of out-
comes, including ones where the revenge is both much larger and
much smaller than whatever provoked it. (Put in monetary terms,
a hostile WTR of 1 to 10 between me and some other individual
says I’d willingly pay a dollar to see them lose ten dollars, or two to
see them lose twenty, or a million to see them lose ten million,
or…). Absolute speciﬁcation is much more common. So, various
ancient legal systems of which we have surviving records prescribe
lists of penalties for recognised offences, which vary in type (death,
corporal punishment, speciﬁc ﬁnes) but are all absolute in the sense
of requiring a single death, corporal penalty, or a ﬁne of some mag-
nitude rather than a ratio consistent with a large range of outcomes.
Examples include the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi from the
18th century BC, and the older Sumerian Codes of Lipit-Eshtar
and Ur-Nammu, as well as more recent but still ancient codes
such as the Hittite Laws. At various places in the Old Testament
a principle of extracting equal injury in retaliation (at least for
some crimes with human victims) is stated, including the speciﬁc for-
mulation of “eye for eye” (Exodus 21:23–25; Leviticus 24:19–21;
Deuteronomy 19:20–21). When Lady Capulet says “Romeo slew
Tybalt, Romeo must not live” (Romeo and Juliet, Act 3, Scene
1), she expresses the view that utterly independent of the ener-
getic cost and inconvenience, a penalty of a speciﬁc magnitude
must be exacted.
An important critical response here would argue that these
codiﬁed systems represent attempts to combat the ongoing
damage that could ensue in the absence of a way of concluding
some conﬂicts, and that they may even be attempts to solve a
problem arising from a simpler WTR system for revenge. Were
that the case one might expect that closely related social primates
lacking legal systems would sometimes engage in runaway reci-
procity and revenge governed by welfare tradeoff ratios and insen-
sitive to absolute magnitudes.
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Abstract: We focus on two aspects: First, we argue that it is necessary to
include implicit forgiveness as an additional adaptive behavioral option to
the perception of interpersonal transgressions. Second, we present one
possible way to investigate the cognitive-affective underpinnings of
revenge and forgiveness: a functional MRI (fMRI) approach aiming at
integrating forgiveness and revenge mechanisms into a single paradigm.
Mere acceptance or implicit forgiveness? McCullough et al.
propose “acceptance” as a means of tolerating the transgressor’s
Welfare Tradeoff Ratio (WTR; Tooby et al. 2008). Despite establish-
ing one plausible behavioral option to the inﬂiction of interpersonal
harm, we deem McCullough et al.’s notion elusive for two reasons:
First, it neglects the possibility that accepting an injustice may be
equivalent to what Exline and Baumeister (2000) termed implicit
forgiveness. Whereas explicit forgiveness (a) directly relates to an
existing debt and (b) acknowledges one’s willingness to absolve
the transgressor from his or her guilt (e.g., “I forgive you for cheat-
ing on me”), the offended person may also implicitly express for-
giveness – either by downplaying the transgression, for example,
by saying “It’s okay,” or wordlessly by maintaining contact with
the transgressor and thus not ceasing the relationship. Along this
line, the concept of implicit forgiveness differs from mere accep-
tance in the sense that a motivation to engage in retaliatory aggres-
sion changes into forgiving motivations, but no direct reference is
made to the cancelled debt (cf. Exline & Baumeister 2000). We
therefore think that implicit forgiveness may also represent a poss-
ible adaptive mechanism when perceiving a social norm violation.
Second, one important question remains unanswered: What if
the victim, for reasons of introspective limits (Nisbett & Wilson
1977), explicitly reports that he or she is okay with the aggressor’s
WTR, yet, implicitly, it reveals that he or she is still holding
grudges? In order to provide empirical evidence for McCullough
et al.’s suggestion that acceptance is marked by an absence of
residual motivation to engage in retaliation, the use of indirect for-
giveness measures seems beneﬁcial. Consistent with the notion that
cognitive accessibility of the self through introspection is limited
(Greenwald & Banaji 1995; Greenwald et al. 2002), indirect
measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald
et al. 1998) capture information processing that resides outside con-
scious control or awareness (e.g., Asendorpf et al. 2002; Greenwald
& Banaji 1995; Wilson et al. 2000). Hence, developing an indirect
forgiveness measure could not only favor a multi-method approach
(Eid & Diener 2006), but also elucidate phenomenological differ-
ences between acceptance and implicit forgiveness.
Investigating the neural substrates of revenge and forgiveness:
An fMRI approach.We concur with McCullough et al. that making
adaptive decisions about revenge and forgiveness encompasses
multiple cognitive components. Judging the forgivability of
another’s actions is one such component (Farrow et al. 2001).
For example, a post-therapy fMRI study with patients suffering
from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) revealed altered forgi-
vability judgments following symptom resolution, suggesting that
traumatic experience changes brain responses to social cognition
tasks (Farrow et al. 2005). Hayashi et al. (2010) further observed
in healthy subjects that the ventromedial prefrontal cortices
(vmPFC) play a central role in forgivability judgments for moral
transgressions regarding deceptive behavior.
Although game theory has clearly advanced our understanding of
social decision-making (Sanfey 2007), deciding upon forgiveness
versus revenge is neither an all-or-nothing proposition (Hayashi
et al. 2010), nor a purely rational or computational process. Unfor-
tunately, most psychological and neuroscientiﬁc studies have largely
tried to assess forgiveness via hypothetical moral scenarios (e.g.,
“Which of the following crimes you would see as more forgivable?”;
Farrow et al. 2001, p. 2434) instead of via real and personally rel-
evant stimuli. Notably, all forgiveness scenarios have been based
on judging actions of unknown individuals (cf. Farrow et al.
2001). It thus remains unclear whether activations in the proposed
brain regions are speciﬁc to forgiveness or whether they mirror
social and/or moral judgment more globally (Hayashi et al. 2010).
Here, we would like to propose that an alternative, non–game-
theoretic approach is also well suited for investigating the roles of
both revenge and forgiveness. More speciﬁcally, we hold an auto-
biographical memory fMRI paradigm (for a review, see Maguire
2001) as particularly promising. The main beneﬁt of using events
with personal signiﬁcance is that by relivingmemories from the par-
ticipants’ own history, forgiveness- and revenge-related emotions
(e.g., anger, fear) that were connected to those memories are sub-
jectively re-experienced (Rubin 2005; Svoboda et al. 2006). An
ancillary advantage is that this procedure allows for the induction
of a personally relevant affective state (Wagner et al. 2011) and
this, in turn, may activate brain regions in a similar manner as the
original emotional event (Buchanan 2007). We conjecture that
this approach is able (a) to induce an intrapsychic instance of
real-life forgiveness and revenge, and (b) to elicit affect-laden
memory relevant for forgiveness and revenge.
We further believe that this approach could shed light on
McCullough et al.’s pronounced suggestion that the evolved for-
giveness systems “inhibit revenge” (sect. 4.2, para. 2). If so,
emotional reliving of forgiveness events should recruit prefrontal
brain areas robustly associated with cognitive control and emotion
regulation. This proposal stands in line with recent empirical evi-
dence, demonstrating that executive functioning (i.e., cognitive
control processes) is negatively associated with retaliatory aggres-
sion, and that this effect is mediated by lower levels of revenge
motivation (i.e., higher forgiveness) (Wilkowski et al. 2010). Relat-
edly, a series of studies by Pronk and colleagues have illustrated
that cognitive control is positively associated with forgiveness
(see Pronk et al. 2010). Pronk et al. (2010, p. 128 f.), and even
directly allude to the possibility that the prefrontal cortex (invol-
ving the anterior cingulate cortex [ACC]) may be implicated in
the down-regulation of negative affect.
To conclude, from a neuroscientiﬁc perspective, it is not only
important to explore which speciﬁc brain areas are involved in
revenge and forgiveness processes, but also to demonstrate (a) the
interplay of both cognitive and affective signature(s) within these pro-
cesses; (b) the involvement of emotionally arousing memory in these
processes; and (c) its advantage over game-theoretic approaches to
the study of forgiveness and revenge. Using McCullough et al.’s fra-
mework as a starting point, these important issues open up ﬁelds of
interesting research questions to be addressed in the future.
An implausible model and evolutionary
explanation of the revenge motive
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Abstract: McCullough et al.’s target article is a psychological version of
the reputation models pioneered by biologist Robert Trivers (1971) and
economist Robert Frank (1988). The authors, like Trivers and Frank,
offer an implausible explanation of the fact that revenge is common
even when there are no possible reputational effects. I sketch a more
plausible model based on recent research.
The target article by McCullough et al. is a psychological version of
reputationmodels pioneered by biologist Robert Trivers (1971), who
called revenge “moralistic aggression” and the associated emotion
“moral outrage,” and economist Robert Frank (1988), who called
it “passion within reason.” This model of reputation effects, with
similar assumptions, was deepened in the economics literature
(Fudenberg et al. 1994; Kreps & Wilson 1982; Schmidt 1993).
The psychological dimension to the reputational model enters
because the proximate motives for seeking revenge in human
societies are generally not to enhance reputation, but rather to
obtain satisfaction by harming the offender. Moreover, revenge
is common in humans even when its cost is greater than its
expected reputational gains, a fact that is difﬁcult to reconcile
with the biological and economic reputational models. One
example is strong reciprocity which, in a social dilemma context
where there is no opportunity for reputation formation, involves
being predisposed to cooperate initially and as long as others reci-
procate, and to punish non-contributors at personal cost (Bowles
& Gintis 2011; Fehr & Gachter 1998; Gintis 2000; Gintis et al.
2005). Another example is third party punishment where, even
under conditions of anonymity, an individual punishes an agent
who has harmed a stranger, or who has committed a social
norm violation that does not affect the punisher (Buchholtz
et al. 2008; Fehr & Fischbacher 2004).
McCullough et al. explain the psychology of revenge and its wide-
spread occurrence in situations where deterrence is not involved by
arguing that in our hunter-gatherer prehistory, revenge had positive
ﬁtness effects by establishing the reputation of the revenge-seeker
as an individual who is not to be exploited and who will defend his
family and allies. A genetically based human cognitive deterrence
system thereby became adaptive. This deterrence system persists
in modern life where it is maladaptive because, by contrast with
the Pleistocene, contemporary social conditions include many
one-shot and anonymous interactions. The absence of one-shot
and anonymous interactions in the human hunter-gatherer societies
of the Pleistocene explains why evolution gave rise to a cognitive
deterrence system that does not condition revenge behavior on
the level of expected future returns.
There are three problems with this argument. First, modern
humans routinely distinguish between situations in which repu-
tation building is possible and situations in which it is not, and
cooperate much more in the former case (Bowles & Gintis
2011, Ch. 3). Assuming that this capacity is a cognitive adaptation,
there must have been frequent and ﬁtness-relevant non–repu-
tation-building interactions in our evolutionary history.
Second, even in a world of repeated interactions among well-
acquainted individuals, anonymous interactions (e.g., hiding a
kill from others) are common in contemporary hunter-gatherer
societies (Kaplan et al. 1984; Hawkes 1993; D. S. Wilson 1998),
and hence doubtless in Pleistocene and early Holocene times as
well. Indeed, such behavior is routinely recorded in chimpanzees,
and hence is likely an attribute of our most recent common ances-
tor some eight million years ago (Boehm 2011; de Waal 1997).
Finally, it is not the case that general individuals in prehistoric
hunter-gatherer communities were life-long social interactants.
The evidence supporting this assertion comes from Late Pleisto-
cene climate records, archaeological records of the causes of
death, and genetic evidence bearing on exogamy and migration.
Neither the likely size of groups, nor the degree of genetic related-
ness within groups, nor the typical demography of foraging bands is
favorable to the view that Late Pleistocene human groups sustained
cooperation through either kin-based or reciprocal altruism. Rather
our ancestors were cosmopolitan, civic-minded, and warlike. They
beneﬁted from far-ﬂung coinsurance, trading, mating, and other
social networks, as well as from coalitions and, if successful,
warfare with other groups (Bowles & Gintis 2011, Ch. 6).
I offer the following sketch of an alternative model of revenge-
seeking, which treats this motive as a form of moral behavior: Indi-
viduals seek revenge not when they have been hurt, but when they
have been morally wronged, or when they countenance others vio-
lating the social norms of the community.
Like other organisms, humans have a preference ordering over
states of affairs, and they act to best achieve their desired states of
affairs, given the material and informational resources available to
them. These preferences are strongly inﬂuenced by genetic pre-
dispositions, but they are affected by group culture. Culture for
humans is not merely a set of learned techniques, but also a set
of moral values that are internalized by group members
(Parsons 1967). The capacity to internalize values through sociali-
zation is an evolved adaptation of humans (Durkheim 1902/1967;
Gintis 2003; Simon 1990), and accounts both for cultural diversity
across societies and (limited) cultural stability across generations.
Human social cooperation is governed not by genes alone, but
by social norms that are widely embraced by social actors, and act
as moral values present in individual preference functions. We
term these other-regarding preferences (Gintis 2009). Individuals
incorporate moral values in their actions by trading off the costly
attainment of other-regarding goals against self-regarding goals.
The ubiquity of altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment
around the world suggests that these values are strong genetic pre-
dispositions, although the evidence indicates that their expression
is strongly modulated by local cultural values (Henrich et al. 2004;
2005; 2006). There are several plausible models of the evolution
of these predispositions (Bowles & Gintis 2011; Boyd et al.
2010; Gintis 2000). There are also plausible evolutionary models
of the internalization of norms, the mechanism by which moral
values become represented in the individual’s preference order-
ing (Boehm 2011; Bowles & Gintis 2011; Gintis 2003).
In this alternative framework, revenge and forgiveness can be
self-regarding acts aimed at deterring malefactors and warning
others of the cost of aggression. But revenge can also be an
other-regarding act carried out to redress wrongs on a purely
moral level. This explains why individuals punish not only those
who hurt themselves, their families, and their allies, but more gen-
erally those who violate social norms. It also explains why individ-
uals will seek vengeance against aggressors even when there is no
possible deterrent effect.
Revenge without redundancy: Functional
outcomes do not require discrete adaptations
for vengeance or forgiveness
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Abstract: We question whether the postulated revenge and forgiveness
systems constitute true adaptations. Revenge and forgiveness are the
products of multiple motivational systems and capacities, many of which
did not exclusively evolve to support deterrence. Anger is more aptly
construed as an adaptation that organizes independent mechanisms to
deter transgressors than as the mediator of a distinct revenge adaptation.
Following Sell et al. (2009), we agree with McCullough et al. that
multiple factors shape responses to being wronged (e.g., whether
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the transgressor is a close ally, kin, or someone likely to exact high
costs due to a status or formidability differential), and that this
process is intimately related to the motivational proﬁle of anger.
McCullough et al. go further, however, by apparently proposing
the existence of additional specialized psychological adaptations
to enable deterrence. It is most parsimonious to attribute the
deterrence-related computations reviewed by the authors to the
emotion “anger,” operating in conjunction with (1) mechanisms
that transcend the domain of interpersonal conﬂict (e.g., norm-
acquisition, future forecasting, perspective-taking), (2) an attitudi-
nal system that regulates a wide variety of behaviors, and (3)
systems related to other motivations, such as reputation
management.
Consider the complex case of indirect deterrence. In our view,
the computational demands described byMcCullough et al. in this
regard are met by evolved capacities to categorize events, assume
others’ perspectives, forecast the future, and weigh costs against
beneﬁts. These capacities are directed and organized over short
time spans by the emotion of anger (Fessler 2010; Tooby & Cos-
mides 2005), and over longer time spans by the more enduring
attitude of hatred, an evaluative representation that tracks and
reacts to the fortunes of an other whose principal relationship
with the self is as a source of costs inﬂicted in zero-sum contexts
(Gervais & Fessler, under review). Hence, on the one hand, if
by “an evolved cognitive system that implements … deterrence”
(target article, Abstract) the authors mean a functionally special-
ized system that evolved expressly for this purpose, then we
would argue that redundant algorithms for deterrence-related
event categorization, perspective-taking, cost–beneﬁt analysis,
and so on, seem implausible –why engineer new content-dedi-
cated devices when a bricolage of existing devices will satisfy?
On the other hand, if the authors concede that there is no
uniquely bounded “revenge adaptation,” but contend that, none-
theless, the outputs of this bricolage can be treated as if they are
produced by such an adaptation, given that they address a uniﬁed
domain (i.e., “revenge” is a recurrent adaptive task), then we
would argue that the authors have mistaken a folk category (cost
inﬂiction motivated by anger and hatred following transgression)
for a nonexistent natural kind. There are many kinds of deterrence
that do not stem from the anger-hatred nexus (e.g., swatting a dog
in order to teach it not to steal food off the table), and hence
neither constitute “revenge” in any ordinary sense of the word,
nor involve the core motivational components of the bricolage
at issue.
The above critique holds for each of the observations adduced
by McCullough et al. As further evidence of special design, the
authors discuss strategic calibrations made in light of culturally
and individually varying exigencies, such as whether the putative
adaptation operates in a legalistic society that punishes retaliatory
violence, or in a weak soma likely to be injured in combat. We
agree that humans adaptively modulate deterrence behavior in
light of social and personal contexts, but, again, see no reason to
postulate specialized subroutines of a revenge adaptation. Cul-
tural norm acquisition mechanisms (Sripada & Stich 2007) are suf-
ﬁcient to enable learning of locally accepted ways of resolving
conﬂict. Reputation management mechanisms are also impli-
cated, moderating retributive behavior to the extent that the repu-
tational consequences of how one responds to transgression vary,
with some societies valorizing, and others demonizing, violent
retribution (Fessler 2006). This suggests only the interaction of
distinct psychological motives (i.e., to punish, to protect one’s
reputation, etc.), not, as the authors imply (sect. 3.1.2, paras. 1–4),
that the supposed vengeance system contains a customized repu-
tation circuit. This explains why the presence of onlookers can
magnify not only violence, but also charitable giving (Harbaugh
1998) and shame displays (Fessler 2004) – reputation manage-
ment systems operate in tandem with, and may potentiate or
vitiate, other systems.
As evidence of a forgiveness adaptation, McCullough et al.
observe that transgressors’ relatedness, past friendship, or
opportunity to injuriously counterattack, mitigate the severity of
deterrent responses to transgressions. The competing perspective
that we have applied to the revenge adaptation applies here as
well. Although humans likely do take ﬁtness-relevant factors
such as relatedness, prior cooperation, and relative status/formid-
ability into account during conﬂicts, it is more parsimonious to
ascribe these calibrations to the operation of other systems (e.g.,
for afﬁliation in the case of transgressive friends or kin, or fear
in the case of formidable adversaries) that moderate anger than
to propose new, highly redundant pathways engineered to facili-
tate strategic détente.
We have argued that the postulated wholes (adaptations for
revenge and forgiveness) are not greater than the sums of their
parts (perspective-taking, event categorization, norm-acquisition,
future forecasting, reputation management, etc.). The proposed
adaptations do not appear to possess domain-speciﬁc content
beyond components that, although useful in calculating deter-
rence, mostly evolved for other reasons. Anger is indeed con-
sidered to have evolved to deter harmful transgressors by
inﬂicting costs or withholding beneﬁts, and has demonstrated
unambiguous domain-speciﬁcity in this regard (e.g., Fessler &
Gervais 2010; Lazarus 1991; Sell et al. 2009). McCullough et al.
characterize anger as the proximal mediator of the proposed
revenge adaptation, but this appears to needlessly multiply enti-
ties. The crux of the issue is whether a vengeance adaptation
evolved with specialized mechanisms to compute factors such as
the likelihood, type, and severity of reprisals, the intentions of
the transgressor, social consequences, status differentials
between self and transgressor, prior history of cooperation with
transgressor, kinship with transgressor, and so forth, or whether
these diverse variables are taken into account through the simul-
taneous operation of multiple domain-speciﬁc modules operating
within the same mind, perhaps coordinated by anger in the short
term, and hatred in the long term. In both scenarios, retaliatory
behavior is moderated by personal, cultural, and situational
factors; adjudicating the issue is therefore a problem of theory
rather than of missing or disputed data. Given these options, we
advocate the latter alternative because it is simpler, kludgier,
and therefore more evolutionarily plausible.
Revenge and forgiveness or betrayal
blindness?
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Abstract: McCullough et al. hypothesize that evolution has selected
mechanisms for revenge to deter harms and for forgiveness to preserve
valuable relationships. However, in highly dependent relationships, the
more adaptive course of action may be to remain unaware of the initial
harm rather than risk alienating a needed other. We present a testable
model of possible victim responses to interrelational harm.
In the target article, McCullough et al. offer the intriguing
hypothesis that mechanisms for revenge in humans have
evolved to deter harms and that forgiveness mechanisms
evolved to compensate for the possibility or consequences of
revenge in order to preserve valuable relationships. They refer
to four possible responses to interrelational harm: acceptance, for-
giveness, avoidance, or revenge. Such responses, however, are
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contingent on the victim perceiving the harm, yet such awareness
is not always apparent or adaptive. Extrapolating from Betrayal
Trauma Theory (Freyd 1996), we suggest a different way to struc-
ture these concepts (see Fig. 1), where their “avoidance” and
“acceptance” are included in our withdrawal and unawareness,
respectively. True acceptance requires awareness; however, in
many cases (we argue in most cases), what looks like acceptance
to an outside observer is actually motivated unawareness.
If a victim is aware of the harm, he or she then has the choice to
demand repair, withdraw from the relationship, forgive the per-
petrator, or enact revenge (Fig. 1). After a demand for repair or
withdrawal, the victim’s next options depend on the perpetrator’s
response. If the response is a good one, reconciliation might
occur, whereas if the response is negative, it constitutes a new
harm and the suite of behavioral options re-starts.
Importantly, the option of awareness depends upon the victim’s
degree of empowerment in the interpersonal relationship in
which the harm occurred. As the target article notes, a victim’s
response depends heavily on his/her relationship with the perpe-
trator. For example, McCullogh et al. predict that relationships
with expected future value are more likely to be forgiving.
However, categories of interpersonal relationships involve more
than just their perceived future value.
Dependence is a particularly important dimension of relation-
ships. Being dependent on others for material and emotional
support has profound implications for adaptive responses to
harm. Betrayal Trauma Theory (Freyd 1996; DePrince et al.
2012) posits that when a victim is signiﬁcantly dependent on the
perpetrator, it may be adaptive to remain unaware of the harm
the perpetrator imposed. A dependent victim is essentially
required to maintain the relationship with his or her aggressor.
Most of the options shown in Figure 1 that follow awareness
may be detrimental to the relationship on which the victim
depends and therefore are not adaptive.
Betrayal blindness is theorized to be a basic response among
humans. Empirical research suggests that betrayal blindness is
both common and psychologically important for the victim
(DePrince et al. 2012; Freyd et al. 2007). It is likely that betrayal
blindness has played an important role in human evolution: For
humans to survive into adulthood, they had to live through
periods of signiﬁcant dependence (such as childhood). Depen-
dence continues in various forms (e.g., due to illness or resource
asymmetries) throughout the lifespan. Furthermore, although
there is variation in severity, harm in interpersonal relationships is
ubiquitous. Thus, every individual who reproduced successfully
maintained important interpersonal relationships with people who
had more power than them and sometimes caused harm. Selection
pressure may have created evolutionarily ancient human victims
who had the ability to remain unaware of interrelational harm.
Why would a person remain unaware rather than acknowledge
and either ignore (pretend not to see) or “accept” a betrayal? We
propose that such pretending is often not adaptive because of the
resources necessary for maintenance and the risks associated with
failure. If the victim is very young (infant or toddler), he or she
may not have the cognitive capacity to pretend and thus be required
to remain unaware in order to preserve the relationship. Even in
adulthood, most humans may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to be effective preten-
ders. For example, in trying to feign happiness with a perpetrator, a
victim may have trouble smiling in a seemingly authentic way (i.e.,
Duchenne smiling; see Ekman & O’Sullivan 2006). There is great
risk to being a poor pretender: losing a necessary (or apparently
necessary) relationship. Even when effective pretending is possible,
it may be very costly to cognitive capacity by consuming attention
resources that would then not be available for other tasks. It is
hard to see how such a risky and resource-demanding process
(feigning unawareness/acceptance) could be adaptive.
McCullogh et al.’s description of behavioral options (sect. 4.4)
fails to give signiﬁcant attention to the variation in awareness
that distinguishes the possible responses. For instance, the
authors’ concept of “acceptance” may actually be better under-
stood as unawareness (betrayal blindness). In other words, a
victim may appear to “accept” a harm by remaining unaware of
it. In contrast, both revenge and forgiveness constitute explicit
actions in response to interrelational harm that necessitate explicit
thought and understanding about that harm and the interpersonal
relationship between the victim and the aggressor.
We can understand different behavioral responses to harm by
organizing them on two orthogonal axes: (1) degree of awareness,
and (2) whether the victim wants to maintain the relationship
(Fig. 2). For example, a victim may forgive an aggressor when he
or she wants to maintain the relationship and is highly aware,
whereas a victim may remain blind to the betrayal when he or she
wants to maintain the relationship with the aggressor and thus is
unaware of the harm. In this model, forgiveness may be most
common when the victim holds signiﬁcant power in the relationship.
Betrayal blindness is predicted to be frequent when the perpetrator
holds signiﬁcant power. A question awaiting future research is how
tightly connected harm awareness is with empowerment.
Another interesting research question concerns the evolution of
the awareness necessary for various behavioral responses to harm.
Forgiveness and revenge seem behaviorally similar to other
responses (e.g., reconciliation and counter-aggression) but psy-
chologically different because of the difference in cognitive
awareness. Do nonhuman animals exhibit the responses of
revenge and forgiveness? Such comparative research might help
us further understand the evolution of the different possible
responses to interrelational harm.
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Abstract: The target article’s evolutionary approach provides an excellent
framework for understanding when and why people retaliate or forgive.
We argue that recent ﬁndings on the basic processes in forgiveness –
particularly, the role of executive control – can further reﬁne the
authors’ proposed model. Speciﬁcally, the lack of executive control may
restrict the explanatory power of relationship value and exploitation risk.
The adaptationist analysis of revenge and forgiveness as offered by
McCullough et al. provides a very welcome overarching theoreti-
cal framework to better understand these concepts. As the authors
note, empirical research on revenge and forgiveness has been
rather scattered, and mainly driven by mini-theories. The
authors have done an impressive job to integrate a host of pre-
viously isolated ﬁndings to support their evolutionary approach
to forgiveness and revenge. Their analysis leads to several interest-
ing testable predictions about when people will be more, or less,
likely to take revenge, and when they are more likely to forgive a
transgressor.
The target article concludes with proposing a computational
model that helps humans to decide whether to take revenge or
forgive an offender, or essentially, which response offers the
most ﬁtness beneﬁts. Ultimately this decision depends on per-
ceived relationship value (as indexed by psychological constructs
such as closeness and commitment) and perceived future exploi-
tation risk, and their interaction. As cited by the authors, research
with both human and nonhuman subjects has revealed strong
support for the relationship value prediction (e.g., Finkel et al.
2002; Karremans & Aarts 2007; Watts 2006). Recently, in line
with their evolutionary argument, we have demonstrated that
the positive association between interpersonal closeness and for-
giveness is robust across several different (both independent
and interdependent) cultures – albeit with some cross-cultural
variation regarding the strength of the association (see Karremans
et al. 2011).
However, although the theorized computational system offers a
very useful tool for understanding when and why humans forgive
or take revenge, less attention is paid to the how of revenge and
forgiveness. Recent studies have provided important insights
into the basic processes that lead to forgiveness, demonstrating
that executive functioning – in particular the cognitive ability to
control and inhibit impulsive responses (as assessed with Stroop-
like measures) – is an important facilitator of forgiveness (e.g.,
Pronk et al. 2010; Wilkowski et al. 2010; cf. Finkel & Campbell
2001). Whereas the initial impulsive response to a transgression
often is to retaliate, individual differences in executive control
are positively associated with the ability to inhibit such retaliatory
and negative affective responses, and instead to respond in a for-
giving manner (Pronk et al. 2010).
Importantly, it appears that individuals low in executive control
have difﬁculty forgiving an offending relationship partner even
when the partner is someone they feel close to – or, to use McCul-
lough et al.’s terminology, even when relationship value is high. In
a recent series of studies in primary schools, we have found initial
evidence that 11- and 12-year old children are more likely to
forgive their friends than non-friends, but crucially, that this
“relationship value” effect was more strongly pronounced
among children high in executive control (Van der Wal et al.
2012). In fact, although based on the relationship value hypothesis
we should have expected stronger forgiveness when the
transgressor is a friend rather than non-friend across the range,
children low in executive control basically did not show this
effect. Similar effects were found in a study with late adolescents,
revealing that closeness only predicted forgiveness among partici-
pants high in executive control. These ﬁndings suggest that high
relationship value generally leads to the recruitment of executive
control in order to down-regulate negative emotions toward the
offender, unless the individual lacks such executive control
resources. Thus, relationship value is not always the best possible
predictor of forgiveness – at least not for everyone, or under all
circumstances (e.g., when executive control resources are tempor-
arily depleted).
Admittedly, this literature has so far not looked at how execu-
tive control may be related to perceived exploitation risk. A poss-
ible prediction based on the authors’ proposed model is that low
executive control individuals may have more difﬁculty in estimat-
ing exploitation risk, which may prevent them from forgiving valu-
able relationship partners. Or, alternatively, low executive control
might disrupt the entire computational process, failing to success-
fully integrate relationship value and exploitation risk information
in order to decide whether or not to forgive.
The fact that low executive control hinders forgiveness, even in
the face of high relationship value (and possibly, low exploitation
risk), raises intriguing and complex questions. For example, and fol-
lowing the authors’ adaptationist logic, do individuals low in execu-
tive control –which is strongly genetically determined (see
Friedman et al. 2008) – adopt alternative strategies to minimize
the ﬁtness costs of their relative inability to forgive valuable
relationship partners? Or, as with the example of sex differences
provided in the target article, does executive control modify the
costs and beneﬁts of forgiving valuable others, such that the lack
of forgiveness may be less detrimental to the valuable relationships
of individuals low versus high in executive control? Do low execu-
tive control individuals in some way compensate for the loss of
ﬁtness beneﬁts from their relative struggle to forgive? Although
very speculative, perhaps low executive control individuals – or
more broadly, any individual with a lower forgiveness propensity
for whatever reason –may seek out relationship partners who
possess particularly well developed conﬂict-resolution skills.
To conclude, whereas in the target article the authors have built
an evolutionary theoretical account of forgiveness and revenge by
integrating largely dispersed research ﬁndings, in turn this account
inspires many novel and speciﬁc questions. However, although
relationship value and exploitation risk are the factors that help to
explain when and why revenge or forgiveness are the most adaptive
and thus most likely responses, they may be limited in addressing
how revenge and forgiveness actually occurs. Yet, knowledge
about the basic processes that describe how forgiveness occurs
also informs us about when forgiveness or revenge is the most
likely response. Hence, we believe that recent ﬁndings on executive
control and forgiveness – and more generally, any past and future
ﬁndings on the role of the proximate cognitive and neural mechan-
ism involved in forgiveness and revenge – can help to further inform
and reﬁne the authors’ theoretical approach.
Revenge: Behavioral and emotional
consequences
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Abstract: This commentary discusses dozens of ecologically powerful
social-psychological experiments from the1960s and 1970s, which are
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highly relevant especially for predicting the consequences of revenge.
McCullough et al. omitted this work – perhaps because of its
misclassiﬁcation as “catharsis” research. The ﬁndings are readily
accommodated by Konecˇni’s anger-aggression bidirectional-causation
(AABC) model and can be usefully incorporated in an adaptationist view
of revenge.
It is commendable that the authors of this excellent adaptationist
account of an important aspect of human social interaction are
concerned that “for some crucial questions about the revenge
and forgiveness systems […] data are scant” (McCullough et al.,
target article, sect. 7, para. 2). However, this is not entirely accu-
rate. The main objective of this commentary is to discuss some
very relevant experimental work on revenge that has apparently
escaped the attention of McCullough et al., in the hope that
these neglected ﬁndings and the associated theoretical ideas can
be usefully incorporated into their broad view.
Unlike the majority of ﬁndings cited by McCullough et al., the
work in question is not from the domain of economic games,
which is signiﬁcant given the external-validity doubts that can be
raised about games research with regard to the genuineness of
participants’ motivation and, especially, emotion. Instead, the
data come from social-psychological behavioral experiments pub-
lished in the1960s and 1970s (in top-tier journals), in which eco-
logically powerful procedures were used that the subsequent
human-research regulations made difﬁcult to implement. Fur-
thermore, some of these experiments dealt with issues that may
arise in long-term human dyadic relationships; such data may con-
tribute to the authors’ complex analysis of repeated “effective
updating” (sect. 3.1.1, para. 2).
The key questions are these: What are the behavioral and
emotional consequences of revenge? How might these outcomes
inﬂuence both the avenger’s (AV) and the initial offender’s (IO)
computations of the present and future costs and welfare tradeoff
ratios (WTRs)?
Most of the data come from a three-stage research paradigm:
(1) IO’s offense against AV (such as insults); (2) AV’s behavioral
retaliation against IO (such as ﬁctitious electric shocks); and (3)
obtaining dependent measures of AV’s arousal, anger, and
additional behavioral aggression against IO. These experimental
results are informative about the short- and longer-term, both
internal (sympathetic arousal, rated anger) and external
(additional aggressive behavior), consequences for AV (and for
IO as the target of any additional aggression) of the retaliatory
actions previously executed by AV against IO.
To summarize the data which have been obtained as a function
of revenge:
1. A sharply reduced amount of immediate (additional – that is,
post-revenge) aggression by AV against IO (and also against sub-
stitute or “scapegoat” targets) – not only in comparison with the
behavior of would-be avengers who did not have a prior opportu-
nity for retaliation (Doob & Wood 1972; Konecˇni & Doob 1972;
Konecˇni & Ebbesen 1976), but also of those who were required to
perform tasks (math problems) that minimized the likelihood of
anger-producing rumination (Konecˇni 1975a). In fact, even
observing the IO (allegedly) in pain (Bramel et al. 1968) or (alleg-
edly) hurt by someone else (Doob & Wood 1972) decreased the
amount of retaliatory aggression directed by the offended
person at the culprit.
2. A signiﬁcantly decreased level of AV’s physiological arousal
(that had been sharply raised by IO) compared to various
control groups (Hokanson & Burgess 1962; Hokanson et al.
1963; Hokanson & Shetler 1961). Revenge decreases physiologi-
cal arousal quickly. More generally, because aggressive responses
apparently succeed in terminating noxious stimulation emanating
from others more effectively than other responses, ceteris paribus,
they acquire arousal-reducing properties (Konecˇni 1975a; Patter-
son & Cobb 1971).
3. Auxiliary ﬁndings that are theoretically congruent with those
in point (2) have also been obtained: As a function of behavioral
revenge against IO, avengers display a restored afﬁnity for
complex stimulation (Konecˇni et al. 1976) and a reduced level
of alcohol consumption (Marlatt et al. 1975).
4. A signiﬁcantly lower level of AV’s self-rated anger, compared
to participants without a retaliatory opportunity, but, importantly,
as high a level of AV’s dislike for IO as that observed in appropri-
ate control participants (Konecˇni 1975a; Konecˇni & Doob 1972).
The entire observed pattern of ﬁndings, (1) to (4), can be
accommodated by Konecˇni’s (1975a; 1984) anger-aggression
bidirectional-causation model (AABC). The model also predicts,
because of the data in the above-mentioned points (2) and (4),
that the future execution of aggressive acts by AV against IO
would be more likely in long-term dyads (and occur sooner in
the offense-revenge sequence): The original angry, righteous
avenger may become an anger-free (“cold-blooded”) bully who
strikes with little or no provocation. Such pre-emption compli-
cates the computation of long-term WTRs beyond what McCul-
lough et al. have proposed for revenge, possibly with large
errors along the long road of adjustment or even a complete
breakdown of the relationship (often with dire consequences).
Retaliatory pre-emption – an unprovoked attack camouﬂaged as
retaliation for an (imaginary) offense – is also relevant for the com-
putation of “indirect [third-party] deterrence” (sect. 3.1.2).
Another important fact – predicted by the AABC model – that
should inﬂuence the computations by both AV and IO is that
the amount of revenge is strongly affected by the random
arousal-related circumstances in which the initial offense occurs.
Speciﬁcally, the amount of revenge has been observed in exper-
iments to increase as a function of additional (unrelated) stressors
that are present concurrently with, or immediately following the
initial offense. When AVs do strenuous physical exercise (Zill-
mann et al. 1972) or listen to loud and complex tones (Konecˇni
1975b), their retaliation against IOs is more severe than that per-
formed by controls. Therefore, from both AV’s and IO’s compu-
tational perspective, the context of the initial offense is
important – as is the perceived intentionality of both the offending
and vengeful actions.
The research described above has been largely ignored – for
various (bad) reasons. It was pigeonholed as “catharsis” and
falsely related to the outmoded “hydraulic” model of Freud and
Lorenz, or to Aristotle’s “pity and terror” – but, signiﬁcantly, not
to Plato’s correct judgment of the beneﬁts of revenge. There
was the dubious idea that watching boxing ﬁlms, fantasy aggres-
sion, or children attacking inanimate targets (none of these
genuine vengeful activities) should reduce aggression – yet the
opposite, and correct, result is predicted by the AABC model. A
slew of inadequate experimental procedures has been used to dis-
prove straw “catharsis” hypotheses and reach the socio-politically
desirable conclusion that “aggression breeds aggression” (some-
thing easily achieved, according to AABC). Fortunately, sound
evolutionary thinking (in the target article) has ﬁnally imposed a
reality check on wishful thinking.
The fuzzy reality of perceived harms
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Abstract: We review two subjective (mis)perceptions that inﬂuence
revenge and forgiveness systems. Individual differences predict more
(e.g., narcissism) or less (e.g., empathy) revenge, with the opposite
pattern for forgiveness. Moreover, differences in victim versus perpetrator
perceptions can inﬂuence revenge and forgiveness systems, perpetuating
never-ending cycles of revenge. These two examples point to the need for
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theories of revenge and forgiveness to address the role of cognitive and
motivational biases in the functionality of such behavioral responses.
When it comes to revenge and forgiveness, there is no black and
white world where harms are objective. Perceptions matter,
whether the misperceptions of individuals who overestimate or
underestimate their deservingness of beneﬁts, or misperceptions
that stem from the fuzzy nature of “who started it.” Such misper-
ceptions can exaggerate harm, and ultimately lead to miscali-
brated revenge responses relative to initiating circumstances.
Theories of revenge and forgiveness must account for cognitive
and motivational processes that serve to inﬂate or reduce percep-
tions of harm.
First, what happens when individuals consistently miscalibrate
their estimations of others’ welfare tradeoff ratios (WTRs)
toward the self? Although McCullough et al. touch on the role of
individual differences, they mainly focus on ones related to physical
strength (e.g., sex), which directly maps onto one’s ability to enact
revenge. However, individual differences in the propensity toward
revenge and forgiveness cannot all be explained this way.
For example, it is likely that people scoring high on the person-
ality trait narcissism overestimate others’ WTRs toward them-
selves, and if so, they would perceive continual violations of
these expected WTRs. This would lead to over-active revenge
systems to try to increase others’ regard for their welfare. Practi-
cally, this would manifest itself as increased sensitivity to others’
harms to the self, over-reactive anger responses, and a lower like-
lihood of forgiveness, each of which are correlates of narcissism
(Exline et al. 2004; McCullough et al. 2003; Rhodewalt & Morf
1998). Although in past research males often scored higher than
females in narcissism, such sex differences are small and are
becoming smaller over time (Twenge et al. 2008). And most
research on narcissistic anger and aggression ﬁnds that these
effects occur independently of sex (Twenge & Campbell 2003).
Thus, narcissists should be likely to see themselves as deserving
of unquestioning respect, and to (mis)perceive violations of their
expected WTRs, regardless of sex. This rules out the possibility
that such individual differences are only explained by the power
to successfully enact revenge.
Similarly, people high in dispositional empathy may chronically
miscalibrate their WTRs in the opposite direction, and have
under-active revenge systems and over-active forgiveness
systems (Macaskill et al. 2002; Stuckless & Goranson 1992).
This could make these individuals ripe for potential exploitation,
leaving open questions about the evolution of such individual
differences. Again, although there are sex differences in self-
reported empathy, these differences disappear in physiological
measures (Eisenberg & Lennon 1983; Lennon & Eisenberg
1989). Thus, it is unlikely that empathy is associated with less
revenge and more forgiveness because empathic individuals are
less able to successfully enact revenge. A number of other person-
ality variables are also consistently associated with more or less
revenge and forgiveness (Mullet et al. 2005).
One way to explain such individual differences in revenge and
forgiveness may be to consider the role of interdependence (see
sect. 4.2, para. 2). For example, those scoring high in narcissism
see themselves as less interconnected and interdependent with
others (Konrath et al. 2009), and do not place a high value on
relationships (Foster et al. 2006). Thus, they may not be con-
cerned about the relational costs of enacting revenge for even
minor perceived transgressions. Because they are always on the
lookout for new and better relationship partners (Campbell &
Foster 2002; Campbell et al. 2002), the potential to lose current
partners might not bother them too much. However, even if
this were the case, it would only explain their individual motiv-
ations for being overly vengeful, and not the evolutionary func-
tion – unless this type of behavior offered them some sort of
survival or reproductive advantage.
Other misperceptions are also important to consider. For
example, how do differences in victim versus perpetrator
perceptions inﬂuence revenge and forgiveness systems? Victims
and perpetrators do not always see eye-to-eye on the impact of
harms, such that victims perceive harms as having continuing impli-
cations for their relationships, whereas perpetrators perceive harms
as being isolated incidents without long-lasting implications for their
relationships (Baumeister et al. 1990; Zechmeister &Romero 2002).
Given such discrepancies in perceptions of harms, victims may
retaliate against perpetrators to deter future harms, but these
actions may in turn be seen as overreactions or unjust by initial per-
petrators, which can ironically lead to feelings of victimization in
them. Thus, the roles of the victim and perpetrator can easily
reverse and perpetuate cycles of revenge (Schumann & Ross
2010; Stillwell et al. 2008). In other words, when both parties’
perceptions of the harms are not calibrated, revenge cycles may
be initiated.
McCullough et al. touch on counter-revenge as a cost to
revenge and the “echo effect,” but more elaboration is needed.
When victims and perpetrators are in revenge cycles, how do
these cycles end if their actions are driven by (mis)perceptions?
What triggers forgiveness in these cycles? Or, at what point do
relationships simply dissolve? Also, what is the evolutionary func-
tion of revenge cycles?
Victims may seek revenge to change perpetrators’ WTRs
toward them. However, because perpetrators may also see them-
selves as victims, they may also try to increase avengers’ WTRs
toward them. Thus, both victim and perpetrators may feel com-
pelled to increase their retaliation level in order to change
WTRs, which can cause irreparable damages to relationships
and make it surprising that forgiveness ever occurs at all.
Perhaps one function of revenge cycles is to give individuals an
opportunity to assess the value of their relationships, so that
they can withdraw from potentially unproductive ones (Kearns
& Fincham 2005). That being said, it is also possible that
revenge cycles may be more likely to occur after individuals
have already decided to dissolve a relationship. In other words,
such misperceptions might be more common in the presence of
unproductive relationships, and may serve as a catalyst toward
dissolution.
We have reviewed two subjective (mis)perceptions that may
inﬂuence revenge and forgiveness systems, pointing to the need
for theories of revenge and forgiveness to address the role of cog-
nitive and motivational biases in the functionality of such behav-
ioral responses.
On the differential mediating role of emotions
in revenge and reconciliation
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Abstract: McCullough et al. suggest that revenge and forgiveness rest
upon risk computation. Risk computation is implemented by emotions
that evolved for additional functions, giving rise to phenomena such as
betrayal aversion and taboo-tradeoffs, and speciﬁc patterns of
forgiveness we have documented. A complete account of revenge and
reconciliation should incorporate broader constructs from social
psychology, including emotions and values hierarchies.
McCullough et al. analyze revenge and reconciliation in terms of
computation of risk and the welfare tradeoff ratio (WTR). Their
functional analysis does not clarify how these mechanisms are
implemented, but suggests that the same computational psycho-
logical mechanisms are always involved. This leaves out a signiﬁ-
cant component of a complete account.
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Risk computation cannot explain why most of us are willing to
forgo beneﬁts, including ﬁtness gains, to avoid the experience of
betrayal. People will make different decisions on whether to
take a risk, depending on whether the potential loss will be
inﬂicted by a person or by some probabilistic machine with the
same probability (for “betrayal aversion,” see Bohnet & Zeckhau-
ser 2004; Koehler & Gershoff 2003). The reason for this is that a
perceived risk of betrayal triggers emotions which, in turn, inﬂu-
ence decision making. Moreover, attitudes to trust and the
impact of fear of betrayal are culture-dependent, indicating some-
thing more than a case by case cost–beneﬁt analysis. In some cul-
tures, betrayal is so aversive that essentially no risks are taken, and
people will forgo signiﬁcant potential gains attainable with sub-
stantial probability, in order to not incur the risk of betrayal
(Bohnet et al. 2010).
McCullough et al. analyze the different costs and beneﬁts
involved in exacting revenge from close as opposed to distant
associates. Our work (Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, forthcoming)
demonstrates that trust violations evoke different patterns of
emotions, depending on the closeness of the perpetrator. These
emotions in turn predict avenues for reconciliation, as well as, cru-
cially, the ineffectiveness of certain remedies to promote reconci-
liation. We established the existence of (at least) two distinct
betrayal-domains that differ in the pattern of emotional response
evoked, in the actions that relieve negative emotions and the inﬂu-
ence of values held by the victim on the emotional response. In
the social norms domain, betrayal evokes predominantly anger-
related emotions that can be alleviated effectively, whereas in
the personal domain more profound negative emotions are eli-
cited by betrayal and fewer actions can relieve them.
For example, according to the analysis of McCullough et al.,
offers of compensation or hyper-compensation should be effec-
tive. In our study, participants did perceive monetary (hyper-)
compensation as highly effective when the perpetrator was a
stranger, but as an inappropriate remedy when the perpetrator
was a friend. In fact, such offers to a friend compound the
injury and make forgiveness more difﬁcult – a situation described
as a “taboo trade-off.” A taboo trade-off (Fiske & Tetlock 1997) is
an incommensurable comparison between two values, in which
one value is desecrated by being weighed against another, for
example to attach “a monetary value to one’s friendship”
(p. 256). Because taboo trade-offs themselves trigger negative
emotional, behavioral and cognitive responses, offering compen-
sation for a betrayal in the personal domain is likely to be per-
ceived by the betrayed as an additional act of betrayal. In terms
of appraisal theory, the victim of personal betrayal is forced to
undertake an ongoing assessment of the situation (Ellsworth &
Scherer 2003). The betrayal victim’s reappraisal of the relation-
ship is ﬁrst based on the betrayal incident and then by the offer
of monetary compensation, which implies that the perpetrator
seeks or sees an instrumental relation to the victim.
The reason for this ﬁnding is quite obvious: In the case of
friends and close allies, the computations about WTR, past invest-
ment, and future expectations are mediated by the feelings or
emotion of personal trust, that are absent with respect to stran-
gers. Moreover, emotions such as personal trust or honor are of
use beyond computation of WTR, on a cumulative or case by
case basis, and relate to broader psychological structures, such
as values. The value hierarchies espoused by people modulate
the functioning of such emotions. McCullough et al. would of
course not dispute this, but the consequences need to be
spelled out. Let us take an example from our work: We found
that the experience of trust-betrayal is inﬂuenced by the impor-
tance of the values “Power” (indicating a concern for self-interest)
and “Benevolence” (expressing the concern for the welfare of
others) (Schwartz 2005) for the betrayal victim. Power ampliﬁes
the emotional response and also enhances the effectiveness of
several relief actions, whereas benevolence may ease negative
emotions, in particular emotions of anger and regret, but it
strengthens the efﬁciency only of apology. Similarly, Stouten
et al. (2005; 2006) found that in the face of norm violators, “pro-
socials” (the benevolence-oriented; see De Cremer & Van Lange
2001) are more concerned with fairness and conﬂict resolution,
whereas “proselfs” (the power-oriented) focus on efﬁciency.
In view of these considerations, a complete account of revenge
and forgiveness should go beyond WTR and incorporate several
central constructs from social psychology. To explain speciﬁc be-
havioral patterns, it is necessary to identify the speciﬁc emotions
that are used to tally and compute the relevant risks and beneﬁts
in each case. These emotions evolved for a variety of broad func-
tions, out of which WTR computation is but one. They are differ-
entially evoked and involved according to the circumstances, and
related to yet broader psychological structures, such as values and
values hierarchies.
No such thing as genuine forgiveness?
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Abstract: McCullough et al. propose adaptations that motivate
forgiveness when the potential beneﬁts of continuing the relationship
outweigh the costs incurred by the transgression. The costs incurred are
deﬁnite, whereas future beneﬁts of forgiveness are only probabilistic.
This situation exposes the forgiver to cheating in the form of repeat
transgression. Adaptations motivating genuine forgiveness are therefore
unlikely to evolve.
McCullough et al. present a convincing case for the evolution of
psychological mechanisms that motivate revenge. They deﬁne
revenge as harm inﬂicted on someone for a perceived transgression.
According to the authors, revenge can (1) deter the transgressor
from inﬂicting future harms, (2) deter others from inﬂicting future
harms, or (3) deter others from withholding expected beneﬁts.
In this commentary, we address McCullough et al.’s proposal
that genuine forgiveness, like revenge, is produced by evolved
mechanisms. According to the authors, forgiveness is motivated
by the desire to maintain a relationship with the transgressor.
They argue that exacting revenge can produce costs for the venge-
ful that are greater than the potential beneﬁts enjoyed from for-
giveness and subsequent continuation of the relationship with
the transgressor. According to McCullough et al., therefore, func-
tional assessments of the potential beneﬁts of forgiveness as con-
trasted with the costs of revenge are key design features of the
evolved mechanisms that produce forgiveness.
The costs inﬂicted by the initial transgression are deﬁnite
whereas the beneﬁts gained from forgiveness are only probabilis-
tic. The potential future beneﬁts of forgiveness may occasionally
outweigh the costs to the vengeful of exacting revenge. That is,
the relationship with a forgiven transgressor may not yield
future beneﬁts, and the opportunity to exact revenge may have
passed. Forgiveness therefore will have produced a net cost for
the forgiver.
Moreover, the forgiven transgressor may inﬂict further costs on
the forgiver, especially given the recent history of violating with
impunity the forgiver. Furthermore, the now multiply-trans-
gressed forgiver risks earning a reputation among the local
group as someone who can be violated with impunity – inviting
transgressions from others. Psychological adaptations that motiv-
ate genuine forgiveness therefore may be unlikely to evolve. What
is more likely to evolve are adaptations that motivate feigned forgive-
ness, lulling the transgressor into reconciliation with the potential to
exact revenge when he least expects it. Feigned forgiveness also
would allow one to evaluate the potential future beneﬁts of
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maintaining the relationship with the transgressor. If the beneﬁts of
maintaining the relationship exceed the beneﬁts of exacting revenge,
feigned forgiveness can produce net beneﬁts. Feigned forgiveness
also provides for the opportunity to maintain cautious surveillance
of the transgressor, reaping any beneﬁts of continuing the relation-
ship while remaining alert to attempts at repeat transgression.
A feigned forgiver “forgives but does not forget.”
For clarity, we contrast brieﬂy a genuine forgiver with a
feigned forgiver. Although the genuine forgiver has sincerely
reconciled with and is preparing to maintain a future relation-
ship with the transgressor, he is open to future violations by
the transgressor and from others knowledgeable of the trans-
gressor’s successful violations of the genuine forgiver. The
genuine forgiver has incurred deﬁnite costs associated with the
initial transgression, but has only probabilistic opportunities to
reap beneﬁts from a continued relationship with the forgiven
transgressor. In contrast, the feigned forgiver has made peace
with the transgressor (as far as the transgressor is concerned),
but remains prepared to exact revenge, if a repeat transgression
occurs or if the beneﬁts of maintaining the relationship become
lower than the costs associated with exacting revenge on the
transgressor.
The feigned forgiver incurs the same initial costs as the genuine
forgiver associated with the original transgression, but retains mul-
tiple avenues for securing beneﬁts from a continued relationship
with the transgressor, while also remaining poised to exact
revenge, perhaps pilfering resources and other beneﬁts from
the transgressor in the process. The feigned forgiver but not the
genuine forgiver can receive beneﬁts from the continued relation-
ship with the transgressor and also can exact revenge when the
transgressor least expects this, reaping the rewards of revenge
while minimizing the costs incurred.
We present examples from literature and television to illustrate
the differing trajectories of the “genuine forgiver” and the
“feigned forgiver.” In Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, the protago-
nist Anna has a long-term sexual affair. Her husband, Karenin, dis-
covers the affair but eventually forgives her (forgoing his attempts
to secure a divorce) after Anna suffers a brief medical emergency.
Following the reconciliation, Anna reignites the relationship with
her lover and the two ﬂee Russia. Karenin is left to raise their chil-
dren alone. Karenin suffers dearly as a consequence of genuinely
forgiving his transgressor. Not only does Karenin lose his long-
term partner to a rival, but also he must now raise their children
alone and contend with a dramatic loss of social status as a conse-
quence of Anna’s inﬁdelity and desertion.
In the second season of The Sopranos, maﬁoso Tony Soprano
discovers that his close friend, Salvatore, is a conﬁdant for the
FBI. In denial and not wanting to hurt a valuable ally, Tony
maintains his relationship with Salvatore until he discovers
more incriminating evidence against him. Under the pretense
of looking at a new boat, Tony tricks Salvatore into lowering
his guard and the two go out to sea. Tony murders Salvatore
and dumps his body in the water. In this example, we see the
victim maintaining a relationship with the transgressor until the
transgressor is revealed to be irrevocably untrustworthy. At this
point, the initial victim (Tony) lulls the transgressor (Salvatore)
into a false sense of security, and then exacts revenge with
little cost to himself.
In conclusion, McCullough et al. propose the existence of
adaptations that motivate genuine forgiveness when the poten-
tial beneﬁts of continuing the relationship with the transgressor
outweigh the costs incurred by the transgression. The costs
incurred are deﬁnite, however, whereas future beneﬁts associ-
ated with forgiveness are only probabilistic. This situation
exposes the forgiver to cheating in the form of repeat transgres-
sion. Psychological adaptations motivating genuine forgiveness
are therefore unlikely to evolve. What is more likely to evolve
are adaptations that motivate feigned forgiveness, lulling the
transgressor into reconciliation and then exacting revenge
when he least expects it.
Affective antecedents of revenge
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Abstract:We propose that revenge responses are often inﬂuenced more by
affective reactions than by deliberate decision making as McCullough et al.
suggest. We review social psychological evidence suggesting that justice
judgments and reactions may be determined more by emotions than by
cognitions.
McCullough et al. posit that revenge is an evolved cognitive
mechanism meant to reduce the likelihood that a victim will
incur future harm. Speciﬁcally, they discuss the ways in which
this rational system (a deliberative calculation of the Welfare Tra-
deoff Ratio) operates in individuals and modern cultures.
However, although they include affect in their model as the
“proximate motivating system” (sect. 3.1.3, para. 10), their
model assumes that the role of affect in decision-making is
superseded by the cognitive mechanism responsible for calculat-
ing costs and beneﬁts (see sect. 3.1.3, para. 11). We review social
psychological research suggesting that revenge is far less delib-
erative than the authors argue and results from more emotion-
ally-driven reactions and biased perceptions. In particular, such
research has shown that emotions are the primary drivers of
decisions to seek revenge, and that individuals are insensitive
to deterrence motives.
Individuals frequently respond to injustice with anger, outrage,
and a heightened motivation to retaliate against the perpetrator
(Darley & Pittman 2003; Carlsmith & Darley 2008). Inasmuch
as deliberative cognitions play a role in the processes leading to
revenge, they are likely to be inﬂuenced by the decision-maker’s
emotions (Schwarz 2000; Schwarz & Clore 1983).
Some theorists have argued that anger is the primary emotion
involved in responses to injustice, leading to an increased ten-
dency to support the punishment of offenders (Darley &
Pittman 2003; J. S. Lerner et al. 1998). Anger not only increases
tendencies toward punitive action but also reduces cognitive pro-
cessing, leading to heuristic-based judgments with stronger attri-
butions of blame and desires for retribution (Goldberg et al.
1999). Moreover, anger induced by events unrelated to a trans-
gression can increase the desire for punishment, suggesting that
even incidental emotions shape justice judgments and responses.
In these instances, “hot” emotional states override deliberate cog-
nition and decision-making (Loewenstein 1996). Avengers who
are victims of the transgression grant themselves a special claim
to justice (Zitek et al. 2010), and are particularly likely to experi-
ence such emotional states.
Consistent with research on the tension between affect and
deliberation (Zajonc 1968), research on moral intuitions
suggests that individuals express moral disapproval and
outrage primarily as a result of emotional reactions, and only
later develop and express cognitive justiﬁcations (Haidt 2001).
More recent work has suggested that even such apparently ideo-
logical variables as political attitudes (Graham et al. 2009) and
voting behavior (Inbar et al. 2012) are inﬂuenced by individuals’
propensity to experience disgust. Similarly, research from
outside the moral domain has established that when asked to
elaborate on their decisions, individuals are quite inaccurate
when it comes to describing the reasons for their actions
(Nisbett & Wilson 1977). In sum, any cognitive justiﬁcation
that individuals claim motivates revenge (e.g., deterrence)
may be post-hoc and less predictive of their decision than
their emotional reactions.
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Taken together, these ﬁndings run counter to the idea that
revenge is based on a rational economic calculus meant to
reduce the future likelihood of repeated wrongdoing. Although
individuals may believe that they seek revenge for primarily utili-
tarian reasons, this research suggests that they may actually be
relatively insensitive to probabilities of deterrence and are
instead driven to punish by more emotion-based motives (Carl-
smith et al. 2002). Indeed, some research has supported this con-
tention speciﬁcally for judgments of blame and punishment. Such
research has found that individuals are more likely to blame and
punish offenders whose intentions evoke moral outrage than
those who perpetrate the same harmful acts for other reasons
(Cushman 2008); this runs contrary to the deterrence perspective,
according to which people should be insensitive to motives so long
as the probabilities of future wrongdoing are comparable. For
instance, individuals attribute more blame and causation to a
transgressor (who, e.g., injured another driver in an accident) if
the reason for the outcome was attributed to an undesirable be-
havior (e.g., speeding home to hide a vial of cocaine) versus a
desirable one (e.g., speeding home to hide an anniversary
present) (Alicke 1992). In other research suggesting that punish-
ers are not driven by cognitively based deterrence calculations,
individuals confronted with incontrovertible evidence that
capital punishment is an ineffective deterrent nonetheless main-
tained strong support for capital punishment (see Carlsmith
et al. 2002; Ellsworth & Ross 1983; Vidmar & Miller 1980).
Thus, individuals seem to be motivated to punish based primarily
on the degree of their outrage, not the potential incapacitation of
the offender (Darley et al. 2000; Kahneman et al. 1998).
Certainly, any decision-making process is likely to contain both
cognitive and affective processes (Schwarz 2000). Indeed, there
are contexts in which revenge may be a more deliberative “cold”
process (Bies & Tripp 1996), and we do not claim that revenge
is always and only emotionally driven. However, we do maintain
that victims’ affective reactions to wrongdoing or injustice, such
as anger, outrage, and resentment, are likely to be stronger predic-
tors of their revenge responses than are their cognitive calcu-
lations of future beneﬁts and costs.
In light of the research reviewed above, we believeMcCullough
et al.’s analysis does not capture the full extent to which emotions
serve as predictive causes of revenge and punishment. While the
authors remind us that evolved mechanisms may not manifest
themselves in identical ways for which they were selected, they
do provide examples of present-day behavior (e.g., recent data
from economic games) as support for their evolved mechanism.
In contrast, the social psychological research on emotions, moral
decision-making, and punishment which we have reviewed
paints a picture of revenge as more of a hot, reﬂexive reaction
than a cold, judicious decision.
Third parties belief in a just world and
secondary victimization
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Abstract: This commentary focuses on how third parties impact the
course of acts of revenge based on their world views, such as belief in a
just world. Assuming this belief to be true, the following questions could
be asked: (a) What are the consequences of a third party’s worldview in
terms of secondary victimization? (b) Are bystanders actually aware of
these consequences? (c) If so, then why do they let it happens?
McCullough et al. deﬁne revenge as a response to harm-imposing,
“to deter cost-impositions […] in the future” (sect. 2.2.4, para. 1).
As straightforward and clear-cut as this deﬁnition is, it is still
reasonable to raise the question of who should evaluate the
social reality of the response. The social reality/utility of an event
depends on the manner and the social context in which the
event is constructed by individuals. Being highly involved, both
the enactor and the receiver of revenge are motivated by the
same self-serving judgments, leading both of them to feel that
the social order is under threat. So they have to penalize the trans-
gressor for what he or she has done. In contrast, the perspective of
third parties is hypothetically the most objective. This is particu-
larly true if the third party is not directly or indirectly involved
and is fully informed of the intervening processes that connect
the instigating condition to the revengeful act.
However, judgments of third parties may also depend on their
activated worldviews. If they believe in the social-psychological
utility of revenge, such as its cathartic effect (psychological
closure and cessation of mental rumination), then their attention
might be focused on the course of revenge. This action-oriented
process leads them to disengage from situational threats (Kuhl
& Koole 2004). However, if they do not believe in the social/
psychological utility of revenge, they are forced to deal with it in
other ways, for example, by deciding that, in a just world, it is
useless to worry about the negative consequences of a person’s
actions. After all, “people get what they deserve and deserve
what they get” (Lerner 1987).
Individuals who believe in an appropriate ﬁt between getting
and deserving can therefore move on and not think further
about revenge. But research often shows that revenge can
increase rumination related to one’s ability to deter further trans-
gressions (Carlsmith et al. 2008). In both cases, however, people
are forced to make a rational analysis of revenge, evaluating its
pros and cons, to justify any punitive decisions they make and
deal with the consequences.
Researchers have distinguished two types of punishment: social
retribution and social deterrence, speciﬁcally when people are
exposed to senseless violence (Rucker et al. 2004, p. 679). Conse-
quently, the motive for retribution reﬂects deeply held beliefs
about justice, and punishment is driven by a desire to see individ-
uals pay for their deeds. The motive for deterrence is to discou-
rage future threats, and punishment in this case is based on a
profound desire to minimize the likelihood of transgression.
Hence, witnessing senseless violence may lead bystanders to
impose costs on the transgressor for his or her deeds or to deter
future wrongdoing in order to restore justice, at least in regard
to victims.
Nonetheless, research has shown that victims of aggression and
revenge must cope not only with the negative consequences
caused directly by the event (primary victimization; Brickman
et al. 1982), but also with the negative judgments (secondary vic-
timization) made by others (hetero-victimization) or even by
themselves (self-victimization). Secondary victimization seems to
be a direct consequence of the Justice Motive, ﬁrst introduced
in Lerner’s (1980) “belief in a just world” theory (BJW) to describe
people’s deep-seated need to believe that the world is a fair place.
To preserve this perception of the world, people are highly motiv-
ated to abide by moral norms and to protect them from discon-
ﬁrming evidence. Witnessing others’ unjust misfortunes may
lead people to help victims in order to deter injustice, or to
adopt cognitive strategies for denying the injustice (Lerner &
Miller 1978). People’s inalienable commitment to justice there-
fore constitutes one of their sacred values, causing them to react
with outrage and anger whenever this value is violated (Tetlock
2003).
Holding such a belief is congruent with the idea that the victim
may not be innocent. Application of the deservingness strategy
thus sometimes leads people to blame or derogate victims. Inter-
estingly, the absence of an opportunity to blame or disparage the
victim can lead people to a person identiﬁcation (perception of a
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unit relation) or a position identiﬁcation (perception of a non-unit
relation) with the victim, the latter corresponding to a less com-
passionate understanding of the victim (Lerner et al. 1976). In
addition, by suggesting a distinction between other-BJW (the
world is fair to others; Sutton & Winnard 2007) and self-BJW
(the world is fair to me; Correia & Dalbert 2008) research has
shown that other-BJW is a better predictor of negative attitudes
toward victims.
If we consider interpersonal relationships and differences/simi-
larity as a form of social distance, then threats to the goodness of
ﬁt between getting and deserving lead to psychological distancing
from victims, by moving them away from an individual’s direct
experience (Liberman et al. 2007). Psychological distance involves
self/other differentiations, which, through position identiﬁcation
and also other-BJW, activate higher-order cognitive strategies
such as the use of language that is abstract (reconstructing inap-
propriate behavior through moral justiﬁcation) and decontextua-
lized (euphemistic), fostering a deeper sense of distance from
the victims (dehumanization of the victim). In addition, such cog-
nitive reconstructions dynamically change the event’s construal
level without any subsequent modiﬁcation of the individual’s
moral standards. For Bandura (1999), these psychological mech-
anisms prepare people to be dogmatic or punitive, and to
quickly start looking for excuses, such as anger and outrage, for
having abandoned their bedrock commitment to justice. When
people blame others, they are not inclined to evaluate the correct-
ness or accuracy per se. They care only about justiﬁability, a pro-
foundly relational construct that depends on the identity of the
protagonists and their evaluative standards, regardless of
whether it captures essential aspects of reality.
Thus, although people may be unaware of the intra-individual
effects or functions of the BJW, there seems to be no doubt
about its social functions in terms of justiﬁcation of interpersonal
relationships. This supplies a good reason for switching off one’s
conscience, which equates to moral disengagement.
Adaptationism and intuitions about modern
criminal justice
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Abstract: Research indicates that individuals have incoherent intuitions
about particular features of the criminal justice system. This could be
seen as an argument against the existence of adapted computational
systems for counter-exploitation. Here, I outline how the model
developed by McCullough et al. readily predicts the production of
conﬂicting intuitions in the context of modern criminal justice issues.
An adaptationist framework predicts that people’s intuitions
regarding modern criminal justice stem from psychological mech-
anisms designed for countering the evolutionarily recurrent equiv-
alent, exploitation (Petersen et al. 2010). By implication, the
model of evolved counter-exploitation mechanisms described by
McCullough et al. should predict core features of criminal
justice intuitions.
Most of the previous applications of the adaptionist framework
to criminal justice focus on people’s perceptions of crime serious-
ness, arguing that they emerge from evolved intuitions about
harm (e.g., Robinson et al. 2007). In making this argument,
researchers emphasize the high levels of consensus among indi-
viduals and countries on the relative seriousness of different
crimes. If widespread agreement is a necessary product of the
operations of evolved mechanisms, we would conclude that such
mechanisms play little role in the production of the intuitions
most relevant to McCullough et al.’s model: that is, intuitions
about whether punitive or reparative goals should be given pri-
ority in criminal justice. Hence, in criminological research, con-
sensus that people have incoherent or “mushy” criminal justice
intuitions has emerged from observations of profound disagree-
ment between individuals, and in different situations about the
prioritization of punitive and reparative sanctioning goals
(Cullen et al. 2000; Roberts & Hough 2002; Roberts & Stalans
2004).
McCullough et al.’s model emphasizes (1) the existence of com-
putational systems designed to implement revengeful as well as
forgiving strategies, and (2) computations of the social value of
the exploiter as the key regulator of the activation of these strat-
egies (see also Petersen et al. 2010). These two features, I
argue, render disagreement between individuals and in different
situations an unavoidable outcome of the operation of our
evolved counter-exploitation intuitions.
This relates to the fact that the social value of others is both self-
speciﬁc and target-speciﬁc. One target is the self’s kin, another is
not; in one case, the target and the self share a history of coopera-
tive interactions, in another case they don’t; one target is part of
the same group as the self, another is not. And so on. Accordingly,
different selves will compute the social value of the same target
differently, and a single self will compute the social value of differ-
ent targets differently. In the face of a speciﬁc exploiter, some
individuals will therefore experience punitive sentiments, while
others will experience reparative sentiments.
In modern mass societies, an individual’s personal welfare will
rarely be affected by how the state sanctions a single criminal,
regardless of that criminal’s social value. Nevertheless, given the
evolutionary importance hereof, our minds should be designed
to automatically pick up on ecologically valid cues to the presence
of social value (e.g., expressions of remorse, shared ethnic back-
ground, lack of criminal record) and activate punitive and repara-
tive sentiments accordingly. In modern criminal justice, different
sanctioning types are aligned with these different sentiments to
varying degrees. Cost-imposing sentences such as prison are
aligned with punitive sentiments, whereas rehabilitation
schemes are more aligned with reparative sentiments (e.g.,
Cullen & Gendreau 2000). Accordingly, different individuals
will prioritize different sanctioning types in the face of the same
criminal (e.g., depending on the match between the respective
ethnic or racial backgrounds of the self and the criminal), and
the same individual’s priorities will change in the face of different
criminals (depending on the speciﬁc cues surrounding each case).
This simple observation readily integrates the adaptationist fra-
mework and the demonstrations of disagreement within individ-
uals towards different crimes and between individuals towards
the same crime. According to this interpretation, lay intuitions
are not “mushy,” and disagreement is driven by the existence
rather than lack of principled intuitions. If valid, we should ﬁnd
that whether individuals agree or disagree about appropriate sanc-
tions is predictable from whether there is agreement or disagree-
ment with respect to the perceived future social value of the
criminal. Some evidence for this link already exists (Burnette
et al. 2012; Lieberman & Linke 2007; Petersen et al. 2012).
Modern criminal justice intuitions have been deemed “mushy”
for more than just these kinds of disagreement. In particular con-
texts, research has also demonstrated how people ﬁnd it highly dif-
ﬁcult to prioritize either reparative or punitive sanctioning goals.
Instead, people concurrently express ﬁrm support for both
(Cullen et al. 2000; McCorkle 1993; Roberts 1992). Such
genuine ambivalence might initially appear more difﬁcult to
reconcile with McCullough et al.’s model. Yet, in order to under-
stand the output of any computational system, we must simul-
taneously analyze the system’s informational needs and the
information offered by the environment (Gigerenzer et al.
1999). As McCullough et al. emphasize throughout their article,
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modern environments do not necessarily deliver the cues that the
revenge/forgiveness systems require to operate adaptively. The
context within which modern criminal justice intuitions emerge
offers a case in point. We evolved to function within small-scale
groups and react towards speciﬁc exploiters. Modern political
debates concerning criminal justice, in contrast, proceed within
anonymous mass societies and are general rather than speciﬁc in
the sense that they are often about how to react towards all crim-
inals. In this context, our counter-exploitation psychology would
be activated by the features exhibited by crime, but the lack of
ecologically valid cues about the social value of the relevant crim-
inals would make it difﬁcult for this psychology to execute prop-
erly and, in particular, to up-regulate either punitive or
reparative motivations at the expense of the other. Some evidence
for this proposition already exists, as people’s difﬁculties in prior-
itizing between punitive and reparative goals seem to be restricted
to general information-sparse decision-making contexts: When
speciﬁc cues are directly available, unequivocal criminal justice
intuitions emerge (Petersen 2009).
Although the previous applications of the adaptionist frame-
work have emphasized the shared nature of criminal justice intui-
tions, the widespread existence of conﬂicting intuitions about the
prioritization between punitive and reparative goals should not be
taken as evidence against the existence of adapted mechanisms for
generating such intuitions. Hence, the model developed by
McCullough et al. readily predicts the production of conﬂicting,
changing, and ambivalent intuitions about this particular feature
of modern criminal justice.
The elementary dynamics of intergroup
conﬂict and revenge
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Abstract: The psychology underlying revenge in an intergroup context is
built around a small handful of recurrent interaction types. Analyzing the
cost/beneﬁt calculations of each agent’s role within these interaction types
provides a more precise way to characterize intergroup conﬂict and
revenge. This in turn allows for more precise models of the psychology
of intergroup conﬂict to be proposed and tested.
In their target article, McCullough et al. re-conceptualize the fam-
iliar concepts of revenge and forgiveness in terms of classes of evo-
lutionarily recurrent situations involving potential costs and
beneﬁts, around which proximate psychological mechanisms are
designed. Here, “costs” and “beneﬁts” are not synonyms for pre-
ferences or desires, but instead correspond to classes of outcomes
which relate to differential reproductive success over multiple
generations. This approach sheds new light on old constructs,
reframes the questions being asked, and provokes new and clear
directions for future research. While the target article focuses
on revenge and forgiveness, this same perspective also suggests
new ways to think about intergroup conﬂict. For example, inter-
group conﬂict and revenge can be understood as a sequence of
triadic interactions, of which there are only four types. Following
Strayer and Noel (1986), these are as shown in Figure 1:
In an Alliance, two agents attack or impose costs on a third
agent: A attacks B, and C also attacks B. In Defense, one
agent attacks a second, and a third agent responds by attacking
the aggressor: A attacks B, C then attacks A. In Generalization,
one agent attacks two others: A attacks B and then also
C. Finally, in Displacement, one agent attacks another, and
that attacked agent responds by subsequently attacking a third
agent: A attacks B, B then attacks C. Any instance of intergroup
conﬂict or revenge will involve a particular concatenated
sequence of these interactions. What determines this sequence
will be the result of cost/beneﬁt decisions on the part of each
actor.
This taxonomy of triadic conﬂict has served descriptive pur-
poses for decades. But from an adaptationist perspective, this tax-
onomy can also be understood as describing recurrent classes of
situations that humans have encountered. Moreover, for each
interaction type, the perspective of each agent can be analyzed.
For example, consider (1) Alliance: A should calculate the like-
lihood that C will ally with him in determining whether or not to
initially attack B. A should also consider the consequences of C
also attacking B. C needs to calculate the value of allying with A
against B. C may do this to ingratiate himself to A, or owe some-
thing to A, or be differentially allied with A. Or, C may have a poor
relationship with B, and take advantage of this opportunity to
impose a cost on B. B should represent the cost imposed by
both agents, and should also consider the pairwise relationship
comparisons: B with A, B with C, A with C in determining what
to do next.
Or, consider, (4) Displacement: B may act because A has an
interest in C, and by imposing a cost on C, B is intending to
indirectly impose a cost on A. Or, even if A has no interest in C,
B’s action towards C may cause C to appeal to A to take B’s
welfare into account (because A’s aggression towards B is now
yoked to B’s aggression towards C, such that if A aggresses
again, C will be hurt again). The potential cost to B of doing
this is that it may cause A and C to unite against B. This is less
of a problem if it is already likely that C would have come to A’s
defense. A will represent that B has imposed cost on C, and will
Figure 1 (Pietraszewski). The four types of triadic conﬂict. Arrows denote attack/cost imposition. All instances of intergroup conﬂict and
revenge are built up out of these interaction types. (Adapted from Strayer & Noel 1986).
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subsequently calculate the effect on C. To the degree A has an
interest in C, or that C will retaliate towards A, A should consider
B’s action a cost. C will represent that B imposed a cost.
The proximate psychology of multi-person conﬂict, revenge,
and retaliation is built around these recurrent interaction types.
Considering each agent’s perspective within these triadic inter-
actions therefore allows one to reframe the vague and difﬁcult
question, What is the proximate psychology of intergroup con-
ﬂict?, into sets of deductively richer and tractable questions,
such as: What are the classes of situations in which an agent
ﬁnds themselves in role B during an alliance event? What cost/
beneﬁt considerations would that agent need to consider? And,
What are the on-the-ground cues that would facilitate identifying
these situations?
From this perspective, the folk construct “group” can be under-
stood as classes of relationships between agents which cause them
to be more likely to be in particular roles within these interaction
types. What it means to be members of a group, as far as the
design of the proximate psychology may be concerned, is to be
in roles A & C in Alliance, B & C in Defense and Generalization,
and A & C in Displacement. These roles would be part of the cue
structure on the input end (i.e., observing these roles allows one to
deduce an intergroup conﬂict is unfolding, and also who is allied
with whom), and also be embodied in the motivational and rep-
resentational changes on the output end (being allied or in a
group with someone makes it more likely one will execute the
behaviors that correspond to these roles). This would be true of
the psychologies driving the decisions of the actors within the
group context, as well as the psychologies of third parties who
are forming expectations and updating their representations of
the groups and their members.
This analysis suggests a tentative answer to a question posed by
McCullough et al., of whether the psychology that governs the
operation of revenge systems also evolved to regulate behavior
in intergroup contexts. In many respects, the proximate psychol-
ogy governing intergroup conﬂicts is probably interestingly differ-
ent from systems primarily designed around dyadic revenge
(different because it requires triadic, rather than dyadic calcu-
lations, and because its cue structure and subsequent behavioral
and motivational responses will likely be somewhat different).
However, even if the proximate psychologies are interestingly
different, they are both examples of phenotypic design to contin-
gently respond to direct or indirect costs imposed by other agents.
Revenge: An adaptive system for maximizing
ﬁtness, or a proximate calculation arising from
personality and social-psychological
processes?
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Abstract: Revenge appears among a “suite” of social interactions that
includes competition, alliance building (a prerequisite for tribal revenge
raids), and so forth. Rather than a modular “system” directly reﬂecting
evolutionary ﬁtness constraints, revenge may be (another) social cost-
beneﬁt calculation involving potential or actual aggression and
proximately controlled by individual personality characteristics and
beliefs that can work against ﬁtness.
In focusing upon revenge, McCullough et al. have raised an inter-
esting topic with broad cultural and social signiﬁcance. If anything,
their article may underestimate its importance in, for example, the
contemporary workplace (e.g., Tripp & Bies 2010). One unnoted
aspect of revenge is its powerful and seemingly universal role in
motivating warfare in preliterate cultures in which homicide
rates can rise well beyond those in industrialized societies. In
the recent past, the Waorani of the Ecuadorian rainforest (Beck-
erman et al. 2009) and the Gebusii of lowland New Guinea
(Knauft 1987) were each locked into repeating cycles of within-
group revenge murders; both may have been on their way to
killing themselves off before being rescued by outside
intervention.
The authors clearly and commendably distinguish between the
ultimate shaping of behavior by its effects on ﬁtness and its prox-
imate behavioral/motivational instantiations. They argue that
revenge is an identiﬁable (presumably modular) system whose
characteristics directly reﬂect the ﬁtness pressures that shaped
it. While I agree that revenge is important, I suggest that (1) it
is just part of a suite of proximate behavioral/motivational mech-
anisms that calculate social cost–beneﬁts involving potential or
actual aggression, and that (2) these powerful mechanisms
shape revenge in ways that are independent of, or even antitheti-
cal to, whatever ﬁtness pressures might have given rise to them.
Thus, the phenomenon of people reciprocally locking themselves
into lethal revenge cycles is a major and fairly common “misﬁre”
(the authors’ term) of proximate mechanisms in the face of sup-
posed ultimate maximization of ﬁtness. Four other caveats and a
comment on tantrums follow.
The reinforcing value of aggression. In a drive-by allusion,
McCullough et al. acknowledge, but do not give due weight to,
the intrinsically reinforcing aspects of aggression as a primary
reward in exacting revenge. Several sorts of evidence indicate
that some men enjoy aggression. Historic episodes, when subcul-
tures enjoyed “recreational” ﬁghting, include 15th century Vene-
tian bridge ﬁghts, 19th century Irish “faction ﬁghts”
(“Donnybrook” refers to a seasonal Irish fair featuring big
ﬁghts), and end-of-season brawls among American loggers
(Ingle 2004). Individuals in subcultures in which ﬁghting is a
norm, for example, some English soccer fans (Buford 1992) and
pub-goers (Graham &Wells 2003), continue to provide subjective
reports of pleasure in ﬁghting; but even in samples not selected
for ﬁghting, a modicum of pleasure in aggression is reported
(Ramírez et al. 2005; cf. Nell 2006).
Of course, beyond any intrinsic reward in activating the neural
circuitry of aggression, its reinforcing value may be shaped by, for
example, pride and self-esteem in ﬁghting and winning and/or
relief of tension and fear of harm. Developmentally, however,
boys’ pleasure in aggression appears as a major sex difference at
least as early as age four (Benenson et al. 2008). Phylogenetically,
aggression’s reinforcing value has been demonstrated across many
species; ﬁsh swim through rings, birds peck at keys, and mice and/
or rats poke their noses in holes, press bars, and run across elec-
triﬁed grids just to attack a conspeciﬁc (e.g., May & Kennedy
2009).
Anger versus rumination. If anger were its driving affect,
revenge would be short-lived. Surveys suggest that ordinary epi-
sodes of anger persist for no more than about 30 minutes,
usually less (Potegal 2010). Unless revenge is taken in the
moment, one must invoke anger transformed into rumination,
which is a highly elaborated cognitive activity that includes
detailed (sometimes fanciful) planning for the future. This
accords with the advice of boxing coaches, military generals, and
others who urge on their ﬁghters the proverbial “Revenge is a
dish best eaten cold.” At a pathological extreme, rumination on
revenge that eventually results in a “catathymic crisis” can
disrupt the would-be avenger’s life for weeks, months, or even
years.
Personality. In the context of anger, the frequency and intensity
of revenge is likely closely associated with an individual’s general
level of hostility as indicated by, for example, standard measures of
hostility or Big 5 (dis)-agreeableness, as the authors and others
have shown. If so, how much variance in individual behavior is
explained by cost-beneﬁt analysis of particular situations versus
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general personality characteristics? Although individual hostility,
enjoyment of aggression, risk-taking, and so forth could be
treated as parameters in equations predicting revenge, if there
are, for example, many individuals who never take revenge and/
or many who always do, no matter how slight the offense, then
revenge depends more on proximate personality than on ultimate
causation as reﬂected in situational demand.
Witchcraft murders –Revenge against kin. Witchcraft trials in
Europe and North America ended more than 250 years ago, but
in parts of India, Sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere, thousands
of people have been exiled or killed for being witches in the last
three decades (Federici 2010). A witchcraft believer who experi-
ences misfortune or illness will suspect that the culprit is someone
who harbors ill feelings toward him. In small communities, these
may well be family members (kin or afﬁnes) because quarrels with
them are the most likely. Remarkably, many children have been
abandoned, injured, or killed by people including their parents
(Adinkrah 2011; UNICEF Report 2010). Witchcraft accusations
among kin, especially against children, contradicts biological
ﬁtness expectations and is more consistent with proximate psycho-
logical processes and beliefs.
Finally, the parenthetical comment that tantrums are among
behaviors that children impose on parents “with impunity”
requires more attention to detail. Across quite different groups
of children, tantrums are composed of one set of behaviors reﬂect-
ing anger (e.g., shouting, hitting) and a second set reﬂecting dis-
tress-sadness (e.g., crying, whining, and comfort seeking, Green
et al. 2011; Potegal & Davidson 2003; Potegal et al. 2003;
2009). This differentiation has been replicated (Giesbrecht et al.
2010). Anger and sadness/distress have different temporal pro-
ﬁles. Angry behaviors peak early in tantrums, then fade while
sadness/distress behaviors remain relatively constant throughout.
Thus, tantrums end with children’s sadness/distress and comfort
seeking. Functionally, the child’s terminal sadness pulls for
parent comfort-giving, that is, behavioral “forgiveness.” Thus,
child sadness and corresponding parent comfort-giving help end
the tantrum and repair social bonds that were just strained by
the child’s anger (Potegal 2000; Potegal & Davidson 1997).
Applying the revenge system to the criminal
justice system and jury decision-making
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Abstract:McCullough et al. propose an evolved cognitive revenge system
which imposes retaliatory costs on aggressors. They distinguish between
this and other forms of punishment (e.g., those administered by judges)
which are not underpinned by a speciﬁcally designed evolutionary
mechanism. Here we outline mechanisms and circumstances through
which the revenge system might nonetheless inﬁltrate decision-making
within the criminal justice system.
Applying the revenge system to the criminal justice system and
jury decision-making. The proposed evolved cognitive revenge
system serves two purposes: to discourage an aggressor from
imposing future costs to their victim, and to encourage the aggres-
sor not to withhold future beneﬁts from the victim. McCullough
et al. suggest that the revenge system is similar to the criminal
justice system (CJS) in some respects, but is fundamentally dis-
tinct from institutionally organised forms of punishment such as
the ones administered by judges. However, we believe that,
under certain circumstances, the revenge system may not be as
distinct from the CJS as McCullough et al. suggest. In particular,
it may be relevant to the applied context of jury decision-making,
where a group of lay people are tasked with deciding whether or
not a person is guilty of committing a crime (this can be wholly,
partially, or not guilty). In light of growing recognition of the
potential for applying evolutionary insights to speciﬁc issues in
modern society (e.g., Roberts 2012), we here discuss the ways
in which the proposed revenge system can be applied to the CJS.
The main distinction between the evolved revenge system and
institutionally administered punishment lies in their respective
foci. While the former is characterised by a mechanism designed
to deter cost-impositions or beneﬁt-withholdings in the future (as
McCullough et al. argue in the target article), and is underpinned
by emotional motivation (e.g., Lapsley 1998), the latter is based on
socially developed constructs of justice (Ho et al. 2002; Price
1997). The CJS therefore aims to allocate suitable and appropriate
punishment in an emotionally detached fashion, according to pre-
identiﬁed guidelines and societal norms (Lerner 2003).
A further distinction between the revenge system and jury
decision-making lies in the level of personal involvement.
Whereas the revenge system is discussed in the context of a
victim-aggressor relationship, where the costs and beneﬁts are
highly personal and relevant to the individuals directly involved,
CJS decision-making involves almost no true personal involve-
ment, as no previous (or probable future) relationship normally
exists between the aggressor and legal representatives or jurors.
There are, however, occasions where the revenge system may
inﬁltrate the CJS. This is because punitive decisions in the CJS
cannot always be wholly extricated from emotional inﬂuence
(Ho et al. 2002; Murray et al. 2011). Individuals who hear intimate
details about a case may involuntarily become emotionally
involved, especially where there has been a high cost to the
victim (e.g., extreme violence, sexual assault), leading to
empathy for the victim (Tsoudis 2002). Jurors, in particular, may
be inﬂuenced by the emotional re-telling of an incident, as they
are relatively unlikely to have experiences of such cases in their
day-to-day lives and have little to no formal training in legal pro-
cesses. Through increased emotional involvement and empathy,
an “emotionally involved” juror may come to view the costs of
the crime in a personal manner, seeing the beneﬁts of punishment
in a similar way to the victim, leading to the desire for “vengeance”
and stronger punitive sentiment (Ho et al. 2002; Lapsley 1998;
Murray et al. 2011). Thus, because of the evolutionary link
between emotion and vengeance, the proposed revenge system
may well be applicable to decision-making by jurors (and possibly
others), at least in cases where emotional valence and cost to the
victim is high.
Understanding the likely circumstances under which the
revenge system may be activated within institutionally adminis-
tered punitive decision-making is a necessary step towards
making such processes more balanced and fair. Activation of the
revenge system is less likely in cases where the cost to the
victim, and therefore levels of empathy, are relatively low (e.g.,
petty crimes, which constitute the majority of cases). In such
instances, punitive decisions may be better explained and
guided by considering socially deﬁned justice processes and
norms. In contrast, as we have discussed, the revenge system cog-
nitive architecture may be suitable for understanding decision-
making in more emotionally valenced cases and especially when
jurors are involved.
Furthermore, research is urgently needed to understand poten-
tial between-individual differences in susceptibility to emotional
involvement and its corollary effects on judgements and punitive
decision-making. Our recent unpublished data, for example,
suggest that personality traits predict levels of anger at transgressors
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and the desire to punish them. Another example is potential gender
differences in emotional involvement. In a scenario involving trans-
gression in a public-goods game, men expressed a greater desire to
punish “cheats” than did women (O’Gorman et al. 2005). Men also
showed different empathy-related activation responses than
women in response to individuals who played unfairly in a study
of another economic game, and were more likely to express
desire for revenge and to favour physical punishment (Singer
et al. 2006). Furthermore, it is now well-known that evolutiona-
rily-relevant characteristics of the defendants (such as their sex
and attractiveness), and shared characteristics between defendants
and jurors (such as race or sexuality, triggering in-group/out-group
prejudice), inﬂuence punitive sentiment and leniency or harshness
in sentencing (e.g., Abwender & Hough 2001). These ﬁndings may
be explained through involuntary activation of the revenge system’s
cognitive architecture.
Although there are clear distinctions between the proposed
revenge system in its current form and institutionally adminis-
tered punishment decisions, the revenge system may be useful
in explaining punitive decision-making in a number of applied
contexts in the CJS, notably where jurors are involved and
emotional valence in a case is high. Through considering justice
as a mediating factor alongside the already existing components
of the revenge system, the theory may also be applicable at a
more “socially driven,” justice-based decision-making level. A
ﬁnal potential use for the revenge system is in future investigations
of punitive decision-making in the CJS relating to between-indi-
vidual differences, such as personality and gender differences,
as we have discussed. Through better understanding the ways in
which individuals come to their decisions about punishment,
improvements to punitive decision-making processes within the
CJS will be made possible.
Forgiveness is institutionally mediated, not an
isolable modular output
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Abstract:McCullough et al. recognize that revenge and forgiveness jointly
constitute a functional strategic complex. However, they model the halves
of the complex as outputs of modules selected for regulating dyadic
relationships. This is backwards. Forgiveness is a culturally evolved
institution that can be exapted for use in dyadic contexts; it would be
cheap talk among dyads were it not for the shadow of society.
McCullough et al. perform several useful services in their target
article. They remind us that the familiar phenomenon of
revenge-seeking is not a pathology for which forgiveness is a
cure – so that the “progress of civilization” might be imagined as
leading toward a world where forgiveness abounds and revenge
goes the way of foot-binding and cigarette smoking. Forgiveness,
McCullough et al. correctly stress, is part of a functional complex
with revenge, and the complex as a whole is almost certainly main-
tained by selection dynamics. Seeking revenge is often welfare-
promoting for an agent because it changes others’ incentives
toward the self (see sect. 2.2.1), ideally inducing an increase in
cooperation and/or a decrease in exploitation. Most importantly
in my view, McCullough et al. recognize that forgiveness is impor-
tant, interesting, and indeed theoretically surprising because it
seems on the surface to be cheap talk. Once I exact my revenge
against you, in equilibrium you should recognize that, if our con-
tinued relationship is of any value to me, I have no incentive to
continue to follow a vengeful course if you avoid the action that
triggered it. And since announcing the words “I forgive you”
seems costless to me, what information value could the announce-
ment possibly add to your appreciation of our equilibrium con-
ditions? And yet most people regard the timing and
circumstances of forgiveness as matters of solemn signiﬁcance.
In other writings (Ross 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2012) I have
suggested that a key condition for the existence of equilibrium
strategy vectors that include revenge and forgiveness is the
human susceptibility to shame – that is, to suffering from highly
aversive emotions when one detects that information about
one’s norm violations may be spreading through social networks
by gossip. Gossiping about a transgression is of course not the
only, nor always the most efﬁcacious, means by which revenge
is carried out. However, it is arguably the most common. And,
as I have argued, it is the crucial mechanism that promotes the
ubiquitous existence of institutions for legitimizing forgiveness.
Members of a species who depend on specialization and exchange
of goods and services beneﬁt from mechanisms that allow reputa-
tionally damaged members of economic networks to be restored
to productive membership once corrective punishment is
thought to have triggered policy reform on their part. Institutions
for forgiveness allow the social costs of the most common acts of
revenge to be massively reduced, at least when revenge is taken
through harming a transgressor’s reputation as opposed, for
example, through harming his kneecaps. This in turn solves the
much-discussed problem that arises when punishment of norm
violation is costly to punishers, that agents are incentivized to
free ride on the public good of norm enforcement (Guala 2012).
It is of crucial importance, on this account, that forgiveness is
institutionalized and public, and operates mainly in games that
involve more than two players. Of course, once institutions for for-
giveness exist, and their force is internalized through socialization
and enculturation of young people, they can be exapted for use in
dyadic interactions. But the shadow of society is always present in
such interactions. Use of a phrase such as “I forgive you” is regu-
lated by pragmatic (Gricean) conventions that include in their
implicatures the act of promising not to spread blame for the
transgression at issue. Forgiveness is a species of promising, and
promising is a conventional institution regulated by socially
enforced norms.
In light of these considerations, it is doubtful methodology to
try to develop a model of the evolutionary function of revenge
and forgiveness, as McCullough et al. do, by beginning with the
case of the isolated dyad. The authors go to some lengths to ana-
lytically distinguish forgiveness – in a technical sense they deliber-
ately construct – from more complicated institutionally governed
cognitive/behavioral relatives. They are compelled to go to this
trouble because they want to promote the hypothesis that there
are specialized evolved cognitivemodules for revenge and forgive-
ness that societies and institutions can then exploit – and some-
times suppress – as networks of interactions become more
complex. Such modules would support special senses of revenge
and forgiveness that can be isolated from social dynamics.
I do not see that in their target article McCullough et al.
produce any evidence for this conjecture. It is plausible that insti-
tutional and culturally evolved and stabilized revenge/forgiveness
complexes depend on biologically selected dispositions to be
emotionally sensitive to perceptions of signals of possible
changes in one’s reputation among conspeciﬁcs. Emotions
related to social rejection and reconciliation are probably
evolved dispositions present in all normal primates, cetaceans,
canids, corvids, et cetera. Such dispositions are likely necessary
aspects of the evolution of cognitively mediated sociality in
general. However, once social interdependence has evolved and
thrown up free rider problems, strategies based on reciprocity
are solutions that any cultural dynamics are likely to ﬁnd and
stabilize. I see no evidence that human institutions for forgiveness
couldn’t be supported by general cognitive processes and should
be thought to require dedicated modules. Of course, dogs and
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elephants (etc.) lack resources for building forgiveness insti-
tutions. But what in their behavior should lead us to think that
their cognitive processing goes beyond general dispositions to
reconcile with group members following non-lethal altercations?
The hypothesis I favor is that the individual psychology of inter-
action is parasitic, both developmentally and theoretically, on its
social psychology, economics, and political anthropology. The
science should start at the aggregate level and treat individual
and dyadic expressions as, respectively, exaptations (when charac-
terizing development) and abstractions (when building game-the-
oretic models). For example, avoidance should be modeled as the
special dyadic case of the primary phenomenon of ostracism from
the group. McCullough et al. deliberately pursue the opposite
modeling approach.
Ethics preclude testing between these hypotheses by isolating
some human children from opportunities to learn forgiveness con-
ventions. But if there are dedicated modules for computing
revenge and forgiveness, we should ﬁnd people suffering from
neural deﬁcits that knock out these capacities while leaving
other emotionally motivated and regulated cognition intact. I
am aware of no clear reports of such cases in any literature.
Revenge can be more fully understood by
making distinctions between anger and hatred
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Abstract: McCullough et al. present a compelling case that anger-based
revenge is designed to disincentivize the target from imposing costs on
the vengeful individual. Here I present a contrast between revenge
motivated by anger (as discussed in the target article) and revenge
motivated by hatred, which remains largely unexplored in the literature.
The idea that hatred is an evolved adaptation has not been
thoroughly elaborated (though see Waller 2004; Petersen et al.
2010; Sell 2011). I give a brief outline here of how a selection
pressure distinct from those considered in the target article
could design a system – hatred – that enacts revenge in response
to different triggers, moderated by different variables and
designed for different purposes.
Consider the following selection pressure: The existence and
well-being of another individual has some impact on your lifetime
ﬁtness; sometimes that impact is negative. Such an individual could
have a low Welfare Tradeoff Ratio (WTR) towards you (e.g., a
bully); could be someone who values you highly but nevertheless
imposes large costs (e.g., a ﬂirtatious student whose inappropriate
behavior threatens your marriage); or even be someone who
doesn’t know you exist (e.g., the person who holds the job you
want). This selection pressure would design a mechanism that
identiﬁes these individuals and then deploys –when cost-effec-
tive – behavioral strategies that reduce the target’s ability to
impose costs by limiting interactions with the target, reducing
their power, or killing them. Let us call the mechanism
“hatred,” recognizing that in layman’s terms “anger” and
“hatred” are often conﬂated.
According to the recalibrational theory, and consistent with the
arguments made by McCullough et al. in the target article, the
function of anger-based revenge is to raise the target’s WTR
(Sell et al. 2009; Sell 2011). The function of hatred, in contrast,
is to reduce costs that emanate from another individual by isolat-
ing, weakening, or killing them. These are different designs and
should generate distinct predictions about their antecedent con-
ditions and behavioral strategies.
The triggers of hatred are theoretically distinct from those of
anger. As discussed in the target article, anger is triggered by indi-
cators that another does not value one’s welfare highly. Hatred is
triggered by indicators that another’s existence and well-being will
cause harm. Both anger and hatred can be triggered by the inten-
tional imposition of large costs for trivially small beneﬁts. But
hatred can also be triggered by rivals for mates or status, even
when these rivals hold the hateful person in high regard (i.e.,
have high WTRs towards the hateful individual). Targets can
also be hated for the imposition of frequent small “justiﬁed”
costs that do not indicate a low WTR but nonetheless bear on
the hateful individual’s future welfare. Such an explanation
could explain the perversely high prevalence of physical aggres-
sion against elders who require living assistance (Lachs & Pillemer
2004; Pillemer & Finkelhor 1988) and disabled children who
require additional investment (Westcott & Jones 1999).
Also unlike anger, hatred can motivate seemingly vengeful be-
havior when the target has done nothing other than be harmed by
the hateful person. Harming someone will cause them to lower
their WTR, retaliate, or spread word of the misdeed to others.
This makes the original victim into a person whose existence pre-
dicts future costs for the offender. As paradoxical as it seems, sub-
jects who were made to insult or harm others did indeed dislike
them for it (Schopler & Compere 1971), but they cannot be
said to have been “angry” at their victims.
The behavioral consequences of hatred and anger partly
overlap, speciﬁcally with the enactment of revenge. Both anger
and hatred can fulﬁll their functions by imposing costs on the
target individual. However, if the selection pressures responsible
for each emotion are distinct, then we would predict certain
differences in their behavioral strategies. One difference is that
hatred should be largely indifferent to apologies or signals of reca-
libration. In fact, apologies – to the extent that they indicate the
hated person is suffering – could be experienced pleasantly and
incentivize more cost inﬂiction. This is because the “off switch”
to anger and hatred are different. Anger has served its function
when the target recalibrates, but hatred has fulﬁlled its function
only when the target has been signiﬁcantly de-powered, killed,
or ostracized. Indeed, anger-based aggression is frequently nego-
tiative in design with clearly demarcated starting and ending
points, turn taking, escalation starting with low-cost assessments
of formidability, and an understanding of “fairness” that tracks
the accuracy of assessments; for example, hitting someone while
they are asleep does not demonstrate your formidability and bar-
gaining power (see Sell 2011). Revenge stemming from hatred is
predicted to have none of these features.
As indicated in the target article, bargaining power (such as
physical strength in men) is a predictor of anger-based aggression
(Sell et al. 2009), because those with better bargaining power will
have more success deploying that tactic. For anger to fulﬁll its
function, one must confront the target and convince them that
one’s interests are worthy of being weighted more highly.
Hatred, on the other hand, can fulﬁll its function without the
target ever knowing the mental state of the hateful person, and
by taking advantage of temporary ﬂuctuations in bargaining
power. For this reason, when faced with an individual who
holds a low WTR, a person with high bargaining power can reca-
librate the target (and evidence shows they do), whereas a person
with low bargaining power will instead hate the target and look for
subtle opportunities to impose costs or temporary shifts in bar-
gaining power that can be used to weaken or kill the target
(e.g., backstabbing, gossip, sabotage). Consistent with this, there
is evidence that physical strength in men positively correlates
with anger and aggression, but does not predict their tendency
to ruminate or seethe over affronts (Sell et al. 2009).
The relationship between anger and hatred is complex. Anger
can trigger hatred if a person resists recalibration and becomes
the perpetual cost inﬂictor that is strategically better addressed
by hatred. Conversely, a hated individual who raises his WTR
may become less hated because of the beneﬁts he will bestow.
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Finally, both emotions can run in parallel, attempting to recali-
brate the target’s WTR while limiting their ability to impose
costs. Regardless of these complications, anger and hatred
appear designed by separate selection pressures with different
triggering conditions, moderating variables, and behavioral strat-
egies. Revenge reﬂects the operation of both adaptations and
will have to be understood that way.
Revenge and forgiveness in the New South
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Abstract: Insofar as South Africa underwent a rapid transformation from
apartheid to democracy, it may provide a unique laboratory for
investigating aspects of revenge and forgiveness. Here we suggest that
observations and data from South Africa are partially consistent with the
hypotheses generated by MCullough and colleagues. At the same time,
the rich range of revenge and forgiveness phenomena in real-life
settings is likely to require explanatory concepts other than specialized
modules and their computational outputs.
The hypotheses generated in McCullough et al.’s article can be
tested in multiple ways and contexts. Having worked in the inter-
esting context of the new South Africa (Allan et al. 2006; Kaminer
et al. 2001; Stein et al. 2008), we read the target article from the
vantage of whether observations and data about revenge and for-
giveness in this setting might be relevant. Insofar as South Africa
underwent a rapid transformation from an apartheid system
characterized by racial discrimination to a democratic dispensa-
tion characterized by universal human rights, it may provide a
unique laboratory for investigating certain aspects of the psychol-
ogy of revenge and forgiveness. We note McCullough et al.’s
warning that their model is not intended to apply to groups, but
groups are of course comprised of individuals.
A ﬁrst point to note is that in South Africa, with the advent of
the new democratic dispensation in 1994, a decision was made
that instead of retributive justice (i.e., punishment), there would
be reparative justice (as embodied by a “Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission”) (Asmal et al. 1996; Stein 1998). One key
rationale was that it simply wasn’t possible to ensure retributive
justice, given that the institutions responsible for implementing
justice after 1994 had not yet democratized. It is notable that
McCullough et al. posit from basic evolutionary principles
that punishment is less effective when the costs of punishment
are high. This was certainly the case in post-democratic South
Africa.
Nevertheless, there were many who objected to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) over precisely this issue. In
particular, families of those who had been victims of gross
human rights violations were vehemently opposed to the idea
that perpetrators would not be formally prosecuted and pun-
ished. Notably, McCullough et al. provide a model which pre-
dicts that revenge is more likely when a kin group member is
involved. Thus, revenge may be well be sweeter for some than
for others (de Quervain et al. 2004; Stein & Kaminer 2006).
Although the courts are not always seen as active in the South
African setting, in the particular instance of the TRC the judicial
system was clearly active (albeit administering reparative rather
than retributive justice), predicting, per McCullough et al., less
need for retaliatory feelings in the majority of observers (Stein
et al. 2008).
Indeed, a second point is that forgiveness levels appear to be
moderately high in all sectors of the South African population in
the aftermath of the TRC (Stein et al. 2008). This may well be
consistent with McCullough et al.’s model, which predicts that
shared interests, similar values, and many opportunities for
mutually beneﬁcial interactions are good candidates for forgive-
ness. Certainly, despite clear racial heterogeneity in South
Africa, there are many values that are held in common by the
population, including religious values, and despite considerable
geographical separation of races, there are many opportunities
for interaction (e.g. in domestic and commercial settings).
Relationships are in many ways “valuable,” and therefore con-
siderable conciliatory behaviour could perhaps have been
predicted.
Nevertheless, there have been many in South Africa, including
participants in the TRC, with low levels of forgiveness for past
violations (Stein et al. 2008). Again, there are a number of poten-
tial explanatory variables. McCullought et al. note that apology is
important, and the South African data conﬁrm this (Allan et al.
2006). McCullough et al. cite meta-analytic ﬁndings that
women score higher on self-reports of tendencies to forgive,
but the South African data suggest that men are more likely to
forgive in the South African context (Kaminer et al. 2001). It
may be that sex differences in forgiveness pertain to forgiveness
of different kinds of violations; indeed, in the setting of the TRC
women were more likely than men to report violations to family
members (Allan et al. 2006). Speculatively, in the South African
setting, forgiving may have higher beneﬁts for males, who are
perhaps more involved in commercial interactions with one
another than are females. Similarly, in nonhuman primates, it
may be hypothesized that reconciliation after contests is particu-
larly adaptive for males who subsequently need to cooperate in
key ways (de Waal 2000).
A third point we want to make is that even within groups of indi-
viduals with apparently similar interests (from an adaptive per-
spective), there is considerable variation (consider, for example,
Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu’s emphasis on reconciliation
at a time when many of their comrades and colleagues were less
concerned with this issue). Indeed, a comprehensive account of
the full range of revenge and forgiveness in settings such as the
new South Africa would seem to require a model that goes
beyond a purely computational approach that weights costs and
beneﬁts, to also include an account of how values are embodied
in cognitive-affective systems. Thus, for example, a detailed
understanding of the moral metaphors that individuals live by,
and of underlying motivational structures, appears relevant to a
full understanding of the complex range of revenge and forgive-
ness behaviours seen in real-life settings (Boulding 1969;
Johnson 1993).
Along these lines, we would emphasize that our observations
and data from South Africa are tangential to the question of
whether revenge and forgiveness behaviour is mediated by
specially evolved brain “modules.” Although tackling the ques-
tion of whether any specially evolved modules exist is not the
main focus of our commentary, we wish to note that, in our
view, the brain-mind has evolved in a considerably “messier”
way than might be suggested by some views of neat modules
proposed by evolutionary psychology, that evolved cognitive-
affective systems instead have components with indistinct
boundaries and distributed functions, and that behaviour is
best understood to emerge from an interaction between rela-
tively few ancient special-purpose circuits and more recent
general purpose mechanisms (Nesse & Stein 2012; Panksepp
& Panksepp 2000).
In summary, then, based on observations from one country that
arguably conducted a nation-wide social experiment on revenge
and forgiveness, we would conclude that these are partially con-
sistent with the hypotheses generated by McCullough and
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colleagues. At the same time, we note that data were not speciﬁ-
cally collected with this thesis in mind, and therefore do not
provide a very direct test of the hypotheses. The South African
ﬁndings on gender are of particular interest insofar as they
apparently conﬂict with other published ﬁndings, and yet
might be explicable on the basis of particular circumstances in
South Africa, and with the underlying explanation that revenge
and forgiveness involve adaptive mechanisms, and therefore
will be triggered in different ways in different environments.
Finally, we suggest that the rich range of revenge and forgive-
ness phenomena in real-life settings is likely to require explana-
tory concepts other than specialized “modules” and their
computational outputs.
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Abstract: McCullough et al.’s functionalist model of revenge is highly
compatible with the person-centered approach to moral judgment,
which emphasizes the adaptive manner in which social perceivers derive
character information from moral acts. Evidence includes act–person
dissociations in which an act is seen as less immoral than a comparison
act, yet as a clearer indicator of poor moral character.
In the target article, McCullough et al. propose a functionalist
model of revenge in which retaliatory aggression is neither
irrational nor a sign of pathological dysfunction. Rather, such be-
havior is driven by the implicit calculations of a revenge system
that seeks to deter harmful future acts against oneself, kin, and
allies. This revenge system operates in tandem with a forgiveness
system designed to reassess whether a person is worthy of
inclusion in one’s ingroups.
The authors’ analysis of revenge is in harmony with the person-
centered approach to moral judgment (Pizarro & Tannenbaum
2011; Tannenbaum et al. 2011; Uhlmann & Zhu, under review;
Uhlmann et al., under review a; under review b), which empha-
sizes the adaptive manner in which social perceivers derive char-
acter information from moral acts. In the same spirit as
McCullough et al., we argue that what at ﬁrst appear to be
irrational decision-making biases often “make sense” when one
considers the adaptive goals individuals must meet as they navi-
gate their social environments. Unlike McCullough et al., we
emphasize that people often wish to avenge moral transgressions
that not only do not harm them or their kin, but in some cases
cause no material harm at all.
In addition to assessing the permissibility of acts, people use
behaviors to draw inferences about the moral character of the
agents who carry them out. Whereas moral judgments of acts
are comparatively more likely to center on the tangible harm
caused, judgments of persons focus on whether the behavior
signals the presence or absence of positive moral traits
(Tannenbaum et al. 2011; Uhlmann et al., under review a;
under review b). Relatively harmless acts can therefore
provoke outrage when they suggest severe deﬁcits in moral
character.
Some behaviors are more informative than others regarding an
agent’s personal character (Nelson 2005; Nelson et al. 2010;
Reeder & Brewer 1979). Drawing inferences about character
based on such signals is critical to resolving the collective action
problems central to McCullough et al.’s analysis of revenge.
Because moral traits predict whether a person will cooperate
with us or betray us, character-relevant information becomes
extremely valuable when navigating social environments. Even
acts that are not especially harmful can speak strongly to personal
character and therefore prove useful for anticipating more conse-
quential future acts. For the same reason, relatively harmless acts
can elicit a desire to castigate the transgressor and exclude him or
her from social ingroups.
Evidence for the person-centered approach to moral judgment
is provided by act–person dissociations in which an act is seen as
less immoral than a comparison act, yet as a clearer indicator of
negative moral traits. For example, although beating one’s girl-
friend is viewed as more morally blameworthy than beating her
cat, the latter act is seen as indicating a more coldhearted and
sadistic person (Tannenbaum et al. 2011). This might seem like
a bias in moral judgment until one recalls that animal cruelty pre-
dicts antisocial behaviors and an erosion of normal empathic
responses (Becker et al. 2004).
Additional studies demonstrate act-person dissociations in
the context of truly harmless acts. For instance, although the
use of a racial slur (in private, and with no one overhearing)
was seen as a less blameworthy act than physical assault, use
of a slur was perceived as providing more negative information
about the person’s character (Uhlmann et al., under review a).
Consistent with the idea that person-centered judgments
serve the function of determining who to include in one’s
social ingroups, participants were more willing to be friends
with the target who had been physically aggressive than with
the bigot.
Negative gut reactions to harmless-but-disgusting transgres-
sions are frequently cited as a case of moral bias. Indeed, partici-
pants can ﬁnd themselves dumbfounded when asked to justify
why they feel eating a dead dog and having sex with a chicken
carcass are morally wrong (Haidt 2001; Haidt et al. 1993). Part
of the reason for strong intuitive responses to such transgressions
is that they provide more diagnostic information about the per-
sonal character of the agent than do most harm violations. Partici-
pants rated eating a dog to be less immoral than stealing a steak,
yet more informative of poor moral character (Uhlmann & Zhu,
under review).
People are left at a loss to justify their intuitions regarding
harmless-but-disgusting acts because they cannot be defended
using rational criteria such as the degree of harm caused. In
contrast, because of their high informational value regarding
underlying traits, there is a clear rational basis for drawing
strong character inferences from such behaviors. Although par-
ticipants were morally dumbfounded when asked whether sex
with a chicken was an immoral act, they were not at all dumb-
founded when asked whether a person who engaged in sex
with a chicken had negative moral traits (Uhlmann & Zhu,
under review). This lack of dumbfounding regarding person
judgments was driven by the behavior’s high informational
value.
As further evidence that person-centered judgments are not
subjectively irrational (Pizarro & Uhlmann 2005), act–person dis-
sociations are observed under conditions of both joint and separ-
ate evaluation (Tannenbaum et al. 2011; Uhlmann & Zhu, under
review). Joint evaluation, in which social targets are evaluated
side-by side, promotes logical comparisons and attenuates many
decision-making biases (Gaertner & Dovidio 1986; Hsee et al.
1999). This suggests that participants do not view their tendency
to judge actions and persons differently as irrational. If they did,
they would correct their judgments under conditions of joint
evaluation so as not to show any “bias.”
In closing, I agree with McCullough et al. that vengeance
against wrongdoers – like moral outrage more generally – has a
logic to it. Indeed, their functional analysis of revenge converges
with our ﬁndings in highlighting the adaptive, reputation-based,
and person-centered nature of moral cognition. The desire to
exact revenge – and willingness to ultimately forgive – may
often be less about the transgression itself than what it says
about the agent’s moral worth as a person.
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A systems view on revenge and forgiveness
systems
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Abstract: Applying a non-developmental evolutionary metatheory to
understanding the evolution of psychological capacities leads to the
creation of models that mischaracterize developmental processes,
misattribute genes as the source of developmental information, and
ignore the myriad developmental and contextual factors involved in
human decision-making. Using an evolutionary systems perspective, we
argue that revenge and forgiveness cannot be understood apart from the
development of foundational human psychological capacities and the
contexts under which they develop.
The mechanisms underlying the capacities for revenge and for-
giveness have evaded evolutionary analysis despite the direct
and indirect ﬁtness consequences these forms of social inter-
action have. McCullough et al. provide an adaptational account
for the evolution of complementary cognitive systems for
revenge (deterring future harm) and forgiveness (mitigating
possible relationship damage and avoiding the costs associated
with such a loss). We argue, however, that the conceptualization
of such systems is problematic, and the social exchange research
reviewed sheds very little light on the evolution of these pur-
ported cognitive systems. The authors base their model on a fun-
damentally non-developmental evolutionary paradigm that
misconstrues the nature of development, its role in evolution,
and mischaracterizes the psychological capacities they wish to
explain. In the following, we outline how an evolutionary
systems approach problematizes the plausibility of such
systems and their putative selection and speciﬁcation. An evol-
utionary systems perspective requires examining developmental
processes, and in this case would require reviewing the social
cognitive development research that demonstrates the complex
and variable ontogenetic processes that give rise to the highly
developed perspectival understanding required in the social
exchange scenarios they describe.
Despite giving “equal footing” to proximate factors in their
adaptationist account (e.g., appealing to Tinbergen’s four ques-
tions; target article, sect. 2.1) developmental processes are a
priori ignored or mischaracterized by the non-developmental
evolutionary metatheory involved. McCullough et al. claim that
a cost is only revenge if it is “caused by a mechanism designed
to deter cost-impositions or beneﬁt-withholdings in the future”
(sect. 2.2.4, their emphasis). From this evolutionary psychologi-
cal (EP) perspective, decisions to act are “computations.” They
are evolutionary-derived algorithms (instantiated as cognitive
mechanisms) that were selected because they conferred ﬁtness
advantages upon ancestral humans. These algorithms do some
heavy lifting in this model, in that they are able to compute
courses of action for seemingly countless situations and factors
involved.
The question is: To what extent is it useful to consider the
decisions humans make in a social exchange game as the
product of evolved cognitive mechanisms? Aside from the plati-
tude that we are products of natural selection, can we gain any
insight into the speciﬁcations of such a system through
reverse-engineering our decisions to seek revenge or forgive
our transgressors? From the non-developmental population
genetic perspective of the authors, this is possible. That is,
genes that give rise to particular, adaptive phenotypes were
selected for in the past. Because the genotype is taken to be
the source of developmental information, it follows that genes
represent the entirety of the phenotypic outcomes that were
once adaptive and selected to solve recurrent social problems.
Environmental factors, at most, become a trigger for the
initiation of a developmental program, and are thus deemed
“equally important.”
The neo-Darwinian paradigm has been increasingly criticized
for its neglect and mischaracterization of developmental processes
(see e.g., Pigliucci & Müller 2010). Failing to use an evolutionary
systems perspective that fully incorporates developmental
processes into evolutionary theory leads McCullough et al. to
mischaracterize the nature and source of developmental infor-
mation. For example, McCullough et al. do not seriously consider
that the evolutionarily relevant problems they outline not only
occurred in our evolutionary past, but they are still occurring.
The implication is that these problems are re-occurring develop-
mental problems, that are, in part, created anew each generation,
and with which each generation must contend. A speciﬁc geno-
type does not equate to a speciﬁc phenotype (Charney 2012).
Simply stated, genes do not contain the developmental infor-
mation in the way needed to make McCullough et al.’s model
tenable.
From an evolutionary systems perspective, examining a
“revenge system” would include tracing the development of
the capacities underlying such a system. The complexity of the
“system” would constantly change (i.e., develop) over time,
with various factors changing it in sometimes non-obvious
ways. In the particulate, additive, non-developmental stance
popular in EP, the “system” with all its potentialities are develop-
mentally predetermined, a perspective that is contrary to the
probabilistic nature of development (Gottlieb 2007). Further,
selection only selects products of developmental processes. A
selectionist perspective can at best only describe why some abil-
ities persist, not how they appeared, which has little relevance for
understanding the choices people make in a social exchange
situation.
For McCullough et al., “evolved cognitive mechanisms”
underlie decision-making processes. Decisions, however, are
made by people with life histories. Decisions are inﬂuenced by
knowledge and emotional and motivational states; they are a func-
tion, in part, of one’s experience interacting with others within
particular social and cultural norms of conduct based upon
forms of interaction characteristic of biological humans. A devel-
opmental perspective is required to examine the many founda-
tional psychological capacities that lead to the high level of
social understanding of adult humans. This understanding has a
long and complex ontogeny beginning in the ﬁrst year of life
with the capacity for joint attention, the ability to coordinate atten-
tion and activity with oneself and another. Young children develop
a “theory of mind” around age 4 when they are able to understand
false belief (Carpendale & Lewis 2006). Although the consistent
age of false belief understanding has led many to assume that it
is speciﬁed by genetic or biological factors (i.e., Baron-Cohen
1995; Gopnik 1996; Leslie 1987), Boesch (2007) demonstrates
the extreme variability in false belief understanding across cul-
tures, including those that do not pass a standard false belief
test at age 14. Such ﬁndings reiterate the fact that consistent
development takes place in the context of consistently recurring
developmental factors. Little can be said about “evolutionary
mechanisms” when the development of these capacities is not
examined.
A fundamentally non-developmental evolutionary metatheory
is not conducive to understanding the evolution of psychological
capacities. From an evolutionary systems perspective, under-
standing developmental changes over generations is to under-
stand the evolution of a trait or a cognitive system. A
selectionist perspective and its inherently developmentally
uncontexualized mechanisms does little to provide this under-
standing. The existence of revenge across cultures does not
mean it is universal in the sense that it is based on genetic selec-
tion, but results from the common developmental conditions of
our species.
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Abstract: McCullough et al. argue that revenge has a future-oriented
function, that is, to deter future harms by changing other individuals’
incentives toward the self. Recent research has shown that people seek
revenge even when harms are unintentional. This commentary reports
these results and proposes that revenge may also serve to reduce the
immediate psychological pain resulting from unfair treatment.
Two factors play a key role in criminal conviction in the common
law tradition: a harmful consequence (actus reus) and the intent
to harm (mens rea). Intentions at the time of action inﬂuence
moral judgment and the subsequent punishment (Young et al.
2010). Individuals who harm others accidentally and unknow-
ingly receive less punishment than those who harm others inten-
tionally. McCullough et al. propose that revenge functions to
deter future harms by increasing others’ “welfare tradeoff
ratios” (WTRs) toward victims. This theory implies that
revenge should exist only when harms are intentional because
only intentional harms can reveal others’ WTRs. On the other
hand, unintentional harms are not informative about the harm
doer’s true WTR and thus should not invite revenge. However,
punishment of innocent people is not uncommon in real life situ-
ations. Take envy, for example; disliking others’ wealth leads
people to pay to destroy the envied person’s money, even
though the envied person is not responsible for the inequality.
In laboratory studies, evidence suggests that revenge exists
even when harms are unintentional.
Our recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
study investigated the behavioral and neural responses to different
types of fairness (Yu et al., submitted). In our experiment (see
Fig. 1), two participants (strangers) jointly completed a matching
task and then they received the outcomes. If their choices were
matched, they both received some monetary rewards. Otherwise,
they both lost money. However, the exact amounts of money each
player could win or lose in each trial were determined by a com-
puter program. Participants received advantageous (more than
their partner), disadvantageous (less than their partner), or
equal payoffs. Then, they were given the opportunity to alter
their partner’s payoff at their personal costs. It is a one way pun-
ishment, that is, their partners did not have such opportunity to
punish. Every ﬁfty pence increase or decrease in the partner’s
payoff cost participants ten pence.
We found that individuals have strong preferences for fairness
in both disadvantageous and advantageous inequality conditions,
such that they alter others’ payoff toward an equal distribution
at a personal ﬁnancial cost. At the neural level, individuals who
spent more money to increase others’ payoff had stronger activity
in the putamen (the reward region) when they encountered
advantageous inequality (Mobbs et al. 2009). Conversely, those
who spent more money to reduce others’ payoff had stronger
activity in the amygdala (the anger region) in response to disad-
vantageous inequality, suggesting that negative emotions evoke
revenge (Scott et al. 1997). Revenge may reduce the immediate
psychological harms (e.g., envy and anger) by bringing others
down. Our study suggests that accidental harms are enough to
elicit immediate negative emotions which may evoke the desire
for revenge.
Why do people punish those who are not responsible for the
inequality? One possibility is that when an individual is treated
unfairly, the induced negative emotion is quite intense. Like phys-
ical pain, which makes people punch objects, and frustration,
Figure 1 (Yu). Experimental task design and behavioral results. (A) In the payoffs distribution task, participants were required to
choose one image. (B) After the Choose stage, participants were informed whether their choices were matched or not, and hence, both
win or both lose. (C) The outcome for the participants and the outcome for their partners were presented. (D) After the Outcome stage,
participants could alter the partner’s payoff at their personal costs. (E) Participants pressed a third key when they ﬁnished changing. The
ﬁnal payoffs for both players were depicted. (F) The self-reported satisfaction toward outcomes across win and loss trails in advantageous
inequality condition (AI), disadvantageous inequality condition (DI), and fair equal condition (FE). (G) The increased money (total
money spent to increase other’s payoffs) in each condition. (H) Reduced money (total money spent to decrease other’s payoffs) in
each condition.
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which provokes displaced aggression, the social pain resulting
from inequality drives people to revenge. The psychological
urge to reduce immediate pain is ignored in the target article.
From an evolutionary perspective, the sense of unfairness is
vital for an individual’s survival in social situations and thus
revenge may have evolved as an instinctive reaction to unfair treat-
ment. Furthermore, outcomes are easy to evaluate but intentions
are difﬁcult to know. Negative outcomes may be enough to elicit
revenge motives in the initial stage. Whether to take revenge or to
forgive is modulated by attribution of intentions in the latter stage.
Previous research shows that forgiveness requires the effort to
restrain vengeful impulses (DeWall et al. 2007; 2010), suggesting
that revenge is an emotional “hot” system and forgiveness is a
rational “cool” process.
Revenge may ultimately hurt the seeker as much as the victim
(Dreber et al. 2008). Like a proverb states, “Before you embark
on a journey of revenge, dig two graves.” In our study, punishment
reduces both players’ payoffs and participants know that. Even
when revenge seekers know such consequences, for example, for
individuals who commit crime of passion, they still choose to do
so. I argue that revenge is not always future-oriented and may
have evolved for other reasons, such as the fairness instinct. It is
possible that revenge serves to restore the fairness social norm
when individual self-interest has been violated by others. It func-
tions mainly to reduce current emotional harms rather than to
deter future harms. This explains why in many situations people
seek revenge even when it escalates conﬂicts rather than moderates
them, leading to destructive outcomes for everybody involved.
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Abstract: In this response, we address eight issues concerning
our proposal that human minds contain adaptations for
revenge and forgiveness. Speciﬁcally, we discuss (a) the
inferences that are and are not licensed by patterns of
contemporary behavioral data in the context of the
adaptationist approach; (b) the theoretical pitfalls of conﬂating
proximate and ultimate causation; (c) the role of development
in the production of adaptations; (d) the implications of
proposing that the brain’s cognitive systems are fundamentally
computational in nature; (e) our preferred method for
considering the role of individual differences in computational
systems; (f) applications of our proposal to understanding
conﬂicts between groups; (g) the possible implications of our
views for understanding the operation of contemporary
criminal justice systems; and (h) the question of whether
people ever “genuinely” forgive.
R1. Introduction
We are grateful to the many scholars who took the time to
read and consider our target article. Despite their potential
importance to social life, revenge and forgiveness have
been, we think, undertheorized (McCullough 2008), and
it was our hope that through an adaptationist analysis of be-
havior and a computational understanding of cognition we
might help to stimulate the sorts of research projects in the
future that would contribute to a fruitful consilience of the
social, behavioral, and life sciences (E. O. Wilson 1998). As
Konecˇni points out, the scientiﬁc record is full of impor-
tant empirical results that are relevant to our claims,
although inevitably we failed to ﬁnd all of them. We are
thankful for those that commentators such as Konecˇni
have brought to our attention.
The commentators have raised issues of two broad types:
ﬁrst, those that concern the speciﬁc claims about revenge
and forgiveness that emerged from our approach, and,
second, those that concern the meta-theoretical apparatus
we put to work in our analysis. We broke responses down
further into eight substantive themes. In this response we
take the eight themes in turn. In Section R2 we discuss
the inferences that are and are not licensed by patterns
of contemporary behavioral data in the context of the adap-
tationist approach. In Section R3 we describe the theoreti-
cal pitfalls of conﬂating proximate and ultimate causation.
In Section R4 we clarify our stance on the role of develop-
ment in the assembly of adaptations. In Section R5 we lay
out the implications of proposing that the brain’s cognitive
systems are fundamentally computational in nature. In
Section R6 we describe our approach to considering the
role of individual differences in computational systems. In
Section R7 we comment on the possible applications of
our theorizing to conﬂicts between groups. In Section
R8, we explore the possible implications of our views for
understanding the operation of contemporary criminal
justice systems. Finally, in Section R9 we consider the
question of whether people ever genuinely forgive.
R2. What are the entailments of claiming that
cognitive mechanisms for revenge and forgiveness
are adaptations with identiﬁable functions?
Some commentators believe our analysis of revenge and
forgiveness leads to implausible hypotheses about the wide-
spread occurrence of revenge in human societies (Gintis),
that the analysis “sheds very little light on the evolution of
these purported cognitive systems” (Wereha & Racine),
and that adaptations for revenge and forgiveness are unli-
kely to exist at all (Holbrook, Fessler, & Gervais [Hol-
brook et al.]). Barclay is right in pointing out that one
major risk of adaptationist analysis is that readers might
misperceive functional claims as universal claims. The
claim that the revenge system is an adaptation emphatically
does not entail that all instances of revenge (or forgiveness)
will be adaptive (Andrews et al. 2002; West-Eberhard
1992; Williams 1966).
Gintis bases his skepticism of our central claims, which
he calls “implausible,” on (a) evidence from economics
experiments indicating that third parties will, under some
laboratory conditions, pay costs to punish a stranger who
has been stingy or greedy with regard to another stranger;
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(b) educated guesses about ancestral population structure;
and (c) the results of his and his colleagues’ evolutionary
simulations. Gintis’s claims, and the evidence he adduces
in support of them, have recently been addressed exten-
sively elsewhere (e.g., Guala 2012; West et al. 2011), so
we restrict our comments to Gintis’s ﬁrst point, which
bears most strongly on our central claims.
Although the data from economics experiments used to
support the concept of strong reciprocity are interesting
and important (but see sect. 3.1.3 in the target article for
difﬁculties surrounding interpretation), the ﬁnding that
people will sometimes pay costs to punish harmdoers
even when (by experimental constraint) the punishers
cannot beneﬁt economically or reputationally from doing
so does not damage our claim that humans have adap-
tations for punishment that were designed by natural selec-
tion because of their deterrent effects. Zooming out to a
broad conceptual level, adaptationists since Williams
(1966) have hewed to a deﬁnition of an adaptation as “a
characteristic of an organism whose form is the result of
selection in a particular functional context” (West-Eber-
hard 1992, p. 12). A critical entailment of this deﬁnition
is that a trait’s status as an adaptation must be evaluated
from the perspective of the historical selection pressures
that gave rise to the trait’s gene-propagating effect. The
operation of the adaptation within the organism’s contem-
porary ecology (or within a laboratory experiment) might
accurately reﬂect the function that natural selection
designed the adaptation to perform, but to the extent
that the organism’s contemporary ecology (or the labora-
tory experiment) fails to capture key elements of the eco-
logical backdrop against which natural selection gave rise
to the adaptation in question, contemporary results from
both the ﬁeld and from the laboratory can be deeply mis-
leading (Burnham 2003; Hagen & Hammerstein 2006).
Indeed, an adaptation can appear to be “misﬁring,” even
though it is merely executing its proper function in
response to environmental stimuli whose sensory proper-
ties are close enough to approximate the ancestral con-
ditions under which the adaptation was naturally selected
to operate.
Biologists frequently encounter initially puzzling costly
contemporary behaviors. In Colorado, for example,
yellow-bellied marmots have not encountered wolves
since the 1930s, when farmers and ranchers eradicated
them. Nevertheless, when exposed to life-sized two-dimen-
sional images of wolves during ﬁeld experiments, these
marmots immediately suspend their foraging activity to
run and hide – a costly pattern of behavior that is unlike
their responses to equivalent images of extant predators
or control animals (Blumstein et al. 2009). Costly ﬂeeing
in marmots, therefore, can be explained with reference to
beneﬁts that existed in the past but no longer do. The
fact that marmots receive no beneﬁts in the modern
ecology from ﬂeeing from images of wolves does not
make implausible, as Gintis’s argument would have it,
that the mechanisms for ﬂeeing were selected for by
virtue of the ﬁtness beneﬁts those behaviors used to
provide (viz., avoiding predation by wolves) under ancestral
circumstances.
Therefore, for some stimulus-response relationships, it is
more plausible that the adaptation that causes a given be-
havior is ﬁring in response to a stimulus that is outside of
the adaptation’s proper domain (i.e., the range of stimuli
whose biological function it is to process; see Sperber
1994), than it is that the adaptation’s proper domain is
broader than scientists had previously apprehended. To
the extent that in ancestral human environments repeat
interactions were common (Hagen & Hammerstein
2006), cooperation-regulation mechanisms might embody
the ex ante assumption that interactions are likely to be
repeated (Delton et al. 2011) even though some social
interactions might have turned out (ex post) to be one-
shot. And if this were the case, people in modern (e.g., lab-
oratory) environments should be expected to execute beha-
viors that promote cooperation or deter exploitation
(including punishment) even when they are aware (i.e.,
have an explicit representation) that the interaction is
likely to be one-shot. Thus, for some of the same reasons
why misﬁring arguments are better suited to explaining
some aspects of contemporary marmot behavior, we also
think that misﬁring interpretations are better suited than
is Gintis’s account for explaining the existing experimental
results about “strong reciprocity.”
R3. What are the advantages of carefully
distinguishing between ultimate and proximate
levels of causation?
Several commentators seem unconvinced that our model
presented an exhaustive account of the causal forces that
are operative within revenge and forgiveness systems.
Potegal, for example, claims that we fail to give adequate
weight to the “reinforcing value of aggression” as part of
the causal apparatus that makes revenge happen. Other
commentators (e.g., Fatfouta, Jacobs, & Merkl [Fat-
fouta et al.];Dellis & Spurrett; Yu;Ross) have suggested
in one way or another that our analysis gave insufﬁcient
attention to neurological evidence (or the lack of neurologi-
cal evidence) about the systems that might be involved in
the production of revenge and forgiveness.
Some of these misgivings, we think, are traceable to con-
fusion about the differences between ultimate and proxi-
mate causation (Scott-Philips 2008). In the target article,
we took pains to point out in sections 2.1 and 2.2 that expla-
nations for revenge that are based on statements about
proximate causation (e.g., that people enact revenge
because it feels “satisfying”) are inadequate for explaining
the evolution of such mechanisms in the ﬁrst place. Ulti-
mate causal explanations must always be with respect to
the ﬁtness-enhancing (i.e., gene-propagating) effects of
rival designs (Scott-Philips 2008). So, when Ross suggests
that “a key condition for the existence of equilibrium strat-
egy vectors that include revenge and forgiveness” (by which
we take him to mean that the conditions under which
revenge and forgiveness can become evolutionarily stable
strategies; Smith 1982) is the human susceptibility to
shame, we believe that more careful attention should be
paid to the proximate/ultimate distinction: Shame, which
is an emotion, is a proximate causal force (which, one is
free to argue, is put to use by cognitive systems for
revenge and forgiveness) rather than a statement about
the effects of rival designs on gene frequencies (Scott-
Philips 2008). Consequently, shame cannot be invoked to
describe the ultimate casual forces that lead to the assembly
of mechanisms for revenge and forgiveness. A similar con-
ﬂation of ultimate and proximate levels of causation occurs
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when Yu writes that “Revenge is not always future-oriented
and may have evolved for other reasons, such as the fairness
instinct.” Sell’s commentary is an elegant example of how
considering ancestral selection pressures (viz., for up-regu-
lating a harmdoer’s WTR for oneself versus reducing some-
one’s capacity for harming oneself) can yield ﬁne-grained
predictions about the distinct proximate characteristics of
the psychological systems that generate anger versus
hatred.
R4. Does our theorizing ignore the role of
development?
Wereha & Racine take us to task for using a “fundamen-
tally non-developmental evolutionary paradigm,” and
commend as an alternative their own “evolutionary
systems perspective.” Their critique gets its traction,
however, by assigning views to us that we do not endorse,
and by substituting a set of bold but largely empty prop-
ositions about understanding the development of the
adult revenge system. Most ﬂagrantly, they claim that,
“In the particulate, additive, non-developmental stance
popular in EP [evolutionary psychology], the ‘system’
with all its potentialities are developmentally predeter-
mined, a perspective that is contrary to the probabilistic
nature of development.” Many researchers in evolutionary
psychology, however – including those whose views we
would associate with our own – take development very
seriously indeed (Belsky et al. 1991; Ellis 2004; Ellis &
Bjorklund 2005; Frankenhuis & Del Giudice 2012; Geary
& Bjorklund 2000), and have taken pains to distance them-
selves from the particulate, additive, adevelopmental cari-
cature that Wereha & Racine set up as representative of
evolutionary psychology’s stance on development (Tooby
et al. 2003). Tooby et al. (2003) pointed out that the idea
that development is a complex interaction between genes
and environment is the starting point for evolutionary
psychologists.
Wereha & Racine’s critique is further undermined by a
category error. Seeking to contrast our view that “‘evolved
cognitive mechanisms underlie decision making processes”
(their phrasing), they write that “Decisions, however, are
made by people with life histories.” Cognitive mechanisms
at any given moment both cause decisions and have devel-
oped over time, so setting the two in opposition to each
other is illogical. Further, our colleagues in evolutionary
psychology who study development draw heavily from life
history theory (Ellis 2004), a feature that distinguishes
their approach from other developmental approaches,
thereby hollowing out this critique. Although it is true we
did not focus on development in the target article, we do
not think that the revenge system magically appears in
adult form; indeed, in section 3.3.2, we discussed the role
that people’s life histories can play in altering the operation
of mechanisms for revenge (see also Barclay). We take for
granted that the unique elements of people’s life histories
likewise inﬂuence the operation of mechanisms for forgive-
ness. Similarly, the idea that we “do not seriously consider”
that people still face the problem of deterrence is a striking
misrepresentation of our work. We discuss examples from
the lab and the ﬁeld in which people are faced with the cat-
egory of problem that we believe selected the behavior,
which is that aggression now predicts aggression later.
Finally, we note that “systems” theories have been criti-
cized for yielding only predictions that are vague at best.
Indeed, Tooby et al. (2003) suggested that “developmental
systems theory makes no predictions.” Vindicating this bold
assertion, the closestWereha & Racine come to a positive
statement about what their view predicts is the claim that
the “complexity of the ‘system’ would constantly change
(i.e. develop) over time, with various factors changing it
in sometimes non-obvious ways.” It is difﬁcult to imagine
what pattern of empirical data might put such a claim in
jeopardy.
Generally, we emphatically agree that explaining and
understanding the development of revenge systems is an
important priority. Indeed, work such as Sell et al.’s
(2009) research on anger points to a potentially proﬁtable
direction: identifying factors – in Sell et al.’s case, variation
in size and attractiveness – that might be expected to sys-
tematically inﬂuence developmental outcomes. Hypoth-
eses about the privileged roles of ecological factors such
as local life expectancies, frequencies of within-group inter-
personal violence and intergroup warfare, the strength of
fraternal interest groups, and the harshness of one’s
family environment during early childhood likewise merit
exploration in future developmental work on revenge and
forgiveness.
R5. What does it mean to refer to systems for
revenge and forgiveness as computational? What
does it mean to refer to them as systems?
Several commentators express reservations about our claim
that the mechanisms underlying revenge and forgiveness
are computational systems. More speciﬁcally, some argue
that it is important to consider that these systems might
not be “rational” (O’Connor & Adams) as opposed to
emotional (Aureli & Schaffner; Leiser & Joskowicz-
Jabloner), and that our explanation was either, on the
one hand, unnecessarily complex (Aureli & Schaffner) or,
on the other, insufﬁciently so (Stein, van Honk, & Ellis
[Stein et al.]).
First, we wish to clarify that we were not trying to be ten-
dentious in making a computational claim. Following con-
vention in the cognitive sciences (e.g., Carruthers 2006;
Pinker 1999), we take computation to be the information-
processing description of what the brain’s functions
entail. Computational mechanisms take as inputs select
types of information (including possibly information from
other computational systems), represent that information
in some sort of physical format, perform operations on
those representations, and pass the outputs of those oper-
ations to other neural or somatic systems for further pro-
cessing or action production. So, in our view, systems for
revenge and forgiveness are computational because their
function is to represent and process particular types of
information – speciﬁcally, information that would have led
them to cause good (i.e., ﬁtness-raising) decisions in the
domains of the adaptive problems for which they were
naturally selected (i.e., deterring future harms and updat-
ing aggressors's intrinsic WTRs for the self peaceably).
We hope it goes without saying that we take for granted
that natural selection is the only cause of complex func-
tional design in biology – computational design included.
Neural systems can only be called computational to the
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extent that they physically represent states of the world
with a non-zero degree of ﬁdelity; thus, to the extent that
computational systems are beset by mutations or otherwise
inﬂuenced by other non-adaptive causal process, the effect
of these non-adaptive causal processes will generally be to
reduce the ﬁdelity with which the systems can represent
true states of affairs. Consequently, their computational
powers will be reduced. For this reason, the concepts of
adaptation and computation tend to go hand in hand. To
the extent revenge and forgiveness systems exist, we
assume that it is ﬁtting to conceptualize them as compu-
tational systems, and that “good computation” within
their respective domains is shorthand for computations
that ancestrally would have provided reasonable tradeoffs
between the beneﬁts of deterrence to be gained by imposing
a retaliatory harm on the harmdoer and the relationship-
mediated beneﬁts to be gained by signaling one’s willingness
to withhold revenge and return to mutually beneﬁcial relat-
ing, conditional on better treatment from the harmdoer in
the future (Burnette et al. 2012).
Referring to revenge and forgiveness systems as compu-
tational systems explicitly is useful, we think, because it
keeps one mindful of the need for clear information-pro-
cessing speciﬁcations when investigating how these
systems might perform their tasks. On the basis of compu-
tational reasoning, for example, Burnette et al. (2012) made
ﬁve novel predictions about the cognition of individuals
who are actively making decisions about whether to
forgive or avenge a recent harm:
(a) those individuals should be willing to pay a relatively large
cost to obtain information that is relevant to assessing
relationship value and exploitation risk (in comparison to the
prices they would pay for other types of social information
about the harmdoer), (b) such information should gain privi-
leged access to attention and working memory and should
be relatively resistant to interference from competing infor-
mation, (c) such information should be automatically
scanned to determine whether it is the result of deception
on the part of the exploitive individual, (d) memories about
the exploitive individual that are retrieved from episodic
memory should tend to be (on average) valid for evaluating
those individuals’ relationship value and exploitation risk,
and (e) memories about exploitive individuals’ past behavior
toward the self should be given more weight in decision
making than will cues about their behavior toward other indi-
viduals. (pp. 353–54).
These predictions resulted from applying computational
thinking to how a well-designed forgiveness system might
operate, as we tried to do in the target article.
The emotions such as those alluded to by the commen-
tators as potential alternatives to the computational steps
that might be involved in motivating revenge and forgive-
ness (e.g., anger), by our reckoning, are also computational
in nature (see, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides 2008). Indeed, we
are unsure what else the systems that produce emotions
might be, though admittedly emotions seem special
because they are associated with complex conscious experi-
ences in a way that non-emotional cognitive processes (e.g.,
vision) are not. The question is not whether anger plays a
role in the production of revenge (it certainly seems like
it does – perhaps along with hatred, as Sell perceptively
proposes), but, rather, what the computational processes
are that make anger happen, and how those subroutines
lead to outputs that can then be put to use in the
production of revenge. In the target article, we intention-
ally refrained from implicating anger and similar emotions
as causal elements in the information processing stream
that leads motivation for revenge and forgiveness because
our goal was to articulate the computations these systems
must perform, but this was not a move on our part that
was designed to exclude emotions in any sense. So, we
ﬁnd little reason to quarrel with Aureli & Schaffner’s sug-
gestion that “emotional mediation” is important for revenge
and forgiveness: The computations involved in the pro-
duction of revenge and forgiveness no doubt involve
emotions; emotions are, from our point of view, fundamen-
tally computational in nature, too.
Further, our claim was not that the computational
systems we propose are “rational” as economists use the
term. “Anger” might be well designed to deter, as we
have proposed, yet give rise to “irrational” behavior,
such as (vengeful) rejections of low offers in the Ulti-
matum Game. According to this view, emotional systems
execute their evolved function in a way that respects
ancestral computations of costs and beneﬁts, but far
from the way envisioned by standard bloodless economic
analysis (Frank 1988). So, (emotional) deterrence
systems need not be “deliberative,” and we reject as
ill-formed the persistent “tension between affect and
deliberation” to which O’Connor & Adams allude
(Tooby & Cosmides 2008).
As for the complexity required for such systems, we did
not intend to take a strong stand on this, though would
resist the ﬂavor of Aureli & Schaffner’s remarks that
emotional systems are necessarily simpler than non-
emotional systems. In our view, emotional systems
embody potentially intricate complex computations
(Tooby & Cosmides 2008), and we look forward to work
from people from differing perspectives helping to shed
light on the intricacies of the involved computations. For
example, Johnson-Freyd & Freyd point out that one
way to engineer “acceptance” is to engineer the systems
to ignore – or at least appear to ignore – intentional
harms. We agree that ignorance can have strategic advan-
tages (Kurzban 2010b; Schelling 1960), and we are sym-
pathetic to the view that one means of accepting an
offense, in terms of the outcome for the relationship, is
to ignore or pretend to ignore an offense.
Holbrook et al. are not sanguine about the claim that
human brains contain computational systems whose func-
tion is to deter future harms. Comparative data illustrate
that nonhuman animals from multiple taxa impose retalia-
tory harms on other organisms that have previously
harmed them, and that by doing so, the retaliators deter
the recipients of their retaliatory behaviors from harming
them again in the future (e.g., Aureli et al. 1992;
A. Bshary & Bshary 2010; R. Bshary & Grutter 2005;
Hoover & Robinson 2007; Jensen et al. 2007). Such data
make the parallel claim for humans plausible.
Instead of revenge mechanisms designed for deterrence,
Holbrook et al. propose as an alternative hypothesis that
the deterrence function we have in mind is more parsimo-
niously handled by anger along with a variety of domain-
general systems (e.g., norm acquisition, future forecasting,
and perspective taking) and “systems related to other
motivations, such as reputation management.” However,
we would argue that their proposal that revenge is sub-
served by “evolved capacities to categorize events, assume
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others’ perspectives, forecast the future, and weigh costs
against beneﬁts” lacks substantial theoretical or predictive
force because it constitutes a far too general gloss of a com-
putational system. The capacities that Holbrook et al. catalo-
gue are all, to be sure, important in executing a deterrence
function, but the organism that is effective at deterring
others from imposing harms upon it in the future must be
motivated – by, for instance, the experience of anger – to
take appropriate adaptive action out of all the possible
actions that one might take. Categorizing events and so on
is also insufﬁcient; particular events (intentional harm)
need to be met with appropriate behavior (e.g., return
harm) to bring about adaptive outcomes. The suggestion
that people choose how to react to a situation through cate-
gorizing it and forecasting the future allows no predictive
mapping between situation and behavior, specifying only
the sorts of mechanisms that are recruited as opposed to
what strategies those mechanisms ought to implement.
To put it another way, the claim that there is no deter-
rence system per se implies that to the extent that
people’s propensity to harm in response to harm does
deter, this comes about as an incidental side-effect of the
action of systems designed for some other (perhaps more
general) function. What function might anger have, such
that it is not designed to deter but happens, as a lucky
side-effect, to deter? The answer to this cannot be “repu-
tation management” without a more explicit and speciﬁc
account of precisely how one ought to manage one’s repu-
tation. Why not cultivate a reputation to be unmoved, or
even happy, when one is harmed? There is an arbitrarily
large vocabulary of reputations one might cultivate; one
cannot cultivate a “good” reputation unless one speciﬁes
the problem that having a reputation is supposed to
solve. Our posited deterrence function explains why
people experience anger rather than joy at being harmed;
a “reputation management” function, in itself, does not
(see Tooby & Cosmides 1992, pp. 109–13; 2008).
So, even if it is the case that the devices that are wired
together to generate revenge within human brains are
also used for other functions (as Holbrook et al. posit),
then an explanation is required for how these devices
came to be wired together in just the sort of bricolage, to
use their favored term, that causes that bricolage to
create retaliatory behavior that returns ﬁtness-enhancing
deterrence beneﬁts to its bearer. Neural wiring is expensive
and needs an explanation in terms of natural selection every
bit as much as do the structures that get wired together
(Anderson 2010; Cherniak et al. 2004).
Finally, we respectfully disagree with Holbrook et al.’s
claim that we have reiﬁed a folk category, a claim which
seems to rely wholly on their observation that “[t]here are
many kinds of deterrence that do not stem from the
anger-hatred nexus.” In fact, we never claimed that
revenge was the only system that deters, and their
example of swatting a begging dog to deter future
begging shows only that some deterrence is not revenge.
The poisons of poison frogs and the thorns of roses are
also deterrence mechanisms, for instance. Therefore, we
of course agree that there are other systems beyond the
ones we posit that can be deployed for deterring predators
from attacking or, perhaps, training domesticated animals.
More generally, we are comfortable with the notion that
the revenge system, as a whole, makes use of subsystems
such as the ones that Holbrook et al. identify.
Dellis & Spurrett have a different problem with our
speciﬁcation of the systems involved in revenge and for-
giveness: They suggest that there is no reason to postulate
two separate systems when one “reciprocity” system will do,
suggesting that the key dispositive evidence would be a dis-
sociation due to, for instance, “local brain damage” or
“genetic intervention.” To clarify our position, we believe
that evidence for a putative function can be aided by
these empirical patterns, though behavioral evidence of
special design is similarly of value (Andrews et al. 2002;
West-Eberhard 1992; Williams 1966). We similarly
believe mechanisms ought to be (and generally are) individ-
uated by virtue of their function (Barrett & Kurzban 2006).
Therefore, we think that it will continue to be useful, in
guiding empirical research, to distinguish the function of
deterring others from harming oneself, from the function
of encouraging others to deliver beneﬁts to oneself.
In short, in broad strokes, we are very pleased to agree
with Aureli & Schaffner, as well as with Leiser & Josko-
witz-Jabloner, O’Connor & Adams, and Holbrook
et al. that emotions do important jobs in the production
of revenge and forgiveness; but our view is that emotions
are computational entities, and if they are to be deeply
understood, the function of the computations they
execute should be made explicit in order to make good pre-
dictions about the nature and details of these computations.
R6. Did we neglect important individual
differences?
Several commentators, including Potegal, Yu, Fatfouta
et al., Balliet & Pronk, Karremans & van der Wal,
Konrath & Cheung, and Roberts & Murray, feel that
we gave inadequate attention to important individual
differences. Karremans & van der Wal, for instance, call
self-control one of the “basic processes that lead to forgive-
ness,” and worry that its neglect might limit our model’s
ability to explain “how revenge and forgiveness actually
occur.” Many individual differences are related to variation
in people’s propensities to forgive and to seek revenge,
including empathy and narcissism, as Konrath & Cheung
point out, as well as agreeableness (or social concern; see
Balliet & Pronk), conscientiousness, self-esteem, and religi-
osity (Balliet 2010; Fehr et al. 2010; Hoyt et al. 2005;
McCullough 2001; McCullough &Hoyt 2002; McCullough
& Worthington 1999; McCullough et al. 2001; Riek &
Mania 2012). We are not overly concerned about our
model’s failure to specify all individual differences that
are associated with forgiveness and revenge. Nevertheless,
we do look forward to more work in this area by people with
expertise in individual differences – perhaps explicitly
incorporating some of the common theoretical tools that
evolutionary biologists use to make sense of individual
differences (Buss 2009; Nettle 2006; 2009; Tooby & Cos-
mides 1990a).
Our interest in writing the target article was to outline
the set of computations that function to deter (the proprie-
tary computations of the revenge system) and to select
behaviors that inhibit the revenge system and signal a will-
ingness to re-establish positive relations, contingent on
improved behavior from the harmdoer (the proprietary
computations of the forgiveness system). We grant that
the inputs to and outputs from the proposed revenge
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system and forgiveness system can be modiﬁed by other
systems. However, the mechanisms that act on those
inputs before they enter the revenge or forgiveness
system, and the mechanisms that act on them after they
have left the system for further processing, are not necess-
arily “basic” (though no less interesting as a consequence).
Narcissism, which Konrath & Cheung encourage us to
consider, for instance, might indeed inﬂuence one’s prone-
ness to respond to harms with retaliation rather than for-
giveness (Riek & Mania 2011), but this does not make
narcissism an individual difference that must be incorpor-
ated into the computational theory per se. (It also does
not make narcissism a “bias”: We see little reason to
discard the hypothesis that narcissistic people simply
believe that they are entitled to better treatment from
everybody [i.e., expect others to hold high WTRs for
them] because narcissistically entitled people, it appears,
really are both physically stronger [Sell et al. 2009] and
better looking [Holtzman & Strube 2010; Sell et al.
2009]). As long as narcissism’s associations with revenge
and/or forgiveness are due to its inﬂuence on compu-
tational events taking place outside of the revenge or for-
giveness systems, it doesn’t necessarily require
speciﬁcation within the computational architecture itself.
Barclay also helpfully describes how individual differences
in people’s perceptions of others’ actions will change the
information that computational systems for revenge and
forgiveness end up processing, consequently changing
their behavioral outputs.
Another individual difference that emerges repeatedly in
the commentaries is “self-control” or “executive control”
(e.g., Yu; Fatfouta et al.; Balliet & Pronk; and Karre-
mans & van der Wal). Impulsivity (which is often pejora-
tively called “low self-control” or “poor self-control”) might
be caused in part by mechanisms whose function is to
motivate organisms to exploit local opportunities (i.e., to
capture resources, or to avert bad outcomes) whose
payoffs can be realized on short time horizons or acceptably
high probabilities of attainment (Daly & Wilson 2005). In
other words, humans might discount the value of rewards
by the time required to wait for them or by the certainty
with which they will come to fruition when that wait time
has ended (Ballard & Knutson 2009). If the deterrence
beneﬁts of revenge can be realized sooner, or with
greater certainty, than the relationship-restoration beneﬁts
of forgiveness, then natural selection might lead to the evol-
ution of a psychology that, ceteris paribus, produces stron-
ger motivation to execute revenge than to execute
forgiveness.
In an alternative speciﬁcation, one might propose that
mechanisms for revenge (as is the case with, say, mechan-
isms that “like” ice cream) themselves have lower discount
rates than do mechanisms for forgiveness (as would be the
case with mechanisms that “like” to go on diets). After all,
there are good reasons to think that a propensity for
action now, or for taking a sure bet over a more speculative
one, will result, effectively, in the inhibition of mechanisms
that are designed to motivate for restoring relationship-
bearing beneﬁts: Generally, reaping the ﬁtness advantages
of reciprocal cooperation, for example, seems to require
that the beneﬁts, which are realized only over a relatively
long temporal horizon, not be discounted too steeply
(Stevens et al. 2005). Additionally, individual differences
in temporal discount rates (i.e., the rates at which people
downgrade the subjective value of future rewards as a func-
tion of the time until their receipt) are negatively associated
with cooperation during the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
and similar social dilemmas (Curry et al. 2008; Yi et al.
2007).
A plausible hypothesis, then, about the associations of
individual differences in “self-control” with revenge and
forgiveness, is that dispositionally impulsive people are
more vengeful and less forgiving not because, as Karre-
mans & van der Wal suggest, their “executive control
resources are…depleted” (a view that is, we acknowledge,
highly inﬂuential in social psychology, but theoretically and
perhaps also empirically problematic; Kurzban 2010a;
Molden et al., in press; Navon 1984), but, rather because
humans have cognitive mechanisms that weight the value
of particular courses of action by the probability that the
payoffs associated with those courses of action will be rea-
lized (see also Barclay, who describes how misperceptions
of the costs and beneﬁts associated with revenge and for-
giveness can lead to individual differences in revenge and
forgiveness broadly). When these valuation-assigning
mechanisms estimate that one’s time horizon is short,
they may motivate courses of action (viz., revenge) whose
payoffs (viz., direct or indirect deterrence) can be realized
over shorter time horizons (McCullough et al. 2012).
Such a hypothesis ﬁnds precedent in work suggesting
that people from homes in which nurturance, discipline,
and parental care were inconsistent, or from neighbor-
hoods in which violence and economic disadvantage were
high, engage in more impulsive and risky behavior as
young adults (Griskevicius et al. 2011; Hill et al. 2008).
By extension, some of the ecological factors that we dis-
cussed in section 3.3.2 of the target article could inﬂuence
people’s propensity for revenge because those factors
might ancestrally have been correlated with a shorter
average lifespan, thereby creating a selection pressure for
psychological mechanisms that can use those cues as
inputs to regulate impulsive decision-making.
There is an interesting developmental angle here, which
might please Wereha & Racine: The impulsive behavior
associated with adolescence and young adulthood is often
viewed pejoratively, as if there were something wrong
with the adolescent brain that causes it to make dysfunc-
tionally impulsive choices (Gullo & Dawe 2008; Hill &
Chow 2006). However, it is important to bear in mind
that every single one of our hominid ancestors successfully
negotiated the challenges of adolescence. Thus, it is highly
improbable that adolescent impulsivity is caused by some-
thing gone wrong in the brains of adolescents, as such frail-
ties would have been subjected to millions of years of
negative selection before they could have become part of
the species-typical brain design (Daly & Wilson 2005).
Accordingly, we assume that youthful impulsivity is
caused by mechanisms that “know,” thanks to the operation
of natural selection, that the only way to improve ﬁtness
when one has not yet reproduced is to increase one’s repro-
ductive prospects –which, for adolescents, ancestrally
came largely from inter-sex competition (i.e., ﬁghting and
displays of mate value) and efforts to manipulate oppo-
site-sex choice by demonstrating one’s possession of desir-
able mate characteristics – that is, by showing off (Geary
2010). In this light, perhaps it is no surprise that the
modal homicide among non-relatives is perpetrated by a
young, unmarried male against another young, unmarried
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male during an “escalated showing-off dispute” or as “reta-
liation for previous verbal or physical abuse” (Wilson &
Daly 1985).
R7. Is our theorizing applicable to revenge and
forgiveness between groups?
Do the deterrence model of revenge, and the “social-
beneﬁt capture” model of forgiveness, apply to groups as
well as to individuals? Certainly Beckerman’s as well as
Stein et al.’s remarks along these lines are intriguing,
and the presence of revenge in diverse societies during
the course of human history and cross-culturally represents
a set of phenomena well worth pursuing.
Still, as Pietraszewski suggests, the strategic dynamics
get considerably more complex when we move from con-
sidering only dyadic interactions to multiple agents, with
the case of even just three already introducing considerable
nuance and texture. It is for this reason that we worry that
the leap from individuals to groups, as intimated by Crisp
& Meleady, might not be completely straightforward.
Speciﬁcally,Crisp &Meleady contend that “systems for
regulating intra- and intergroup behavior should be inti-
mately linked because they involve precisely the same com-
putational requirements.” However, we would be cautious
about such a claim. In particular, moving from dyads to
groups raises several additional issues. First, even if a
third party represents himself or herself as belonging to
the same “group” as a person who was harmed, the third
party still must compute the extent to which it is worth
the costs of taking revenge to deter subsequent harms
that might later be directed toward the third party as a con-
sequence of the shared group membership with the victim.
Just to take one of many possible complications this raises,
the third party must infer whether the harm to his or her
fellow group member was (a) because of their group mem-
bership, in which case revenge might be worth the cost
because the third party could be the next victim, or (b)
due to some other cause, in which case taking revenge on
behalf of one’s group member may be less proﬁtable.
This raises the further complication Crisp & Meleady
point to, the usual issue of free riding. It might be that I
indeed would beneﬁt from taking revenge when a
member of my group is harmed, but I would be better
off still (if no additional beneﬁt from being a punisher
can be expected) if someone else from my group bore
the costs of revenge rather than bearing them myself.
These factors imply that the computations involved in
revenge in group contexts might be different from those
in the more simply dyadic case. We note, in this regard,
that the literature cited by Crisp & Meleady showing pun-
ishment in Public Goods games has a somewhat ambiguous
interpretation, for the reasons discussed in section 3.1.3.
As Pietraszewski points out, computational require-
ments increase substantially in complexity as we move
even the single step from dyads to triads, and, as he indi-
cates, the proximate systems are indeed likely to be “inter-
estingly different.” Because humans can, unlike most other
species, form relatively long-lasting, non-kin based alli-
ances, coordinating activities in the service of cooperative,
potentially antagonistic activities (Harcourt & de Waal
1992; Kurzban et al. 2001; Tiger 1969), we face strategic
complications surrounding building and maintaining
alliances (DeScioli & Kurzban 2009a; 2009b; 2012),
which includes keeping track of where one stands in
others’ alliance hierarchies (DeScioli et al. 2011b), an
important factor in being able to predict others’ actions in
the kind of triadic conﬂicts Pietraszewski has in mind.
Indeed, the problem is even worse than that because
humans do not always take the side of close allies when con-
ﬂicts emerge, instead using the moral value of the acts of
those involved in the conﬂict to choose sides (DeScioli
2008; DeScioli et al. 2011a; Kurzban et al. 2012). So,
although we agree with Uhlmann that often people
desire that those who violate a social norm should be pun-
ished even if the target or the target’s allies were not
harmed (Kurzban et al. 2007), we believe – and suspect
that Pahlavan would agree – that it will be useful to dis-
tinguish revenge from moralistic aggression, which we
believe evolved for a different function (Szymanska 2011).
We are similarly skeptical of Uhlmann’s suggestion that
people’s reactions to harmless moral violations are designed
around inferences about character (DeScioli et al. 2012;
Gray et al., in press) –why the accompanying desire for
punishment as opposed to mere avoidance, if the goal is
simply character evaluation? – but we agree that this
remains an open and interesting question (DeScioli &
Kurzban 2009a).
For these reasons, we are optimistic that the overall
approach we suggest here might be fruitfully applied to
groups, but we continue to believe that additional theoreti-
cal development will be needed to bridge the gap from
dyad to collective.
R8. What are the implications for criminal justice
and restorative justice?
We appreciate Roberts & Murray’s, and Petersen’s sug-
gestions that our ideas about revenge might be productively
applied to understanding how humans make decisions in
the context of contemporary criminal justice systems.
Roberts & Murray note that when people empathize with
victims (e.g., when the costs to the victim are high), they
are more likely to “view the costs of the crime in a personal
manner,” leading to an increase in their motivation to retali-
ate on behalf of victims via their decisions about guilt versus
innocence or about punishment severity. We appreciate
this point, and Petersen shows that even more subtle pre-
dictions are possible. In particular, he notes that third
parties will inevitably disagree about how much punish-
ment versus restorative action a speciﬁc offender should
receive because social value is a dyadic phenomenon. As
Petersen writes, “different selves will compute the social
value of the same target differently, and a single self will
compute the social value of different targets differently.”
Consequently, disagreement among jurors or other third
parties regarding the sanctions that should be delivered
to a criminal (as a function, say, of racial or ethnic similarity,
or other cues of social value), particularly in information-
sparse decision-making contexts where the ancestrally
valid cues for making such determinations are generally
unavailable, is not only unsurprising, but probably also
inevitable. The applications of this insight, both for
research and policy, are considerable.
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R9. Do people ever genuinely forgive?
Finally,McCoy & Shackelford raise doubts as to whether
people ever “genuinely” forgive. We actually agree with
their analysis suggesting that systems for regulating behav-
ior with respect to others are unlikely to be designed to
discard entirely past information about harms; indeed,
past information should be used in some more or less Baye-
sian fashion to update expectations. Our proposal regarding
forgiveness was not meant to imply that the past behavior
did not inﬂuence subsequent behavior in any way. In fact,
we take for granted that a “genuine forgiver” will also be
“prepared to exact revenge” if a future harm occurs in
the same way that McCoy & Shackelford envision their
so-called “feigned forgiver” would be. Our model does
not imply that someone who forgives at time one necess-
arily will permanently forego revenge in the future.
Moreover, we note, after Petersen et al. (2010) that forgive-
ness-based strategies for addressing exploitation are dicey
propositions because failures to impose retaliatory harms
can easily be confused for weakness or failures of nerve,
inviting further exploitation from one’s harmdoer.
Still, we doubt that all forgiveness signals are disingenu-
ous (i.e., serving only to lull others into complacency) for
two principal reasons. First, if all such signals were false,
then they would be ignored, for the usual reasons associ-
ated with the evolution of signaling systems (Dawkins &
Krebs 1978). Second, we believe that harms occur within
the context of relationships that are, with some probability,
likely to produce positive sum outcomes over time, which
means that reconciliation along the lines we propose
carries a higher expected value in some contexts than exact-
ing revenge would. We think that forgiveness might serve
to put relationships (back) on a positive sum footing while
still leaving open the possibility of revenge, should further
harms occur.
R10. Conclusion
Once again, we wish to thank the many commentators who
responded so thoughtfully to our target article. We see sub-
stantial (though hardly unanimous) agreement among our
colleagues about the basic framework we propose – speciﬁ-
cally, that revenge is a deterrence system and forgiveness is
a system designed to preserve valuable relationships.
This is not, of course, to minimize the work still left to be
done. Empirical research that carefully evaluates the com-
putational systems responsible for generating revenge and
forgiveness would be most welcome, as would continuing
work on the development of these systems over the life
course and the interaction of individual (e.g., sex, personal-
ity, genetic), cultural, and ecological differences with the
computational systems we have sketched here (McCul-
lough 2008). In addition, as imaging technology becomes
more powerful and theorizing about the interface of cogni-
tive science and neuroscience becomes more sophisticated,
cognitive neuroscientists will increasingly be in a position to
shed light on the neural bases of the computational systems
we have presented here. Finally, we look forward to the
possibility that the ideas we have presented might help to
build bridges to the work of our colleagues in biology
who study the evolution and operation of homologous be-
havioral systems in nonhuman species.
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